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Editorial
The European Commission’s Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs regularly
monitors economic developments in all Member States as part of its general duties. Out of this
work, occasionally a more in-depth analysis of an individual country is published. The study on
Germany presented here takes the form of a Working Paper. This means that it does not reflect
the official position of the European Commission. Rather it mirrors exclusively the views of DG
ECFIN, and should be interpreted as a contribution to the ongoing academic and political
discussion in Germany and Europe about how the economic growth potential could be
increased.
The study is subdivided into three chapter. A first chapter presents stylised facts about growth in
the German economy. This chapter contains two sections. One on Germany’s business cycles in
the 1990s was written by H. Jansen. P. Weiss contributed the section on longer-term trends. The
study does not contain a separate section on eastern Germany, because the problem of re-
unification is pervasive throughout the study. However, partial aspects are presented in separate
boxes. Two of them, one on the economic performance of the New Länder and one on economic
policies in the New Länder were written by M. Hallet; a box on the construction sector was
contributed by S. Webers.
The chapter on the macro-economic policy mix also contains two sections. Monetary policy was
analysed by O. Dieckmann, public finances by U. Jochheim. A final chapter analyses structural
factors impacting on output growth. The first section on competitiveness, trade and FDI was co-
authored by O. Dieckmann and H. Jansen. B. Döhring contributed a section on the German
labour market. H. Jansen provided the brief section on product markets.
The overall supervision of the study lay with P. Mills and P. Weiss who also wrote the
executive summary. They are grateful to H. Jansen for editorial assistance and to K. Gradinger
and C. Hallberg for technical assistance. Special thanks are also owed to W. Roeger for various
simulations with the QUEST II model.iv
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Economic growth in Germany has been lacklustre since the mid-1990s …
Since the mid-1990s, output growth in Germany has been lacklustre: between 1995 and 2001
growth averaged 1.6% per year. This is almost 1 percentage point below that of its partner
countries in the EMU/EU area, even if the faster growing cohesion countries (i.e. Spain,
Ireland, Portugal and Greece) are excluded from the comparison. The only year where this
gap was notably smaller was 2000 when an unprecedented export boom propelled output
expansion close to the European average. But the growth momentum faltered again in 2001 as
the international economy slowed. With the German economy relapsing into slow motion the
growth gap re-emerged and there are little signs that this would change in 2002.
… and the economy has proven highly vulnerable to external shocks.
Subdued economic activity has been accompanied by a strong volatility of output growth. The
most recent downturn in 2001-02 completes already the third full cycle since the recession of
1993. For each of these three cycles the downward movement was triggered by an
international crises, in particular the Mexican crisis in 1994, the Asian crisis in 1997/98 and
the oil price hike in 1999/2000. Although Germany’s European partners were also adversely
affected by these shocks to the world economy, output growth of these economies proved
much more resilient. Evidently, compared to its European partners in Germany these adverse
shocks were propagated much more directly and unmitigated.
This is due partly to long-lasting effects of re-unification, …
Slow growth of domestic demand, essentially of private consumption and construction
investment, is the key factor behind the weakness of GDP growth in Germany. On the supply
side, this weakness is reflected by a very low contribution from employment to output
growth. Long-lasting effects of re-unification seem to play a pivotal role in the twin
phenomenon of sluggish domestic demand and anaemic job growth. Indeed, re-unification
brought together one of the most advanced economic areas of the world with an area of low
productivity, state-protected companies, artificial exchange rates and an almost obsolete
capital stock. The clash this implied for East German production was enhanced by a 1:1
conversion rate of the East German mark into the DEM, while the exchange rate applicable
for East German exports had been at 1 to 4.3. In addition, in the initial years eastern wages
rose far beyond productivity gains. This was due partly to the specific wage bargaining
situation, where labour unions and employers’ associations from the West oversaw the
negotiations in the New Länder, but also to political reasons such as equality consideration
and the attempt to prevent a massive outward migration. The consequence was a near collapse
of those sectors of the economy that were exposed to West-German and international
competition, particularly the manufacturing sector, with a dramatic labour shake-out and
skyrocketing unemployment as a result.
… with the construction sector in the East particularly affected, …
In spite of this, in the initial years after re-unification output growth in the New Länder was
higher than in the West. In part this is explained by a catching-up effect following the drastic
fall in output at the start of re-unification. But even more so it was the result of a composition
effect, with the building sector giving a disproportional contribution to growth in the New
Länder in the first half of the 1990s. This was partly due to reconstruction needs related in
particular to the area of infrastructure, but it also resulted from very generous fiscal incentives
for both business and housing construction. When in the mid-1990s infrastructure investment
levelled off and fiscal incentives were reduced, construction investment in the New Länder2
imploded, imparting very negative contributions to growth ever since. As a consequence,
growth rates in the East have fallen short of those in the West from the mid-1990s onwards.
… although construction also took a plunge in the West.
At least one third of the total difference in the growth performance between Germany and its
European partners since the mid-1990s can be attributed exclusively to the shrinking German
construction sector. However, this huge impact did not stem solely from developments in the
East, but coincided with the cyclical evolution of the building sector in the West. Specifically,
strong immigration in the late 1980 and early 1990s boosted residential construction in West
Germany. By the mid-1990s, when the inflow of immigrants tailed off, demand for residential
construction stalled. At the same time, the public sector reduced drastically its subsidies for
low-cost housing, while public investment was cut substantially, reflecting mainly budgetary
consolidation efforts. Moreover, the demand for business premises declined in a general
environment of low growth expectations. Therefore, while the boom-bust cycle of the
construction sector in the New Länder was much more eye-catching, the parallel decline in
the West was just as important in pulling down overall output growth.
Sharp tax increases to finance huge transfers to the East …
Economic growth has also been affected by the large financial burden re-unification imposed
on the country. These transfers have been used to finance the reconstruction of the eastern
economy and, even more importantly, to pay for the large deficits in the social security
systems of the New Länder which resulted mainly, but not exclusively, from very high
unemployment levels. These transfers have amounted to some 4% of GDP per year in net
terms ever since re-unification. Initially, they were mostly financed by allowing budget
deficits to increase, but when the budgetary situation risked to become unsustainable taxes
and social security contributions were raised sharply. Although most other European
countries also witnessed a rise in the tax burden in the early 1990s, in Germany this increase
was particularly strong.
… impacted adversely on growth throughout the second half of the 1990s.
Economic theory suggests that a fiscal expansion financed by distortionary taxation could
potentially generate substantial adverse growth effects after the initial positive demand
stimulus dies down. Two transmission channels of this second-round negative impact can be
identified: crowding out of private investment as higher taxes reduce expected net profits, and
adverse labour market developments arising from higher wage and non-wage costs.
According to simulations undertaken with the Commission services’ QUEST II  model, this
could have led to a negative growth impact of around 0.3% per year from the mid-1990s
onwards. This negative impact may, therefore, explain up to one third of the growth gap
between Germany and its European partners.
Cost-competitiveness suffered in the first half of the 1990s …
Re-unification also contributed to the deterioration of Germany’s external competitiveness in
the first half of the 1990s. Although the overall competitiveness of a country is a complex
notion, which is difficult to measure, it is evident that the cost competitiveness of Germany as
measured by relative unit labour costs declined strongly in the first half of the 1990s. This
was due to wage increases much above productivity increases, especially but not exclusively
in the East, coupled with a strong appreciation of the D-Mark. The decline in Germany’s
competitiveness can be detected, for instance, in the relative loss of export market shares
witnessed since re-unification. In particular, East German firms are virtually absent from
world markets, causing the New Länder to run a de facto trade deficit of enormous3
proportions. Other indicators, such as a relatively low inflow of foreign direct investment also
point to a comparatively low attractiveness of Germany as a business location.
…but most of these effects have run their course since the late 1990s.
Although wage moderation since the mid 1990s and a fall in the exchange rate of the euro in
the late 1990 have helped recapture most of the initial losses, vis-à-vis the Euro-area countries
various indicators of cost-competitiveness are still somewhat worse than the levels observed
before re-unification. This may continue to exert a certain drag on growth, but the overall
impact of this is likely to be very small. According to econometric simulations the negative
growth impact of the appreciation of the real effective exchange rate in the first half of the
1990s reached its maximum around the middle of the decade, but since then its effects have
gradually dissipated. However, given that available indicators might not fully capture the
impact of the re-unification shock on the overall level of competitiveness of Germany it
cannot be excluded that quantitative evaluations underestimate these effects. More
specifically, while, thanks to wage restraint and the weak euro, external competitiveness in
the West seems to have been largely restored, this can hardly be claimed for the New Länder
which continue to be hampered by high unit labour cost.
Macro-economic policies can hardly explain the remaining growth gap …
Adding up, a significant part – up to two thirds - of the growth gap between Germany and its
European partners since the mid-1990s must be ascribed to direct or indirect effects of re-
unification in combination with developments of the West-German construction sector. Can
the remainder be explained by macro-economic policies that were tighter in Germany than in
other European countries?
…as monetary conditions have been broadly supportive since the mid-1990s …
On the other monetary side, with the DM being the anchor currency in the EMS, Germany
could not benefit to the same extent as other countries from falling interest rates after 1994.
The monetary relaxation was therefore less marked for Germany than for its partners.
However, most of this differential impact of monetary policy occurred in the run-up to EMU,
while in later years a divergence in real interest rates was due to different inflation rates. As a
consequence, in light of generally supportive monetary conditions during the second half of
the 1990s, monetary policy can hardly be blamed as a main factor behind sluggish output
growth. Quite evidently, the German economy had made a strong showing during phases of
clearly tighter monetary conditions, such as the late 1980s.
… while budgetary consolidation proceeded in step with Germany’s European partners.
On the fiscal side, Germany had to follow a rather restrictive budgetary stance in order to
qualify for EMU and comply with the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact. According
to DG ECFIN estimates, the cyclically adjusted general government balance excluding
interest payments improved by somewhat less than 2% of GDP between 1995 and 2000. This
improvement is smaller than that registered for the average of its EMU/EU partners. Hence,
differences in the overall budgetary stance cannot account for the difference in output growth.
However, the budgetary strategy chosen in Germany might have been more harmful to
growth than in other Member States as, in order to make up for the sharp rise in social
transfers, expenditure was drastically cut at the level of government employment and
investment. In conclusion, in the second half of the 1990s the German policy-mix followed a
path similar to the one followed by its European partners. If macro-economic policies were to
be held responsible for a differential impact on growth, it was probably through the specific
composition of the budgetary consolidation process rather than the overall macro-economic
policy stance.4
Structural factors may explain a significant part of the growth gap …
A significant part of the growth gap between Germany and its partners is, therefore, left
unexplained. A decomposition of the growth path of potential output shows that labour
market behaviour is an important factor behind a lower than average growth rate in Germany
after the mid-1990s. According to DG ECFIN estimates, German potential growth during the
second half of the 1990s could have been around 0.5 percentage points higher per year if
Germany had developed like the Euro-area average. Most of this difference can be explained
by developments in the labour market. Two factors, in particular, stand out, each explaining
about one half of the overall difference in potential growth. First, the labour market
participation rate has seen a more subdued development in Germany than in other countries.
On the other hand, the estimated equilibrium unemployment rate as measured by the NAIRU
has remained rather stable in Germany, while it has trended down in most other EMU/EU
countries.
… with rigidities in the labour market standing out as a key factor, …
It is a difficult task to pinpoint the exact underlying factors, which account for the different
labour market experience of Germany in comparison with other European countries.
Nevertheless, it seems likely that a lack in labour market reform in Germany lies at the root of
these differences. Several impediments in the German labour market could be identified
which might have a dampening effect on labour market participation and the equilibrium
unemployment rate: (i) wages out of line with productivity due to the nature of the wage
bargaining process in Germany, especially for the unskilled segment of the labour market,
with the East-West wage differentiation remaining a particular problem; (ii) high marginal tax
rates which, in combination with a long benefit duration and high benefit rates for certain
groups, lead to significant unemployment traps; and (iii) a general lack of flexibility and
mobility.
… which interacted with factors related to re-unification.
In general, however, labour market regulations in Germany are not much higher than in most
other continental European countries. Differences in outcomes are, therefore, most likely due
to differences in the evolution of structural labour market impediments during recent years
rather than their level. In particular, while many European countries made efforts to render
their labour markets more flexible, similar effort have been largely missing in Germany. On
the contrary, in addition to reversing some of the timid measures adopted by the previous
government with a view to increasing labour market flexibility, the present government
implemented regulations which were widely seen as adding further constraints. Although the
direct effects of these measures on employment creation were probably small, in view of a
broad consensus that Germany needs to lower labour market rigidities, the political
orientation of these actions might have generated harmful signalling effects in the longer
term. It needs to be emphasised, in this context,  that in many respects re-unification has made
the country more heterogeneous than it had been before. The appropriate response to such an
increase in heterogeneity would have been a decisive move to make labour markets more
flexible. In this sense, existing rigidities were made worse through their interaction with re-
unification-related factors. For instance, a significant share of the East German labour force
was priced out of the market because wage rises much above productivity increases concurred
with Germany’s general compression of wages at the lower end of the wage scale.5
While continuous reforms of product and capital markets will be important…
Although, in general, the growth potential of an economy may be seriously constrained by
product and capital market rigidities, in comparative terms they seem to be of lesser
importance in explaining the specific growth performance of Germany. Indeed, Germany has
made substantial progress during the 1990s in liberalising its network industries. While state
aid, which is mostly geared towards large industrial companies and based on subsidising
capital inputs, continues to act in a distortionary way in various markets its scale does not
seem to differ significantly from that observed in other European countries. On the other
hand, outdated regulations tend to limit the creation of jobs in new types of activities, thereby
reducing potential employment. Overall, however, imperfections in product and capital
markets do not seem to go beyond those of Germany’s EMU/EU partner countries. These
considerations are also corroborated by the above-mentioned simulation exercise which
shows that neither equipment investment nor total factor productivity can account for the gap
in potential growth between Germany and its European partners. Indeed, this gap is
exclusively explained by the labour contribution to potential growth.
… labour market reform will be key to bring Germany back onto a robust growth path.
Looking ahead, according to DG ECFIN estimates, Germany is likely to have a medium-term
growth path of some 2% which compares with a potential growth rate of close to 2½ % for
Germany’s EMU/EU partners. This reflects first of all a demographic differential between
Germany and other European countries, but also insufficient labour market flexibility to cope
with change in comparison with other European countries. Notwithstanding some recent
measures in this field, Germany would need to undertake labour market reforms to lower the
NAIRU and increase the participation rate if it wants to catch up with the other Euro-area
countries and face enlargement and the consequences of its ageing population. Without a new
round of labour market reforms the German medium term growth outlook is likely to remain
bleak.6
1. Growth of the German economy in the 1990s: stylised facts
1.1 After the re-unification boom: Germany’s business cycles in the 1990s
1.1.1  Output growth
Economic activity in Germany in 2002 continues to be disappointing. With an estimated
growth rate of  ¾%, barely higher than the 0.6% in 2001, Germany will yet again carry the
red lantern among EU countries. This worrisome pattern for the largest EU economy persisted
throughout the 1990s. In understanding this pattern, two questions will have to be addressed
separately. First, it needs to be explained what ended the present business cycle and what
general role short-term factors play in the German economy. Second, as the long-term growth
potential of Germany is very low, it needs to be analysed what holds back potential growth
factors. This sub-section starts with the short-term factors.
Since 1992 economic forecasters have been projecting a longer lasting recovery in Germany,
sparked off by strong export growth. Up to now, however, so-called external shocks impede
an acceleration of growth. This leads to a pattern of very short and flat economic waves. In
1994/5, the incipient recovery was stifled by a sharp appreciation in the nominal exchange
rate and high wage increases. In 1997/98 Germany was sucked into the turbulence caused by
the Asian crisis. In 2000, the sharp increase in oil prices and a sharp downturn in the stock
markets choked off demand.
As Figure 1.1 shows, 2001 clearly marks the end of what is already the third full business
cycle after German re-unification. With troughs in 1992/3, 1995/6 and 1998, the average
length of a business cycle in the 1990s is a mere three years long
1. This distinguishes the
German growth pattern clearly from the business cycle in the USA, which lasted longer than
the full three German cycles combined. The German cycle is also substantially shorter that
those of most other European countries, with the exception of Italy, the other European
country that shows particularly weak growth in recent years. France, for instance, basically
skipped the 1998 recession experiencing only a mild slowdown in growth. This means that in
France the time from 1995 until 2001 forms part of a single cycle. Before 1998, growth in
Germany, France and Italy went in parallel. Since then, France set itself apart form the two
other countries. The pattern of 1998 might repeat itself in the present downturn: Germany
already practically stopped growing since the third quarter of 2000. Quarterly growth in the
six months from the third quarter of 2000 until the forth quarter of 2001 averages 0.05%. By
contrast, average quarterly growth in France during this period, even though also levelling off
recently, remained at 0.4%. It is therefore of particular interest to analyse the present and
previous cycle and take a look as to how France avoided the sharp cyclical downturn.
1.1.2  The recovery of 1995/98
The starting point of the previous cycle in Germany was the 1995 recession, when export
growth was choked off as a result of a sharp increase in German wages and the Mexican peso
crisis, which was accompanied by a significant appreciation of the DEM. The end point is
marked by the slowdown in 1997/8. Again an external shock set off the end of the period; this
time it was the Asian crisis. The 1995/98 cycle appears to be highly typical for the German
situation in the 1990s, as both its beginning and its end are triggered by external events, with
domestic policies, notably in the labour market, contributing their share to aggravating the
situation.
                                                
1 A recession is most frequently defined as two consecutive quarters with negative growth. As over the long
run a market economy usually grows, this definition is generally not useful in defining a growth cycle, as it
would only apply to the 1992 recession. As a pragmatic definition, we use here two consecutive quarters
with less than 0.2% quarterly growth.7
Figure 1.1: Quarterly real growth rate in Germany
A look at the data shows a fairly clear pattern (Figure 1.2a): Exports contributed to kick-
starting the economy. For about two years, the brunt of the growth was borne by the foreign
contribution, while domestic demand played only a relatively weak role in the early years of
the cycle. The growth contribution of the external balance until the end of 1997 is over 40
percent. This means that instead of growing with an average rate of  2% over the two year
period, Germany would have grown only at a rate of 1.2%, which hardly constitutes a boom.
In fact, the significant impulse coming from the external contribution never really translated
into domestic demand. As soon as the unsustainable external contribution of annually 0.8%
subsided, respectively turned negative, the mini-recovery collapsed and quarterly GDP
declined by 0.5% in the second quarter of 1998. Put in extreme terms, the Asian crisis did not
halt a recovery. As far as domestic demand is concerned, a recovery never took place.
A disaggregation of domestic demand into its components reveals that the problem of weak
demand is not so much found in equipment investment, which grew over the same period by
about 6% annually. Rather, private consumption remained very slack throughout the period. It
only grew at an annual rate of 1.2% over the two-year period. More importantly, most of that
impact only came in the last two quarters of the cycle—not enough to lift Germany onto a
sustainable growth path. The underlying reason is that, during the period under consideration,
real disposable income barely rose by 1%. One important aspect is that despite rising wages, a
rise in the wage sum was held back by a reduction in employment by 0.5% during the cycle,
because the growth rate during 1996/7 was not enough to generate employment growth. This
situation was aggravated by a rising tax burden.
The same period in France presents itself completely differently (Figure 1.2b). Just as in
Germany, the upswing was triggered by a strong contribution of net exports. Here, however,
the similarities end. Right from the beginning, private consumption bore a significant share of
the upswing, while investment initially provided no impulse to growth or was even negative.
After six quarters the boom in France became self-sustained with both consumption and
investment picking up speed. At this point France had entered the virtuous cycle of rising
employment, rising income and higher domestic demand. While the Asian crisis affected also
the French economy from 1998 onwards, the country benefited from the fact that it had
reached a self-sustaining growth path by that time. Consequently, the crisis is visible only as a
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Figure 1.2 :  Cumulative growth contribution of consumption, investment and
external balance (percentage growth of GDP since base period)
a) Germany: Period 1996/1998
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c) Germany: Period 1999/2001
































1.1.3  The recovery of 1999/2001
The recovery after the 1998 downturn in Germany shows some of the features of the previous
recovery (Figure 1.2c). In particular, it is also very short-lived. The period with high growth
lasted no longer than from the first quarter of 1999 until the second quarter of 2000, and even
here a brief spell of negative growth is interspersed (in the second quarter of 1999). However,
the role of trade is not quite as prominent as in the previous upswing. The initial spark instead
is provided by the 1999 tax reduction and transfer package of the incoming government,
which led consumption to increase by 2% in one quarter. At the same time investment rose
rapidly. A backlash in these factors in the second quarter of 1999 is partly compensated by a
rising external contribution. Throughout the cycle, equipment investment plays an important
role in sustaining growth. Also, and in contrast to the previous cycle, private consumption
growth is gathering momentum in the period between 1999Q3 and 2000 Q4. It all but
appeared that Germany finally reached the stage of sustainable growth. Growth was both
higher than in the previous recovery and most importantly it was internally generated. The
higher pace of growth led to rising employment - also in contrast to the previous cycle -
which sustained higher private consumption and higher investment. In addition, the general
upswing was reinforced by a stock market boom, which combined with large scale
privatisations (e.g. of Deutsche Telekom and Deutsche Post), plenty of IPOs and the creation
of the New Market. This latter factor probably also contributed to the rapid downswing in the
third quarter of 2000, as starting in Spring 2000 stocks began to slide and the impact of rising
interest rates began to be felt (Figure 1.3).
Figure 1.3: DAX and Dow Jones
The rapidity of the break in German growth is, however, mainly explained by the high loss of
purchasing power, which set in as a result of the fall in the Euro exchange rate and the rising
oil prices. How substantial this loss in real disposable income is can be seen when the GDP
growth for 2000 of 3% is compared with a terms-of-trade adjusted real value of GDP growth
of only 1.5%. Most of this terms of trade loss is concentrated in the final half of the year,
leading real disposable income growth and with it consumption to stagnate. In addition, in the
first quarter of 2001, equipment investment and construction activity shrank substantially.
Only a rise in the external contribution kept Germany from negative growth during the first
half of the year. The impact of the US slowdown provided the final straw that kept the
downswing from being only temporary. Even though the impact was not felt much on the
export side before the end of 2001, the transfer of declining confidence via the stock market
appeared to have a more immediate impact. The events in the context of the terrorist attacks
in the US have contributed to a deepening of the recession, but cannot be considered the root




















Again, the situation for France presents itself more favourably (Figure 1.2d). On the one
hand, the momentum of rising employment, rising consumption and investment persisted
already since 1996, making the situation in France less fragile. On the other hand, France
appears to have been much less hit by the impact of rising oil prices than Germany. As an
indicator, Figure 1.4 presents the difference in the harmonised index of consumer prices
(HICP) between France and Germany and compares this value to the component that can be
attributed exclusively to the development in energy prices. As the Figure shows, the two
curves practically overlap and  the deviations between France and Germany are substantial. In
January 2001, German HICP inflation was around 1.2 percentage points higher exclusively
because of the higher weight of fossil fuels in the French consumption basket. This is due to
the greater reliance of France on nuclear electricity and the more privileged climate of the
country. In this situation, it appears to be a fortunate mix of a more favourable policy
environment and good luck that kept France growing at a faster pace than Germany.
Figure 1.4: Weighted HICP differences Germany-France explained by energy
1.1.4  An econometric analysis of the short-term response of growth to exports
In order to deepen the analysis of the 1990s business cycles, some interesting information on
the short term interaction between exports and GDP can be gleaned from an analysis of
quarterly data. In particular, this sub-section assesses whether the sensitivity of Germany to
changing export performances differs systematically from that of the other two big Euro-area
economies, France and Italy. To allow a meaningful statistical analysis, the German data set
was extended backwards by using West German data for the pre-unification period.
Furthermore, quarterly growth figures were smoothened by using a weighted moving
average
2.
                                                
2 Data used are seasonally adjusted quarterly real figures from 1978 Q1 until 2001 Q2 (Q1 for France; 2000
Q4 for Italy). To achieve stationarity of data the econometric analysis looks only at first differences, i.e.
quarterly growth figures. These figures are, however, relatively volatile. Therefore a smoothing function has
been used applying the formula: X(smooth)t = 0.25 * Xt-1 + 0.5 Xt + 0.25 Xt+1. A sensitivity run does not
show any qualitative differences between smoothened and original data. However, graphs based on estimates
with the original data result in curves with a number of abrupt kinks that make a smoothening more realistic
looking. It also has the intuitive advantage that temporary blips have less influence than more permanent
shocks. West German data series were adjusted so as to fit smoothly with data of unified Germany. The point























total difference difference due to energy12
Table 1.1 presents stylised information on the quarterly export and GDP figures. It can be
seen that export shares per unit of GDP are practically the same for all three countries. While
Germany’s exports of goods and services make up more than 30% of GDP, with 28% the
export share of France is not significantly lower, with Italy taking an intermediate position.
The relative importance of exports alone therefore does not explain any possible difference in
the sensitivity of growth to export performance.
Table 1.1: Exports and GDP growth
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Germany 30.6% 1.57% 0.58% 0.41%
France 28.0% 1.28% 0.37% 0.42%
Italy 29.1% 2.02% 0.42% 0.25%
* Own Estimation
A more significant aspect is the degree to which exports fluctuate. Here it can be seen that
France apparently benefits from a relatively stable situation in its export markets. The
standard deviation of quarterly export growth lies at 1.3%, while that of Germany is
noticeably higher with some 1.6%, with Italy suffering from even higher export volatility
(2%). France also benefits from a very constant degree of GDP growth, with a standard
deviation of 0.37% in quarterly growth rates. With a value of 0.42%, growth volatility of Italy
is only slightly higher than that of France. By contrast, the growth volatility in Germany is 1½
times higher than that of France with a value of 0.58%. Ceteris paribus, a high volatility of
GDP growth should lower the potential medium term growth path, because it increases the
risk of sub-optimal factor allocation in an economy. Noticeably, volatility renders investment
decisions more difficult.
An econometric analysis should pick up three potential links between exports and GDP
growth. First, the two are directly linked, because exports by definition are a component of
GDP. Second, export growth can induce additional GDP growth via economic multipliers,
notably investment. Third, any correlation could simply reflect joint influences. In particular,
exports are a strong indicator of global economic growth, which should also go in parallel
with rising stock markets. Insofar as stock markets are increasingly linked and, therefore,
economic sentiment moves increasingly parallel across the world, an econometric analysis
might therefore pick up a spurious correlation. Nevertheless, it indicates the impact of the
global economy on the domestic market.
Clearly, therefore, exports should exert a positive influence on growth and investment. By
contrast, as the three countries are small compared to the rest of the world, they are largely
unable to pull the global growth rates. Export growth should therefore lead GPD growth, but
not the other way round. This is confirmed by a Granger causality test undertaken for the
three countries.
A dynamic means of testing the impact exports have on GDP consists in a vector
autoregression (VAR). This econometric technique implies regressing each variable of the
studied system on lagged values of itself and the other variables. Here we present only the
findings of a bivariate VAR that includes quarterly GDP and export growth. The presented
results are very robust. This means neither the inclusion of other variables, variation of the
time lag or even the inclusion of a dummy variable to distinguish the pre- and post-unification
situation alter the result in a qualitative way. The estimated parameters of the VAR allow a
dynamic analysis of what happens to each variable if export growth is changed.13
Figure 1.5 shows the impulse response of GDP over time to a one-time increase in the export
growth rate by one standard deviation. The response differs clearly among the three countries.
Despite Italy’s higher export volatility, and hence relatively large initial export increase, its
GDP response is rather flat and peters out after 7 quarters. The cumulative impact on GDP is
0.25% (Table 1). By contrast, France’s response is bell shaped with additional growth rates of
over 0.10% in the second to fourth quarter, after which it drops to zero in the sixth quarter.
The cumulative impact is accordingly higher than the Italian one with 0.42 %.
Figure 1.5: Response of quarterly GDP growth to a one time increase in export growth





































Germany’s response is clearly front-loaded. While its cumulative GDP response is the same
as that of France (0.41%), practically all of the impact is noticeable in the immediate first two
quarters, after which it quickly dissipates. The inability of Germany to attain self-sustained
growth was described further up. The figures clearly reflect the otherwise anecdotal
observation that Germany is relatively more dependent than other countries on the global
business cycle. As Figure 1.5 shows, Germany’s reaction to export changes tends to be large
and direct. A separate analysis of pre- and post- unification data supported the view that this
characteristic is not a recent phenomenon.
While the vector autoregression presented here provides some evidence on the dynamic
aspects of the trade-growth nexus, it cannot provide much guidance on the transmission
mechanism between export performance and growth. Given the very immediate impact
exports have on growth, it appears, however, that relatively slowly and indirectly working
factors are weak in Germany compared to other countries, while direct factors such as the
instantaneous transmission of economic sentiment from abroad carries relatively large weight,
as can be seen, for instance, from the close correlation of the German and American stock
market in Figure 1.3.
1.1.5  The dependence of the business cycle on trade
The previous sub-section established that one of the defining features of the German economy
is - despite its large size – its strong dependency on external developments. As shown by
Figure 1.6, the degree to which export expansion and GDP growth move in parallel is indeed
remarkable. All turning points in the growth cycle trace contemporaneous changes in the rate
of exports. A positive correlation of exports to GDP is certainly no surprise, because exports
are included in the calculation of GDP itself. However, the contribution of net exports to
growth is relatively small and less correlated with growth than exports alone. Insofar as other
EU economies, and hence German exports, are subject to similar monetary policy shocks as
Germany via EMS and EMU, it is remarkable that in Germany the correlation between14
exports and GDP growth is stronger than what can be observed, for instance, in France and
the UK. It is especially weak in the cases of Italy and Spain.
Figure 1.6: Real GDP and export growth
The primary reason for the very tight correlation of exports to GDP growth in Germany
appears to be that the impact of exports on business confidence is a more important
transmission mechanism than in other countries, as was described in the previous sub-section.
The data in the figure reflect those of West Germany until 1991 and of unified Germany
thereafter. This means that up to this point in time, which includes most of the re-unification
boom in the early 1990s, West German sales to East Germany are shown as exports. As a
consequence unification does not interrupt the trade-growth nexus and even underscores the
high dependence of the German economy on external influences.
1.1.6  Conclusions
An analysis of the short term economic situation identifies external factors as the outstanding
features in generating business upturns and downturns in Germany. At first glance this is
astonishing, given the size of the economy. It appears, however, that a significant part of the
attention to the external side in Germany is given by the fact that since 1991 average quarterly
growth in Germany amounted to a pale 0.4%. With such a low underlying growth rate,
fluctuations in the external contribution can easily turn a mildly positive growth rate into a
negative one and thus make the difference between a boom and a recession. While it appears
that Germany also had a streak of bad luck in the timing of the external shocks, clearly the
fundamental problem is that the country does not succeed in generating a sustainable
domestically-driven growth path. Consequently, it is not able to take full advantage of the
impulse of an export boom. Apparently, France succeeded much better in this respect in past
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1.2 The growth performance in the 1990s in a longer-term perspective
1.2.1  Output and employment growth
The previous sub-section has shown that, despite its large size, the German economy reacted
very sensitively to external developments during the 1990s. Partially owing to this strong
response to adverse external shocks, annual average growth of the German economy has been
particularly sluggish after the mid-1990s. However, output growth in Germany has been
relatively modest for most of the past three decades. In a comparison with the larger
industrialised countries Germany holds the last position in terms of average annual output
growth over the period 1971-2000 (Table 1.2)
3. Only the UK experienced similarly low
output growth but, in the case of this country, the poor performance was due to its slow
growth at the beginning of this period, whereas for most of the 1990s economic growth in the
UK was rather dynamic and well above the EU average. Moreover, slow output growth in
Germany went along with anaemic job creation, with the annual average rise in employment
being clearly below that of the EU and Euro-area partner countries.
Table 1.2: Output and Employment (annual average growth)
D(1) F I UK EUR(2) EU(3) US JP
GDP
1971-2000 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.6 2.5 3.2 3.3
1991-2000 1.9 1.8 1.6 2.3 1.9 2.0 3.3 1.4
1991-1995 2.1 1.1 1.3 1.8 1.3 1.4 2.4 1.4
1996-2000 1.8 2.5 1.9 2.8 2.6 2.7 4.1 1.4
Employment
1971-2000 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.5 1.7 0.7
1991-2000 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.4 1.2 0.3
1991-1995     -0.3     -0.2     -0.7     -0.9     -0.3     -0.6 0.9 0.8
1996-2000 0.7 1.2 1.0 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.6     -0.1
(1) Data up to 1991 West Germany.
(2) Euro-area  excluding Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain
(3) EU excluding Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain
Source :  Commission services
In recent years, the apparent lack of dynamism of the German economy has become more
accentuated. Indeed, in the second half of the 1990s annual average output growth of
Germany was almost 1 percentage point below that of the EMU/EU partner countries and
around 2¼ percentage points below that of the US. Likewise, during this period the annual
average increase in employment in Germany fell short by more than ½ percentage point of
that of the EMU/EU comparison group and by almost 1 percentage point of that in the US.
Partly, the meagre economic performance can be blamed on the fact that in the aftermath of
re-unification German real GDP growth rose significantly above its longer-term trend.
Specifically, real GDP growth between 1990 and 1992 averaged almost 4½ %, i.e. more than
2 percentage points above Germany’s longer-term average. The ensuing period of weakness
could thus be viewed as an adjustment process towards the longer-term growth potential of
the German economy. However, this argument stops short of explaining why Germany’s
potential growth has been so low and, more importantly, why the period of adjustment has
lasted for so long.
1.2.2  Population growth
A slowly growing population has clearly contributed to weak overall economic growth in
Germany. Over the last three decades the differential in annual average population growth
between Germany and the US amounted to no less than -¾ percentage points and there is also
a negative albeit much smaller differential vis-à-vis France (Table 1.3). However, other
                                                
3 For the years up to and including 1991, growth rates underlying Table 1.2 and all following tables in this
sub-section are based on West-German data only, while growth rates for the years from 1992 onwards are
based on data for unified Germany.16
countries like Italy and the UK exhibit even slower population growth than Germany and the
overall difference with the EMU/EU average is negligible.
Table 1.3: Population (annual average growth)
D(1) F I UK EUR(2) EU(3) US JP
1971-2000 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3 1.0 0.7
1991-2000 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 1.0 0.3
1991-1995 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 1.0 0.3
1996-2000 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.9 0.2
(1) Data up to 1991 West Germany.
(2) Euro-area  excluding Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain
(3) EU excluding Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain
Source :  Commission services
Only during a couple of years before and after re-unification German population growth was
unusually high as a result of special factors. Particularly, a wave of so-called “ethnic
Germans” reached Germany in the wake of the opening-up of the Central and East European
countries. As a result, population growth in Germany was significantly higher between 1988
and 1993 than in any other of the large OECD countries
4. By contrast, in the years preceding
and following that period German population expanded much more slowly and in line with its
longer-term trend (Figure 1.7).
Figure 1.7 German Population Growth (annual average)
Therefore, moving from total output to output per capita clearly reduces the longer-term
growth gap of Germany vis-à-vis its EMU/EU partners but also the US (Table 1.4). However,
the situation is different for the period between 1996 and 2000, for which a significant gap in
the growth rate of per capita income remains, particularly vis-à-vis the US but also in
comparison with the EMU/EU partner countries. Hence, while population accounts for much
of the growth differences between Germany and the other larger industrialised countries over
the longer term, apparently in the second half of the 1990s economic activity in Germany was
held back also by other factors.
Table 1.4: Output per capita  (annual average growth)
D(1) F I UK EUR(2) EU(3) US JP
1971-2000 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.6
1991-2000 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.9 1.6 1.7 2.0 1.2
1991-1995 1.4 0.6 1.1 1.4 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1
1996-2000 1.7 2.1 1.7 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.9 1.2
(1) Data up to 1991 West Germany.
(2) Euro-area  excluding Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain
(3) EU excluding Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain
Source :  Commission services
                                                
4  In addition, re-unification triggered strong intra-German migration from the New Länder to the West. This is










Box 1: The economic performance of the New Länder
5
B1.1  Output growth and production structure
GDP growth in East Germany was higher than in West Germany until 1996, but has been
slightly lower thereafter (Figure B1.1). As a consequence, GDP per capita relative to the West
increased from 40% in 1991 to somewhat above 60% in 1996, remaining more or less steady
since then.
6
Figure B1.1: Annual change in real GDP in East and West Germany, 1992-2001
         (1995 prices)
Source: Arbeitskreis “Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung der Länder”; own calculations
Economic growth in East Germany was dominated by developments in the construction
sector. A very rapid expansion of construction investment in the first half of the 1990s was
followed by a sharp decline when fiscal incentives for housing investment where phased out
(Table B1.1 and Figure B1.2). Despite this sharp decline, in 2000 the share of gross value
added (GVA) of the construction sector in the East was still more than double that of the
West. By contrast, the manufacturing sector exhibited rather high growth rates throughout the
1990s, although due its almost complete collapse after exposure to external competition from
a tiny base. Despite this catching-up process, in 2001 the share of manufacturing GVA in total
East German output was still more than 7 percentage points below the equivalent share in
West Germany. East German growth rates in the services sector were generally below those
of the West and, with the exception of public services, the share of the service sector in the
economy remains clearly below the comparable share in the West.
A further dimension of growth in East Germany is its regional pattern, which is becoming
increasingly differentiated. A cluster analysis carried out by the German Council of Economic
Experts in 1999 identified Leipzig, Dresden, Halle/Saale, Jena, Erfurt, Chemnitz and Berlin
(including Potsdam) as the main growth clusters in East Germany.
7 These regions are well
equipped with the growth determinants taken into account in the analysis, i.e. a high
productivity based on a favourable sectoral structure with many high value-added,
technology-intensive activities; a low share of agriculture; a high share of qualified workers;
                                                
5  This box mainly draws from section II of Davies/Hallet 2001.
6  Note that there are different statistical concepts of East Germany due to the specific situation of Berlin. In
labour market statistics West Berlin is attributed to West Germany and East Berlin to East Germany. In
economic accounts, however, following the revision of the methodology (to “ESA95” by the Arbeitskreis
“Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung der Länder”), there is no longer a division of Berlin so that a choice
is to be made as to which part of Germany Berlin is statistically attributed to. Here, given the dominance of
the West Berlin economy for Berlin as a whole, Berlin is attributed to West Germany.
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Box 1 (continued)
a high degree of industrial diversification; a high population density; as well as a low distance
to other agglomerations. The explanation provided is that the proximity of firms, universities
and research institutes allowed to exploit knowledge spillovers and to draw from a pool of
qualified employees.
Table B1.1 : Change in GVA in % (constant 1995 prices) in the New Länder (excl.
Berlin), 1992-1999
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Agriculture, forestry, fish. -8.8 16.9 -3.7 6.7 3.4    -0.1 6.6 2.1
Industry (excl. constr.) -5.8 14.6 12.3 6.4 10.6 3.6 6.4 3.5
- of which : manufacturing 1.3 19.6 20.8 8.5 8.7 9.0 9.2 4.4
Construction 31.6 17.2 22.4 2.6   -1.3    -0.2   -9.0   -3.2
Trade, tourism, transport 16.8 13.1 10.8 2.5 1.3 1.9 1.9 2.7
Finance, business services 9.7 17.1 13.6 10.8 6.3 6.2 4.8 4.0
Public and private services 14.1 0.1 5.0 4.5 -0.1 -2.5 0.0 1.0
All sectors 11.8   10.3   11.2 5.4  2.9 1.5 1.2 1.8
Source: Arbeitskreis “Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung der Länder”, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft
Three industries had a rather strong, spatially concentrated development in East Germany:
microelectronics, chemicals, automobiles. In all three cases there is a certain tradition from
the pre-war and GDR periods which is important with regard to the availability of skilled
labour. At the same time, many of them strongly depend on input and output linkages so that
clustering is a useful strategy for being close to suppliers, customers and skilled labour. These
industries are all very capital-intensive which reduces the importance of labour costs and is a
consequence of the generous subsidisation of productive investment in East Germany.
Figure B1.2: Share of sectoral GVA in total GVA in East and West Germany
          in 2000 (in per cent)
  Source: Arbeitskreis “Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung der Länder”
The electronics industry is among the industries with the strongest growth of production in
East Germany and doubled from 1995 to 1999. In 1998, about 34,000 were employed in this
industry, or 6% of all employees in the manufacturing sector. A particular specialisation is in
microelectronics which had already been developed in the GDR with about 120,000
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Box 1 (continued)
production plants in four locations (Erfurt, Dresden, Frankfurt/Oder and Neuhaus/Thüringen).
Following the closing down or privatisation of these plants during the 1990s, Dresden (capital
of Sachsen) developed a cluster of microelectronics with currently around 500 companies
with more than 20,000 employees working directly in microelectronics or indirectly in related
branches. Production plants of major companies include Infineon, AMD (Advanced Micro
Devices) and ZMD (Dresden Centre for Microelectronics). Furthermore, there are 15
independent research institutes and more than 150 software offices active in this sector.
The East German chemical industry underwent the most intense restructuring after re-
unification. Only in 1997 did employment increase again for the first time and has remained
since then at a level of 32,000. The so-called “chemicals triangle” has a number of locations,
most of which are in Sachsen-Anhalt and in basic materials including hydrogenation
(Rodeleben), nitrogen products (Piesteritz), chlorine, phosphorus and silicon chemistry
(Bitterfeld/Wolfen), olefins (Buna), refinery and petrochemicals (Leuna). The most important
location is the “ChemiePark Bitterfeld/Wolfen” where there are 3,600 direct jobs in the
chemical industry and another 7,000 indirect jobs. The production there is rather capital-
intensive with an investment per job of about € 500,000. It is a traditional chemical industry
location which was founded at the end of the 19
th century on the basis of exploitation of
brown coal which however no longer exists today. The advantages of this cluster in
Bitterfeld/Wolfen are best illustrated by the common utilities for energy and waste as well as
a closed product flow cycle for synthetic quartz glass production on the basis of co-operation
between different plants.
The production of automobiles was one of the most dynamic industries in East Germany after
re-unification. This dynamism was supported by rather early decisions to stop the production
of the GDR brands “Trabant” and “Wartburg”, which were not competitive in terms of
quality, and the investment decisions for highly productive production plants by Volkswagen
(in Mosel and Chemnitz in Sachsen) and Opel (in Eisenach in Thüringen). This allowed them
to make use of the available resources at these locations whose tradition goes back to the
predecessors of Audi and BMW at the beginning of the 20th century. At present there are
about 30,000 employees producing more than 400,000 cars per year in East Germany, which
is about 8% of the domestic production of German car producers. Further investments which
have recently started or will soon start production are DaimlerChrysler in Ludwigsfelde
(Brandenburg), Porsche in Leipzig (Sachsen) and a transparent factory for assembling a
Volkswagen luxury model in the centre of Dresden. In July 2001, BMW decided to build a
new production site in Leipzig, creating 5,000 direct jobs in the medium term and an
estimated 5,000 indirect jobs. Leipzig had been chosen after a long selection process among
applications from more than 250 cities and regions. The main arguments in favour of Leipzig
had been the proximity to the BMW plants in Bavaria, the good infrastructure, the subsidies
to be expected (28% of the investment), the availability of skilled labour, and a flexible
working time scheme. The latter was agreed with BMW’s workers council so that machines
will be running between 60 and 140 hours per week while individual workers’ time will be
accounted on a medium-term basis.
B1.2  Competitiveness and the labour market
One of the main handicaps for growth and employment in East Germany has been the rise of
wages above increases in productivity. Wage convergence in collective agreements had the
consequence of high unit labour costs caused by wages that have been about 13% above
productivity on average since 1996 (Figure B1.3). In 2001, compensation per employee was
at 78% of the West German level, while output per employee was at 71% of that in the West.
This holds in spite of an average weekly working time of 38.9 hours in 1999, compared to
36.8 hours in West Germany. Among the reasons for the low labour productivity in the new
Länder are a low capital intensity due to different relative factor prices, a low utilisation rate20
Box 1 (continued)
of production capacities and the need for many East German firms to compete through lower
prices.
8
Figure B1.3: Compensation, productivity and unit labour costs in East Germany,
          1991-2001 (current prices, West Germany = 100)
  Source: Arbeitskreis “Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung der Länder”; own calculations
Wage developments in East Germany are the outcome of many forces, preventing wages from
developing in line with productivity. The initial situation of the German monetary union and
unification is crucial to understanding the process in the 1990s. While the 1:1 conversion rate
of the GDR Mark to the D-Mark is often said to have been the main problem, this does not
seem to be the case given that wages in the East were only about one third of those in the
West. At the time this corresponded largely to differences in productivity. More important
was the situation of wage bargaining in 1991 when wage convergence within five years was
agreed in many sectors. These negotiations were mainly led by employers’ associations and
trade unions from the West due to the fact that most East German firms were not yet
privatised by the Treuhandanstalt and not sufficiently represented to raise the issue of
competitiveness. Whether this was done with the intention “to bind future East German firms
and to effectively prevent them from threatening their markets”
9 is arguable. However, three
factors have certainly contributed to this situation: first, the federal government’s initial
optimism on the time path of catching-up of East Germany (“flourishing landscapes”);
second, the objective of avoiding major out-migration from East Germany that was presumed
to take place if considerably lower wage prevailed for a longer time; and third, equity
considerations ( “equal pay for equal work”). These factors created an environment in which
rapid wage convergence was the most popular strategy to take. However, the five-year-
agreements on full wage convergence proved to be unfeasible and were basically abandoned
in 1993, but high rates of wage increases continued throughout the 1990s.
While one may conclude that unit labour costs have already fallen considerably towards the
end of the 1990s, it is to be recognised that a major share of the adjustment has taken place
through the reduction of employment and other channels. In manufacturing, which is the
sector that is most exposed to external competition, firms are forced to adjust immediately by
either closing down, increasing their capital-intensity (by higher investment and/or reduction
of employment), or by leaving employers’ associations, which allows them to pay wages
below those of industry-wide agreements between employers’ associations and trade unions.
                                                
8  Cf. Sachverständigenrat 2000, p.186f.
9 Sinn/Westermann  2001,  p.17.
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Box 1 (continued)
In manufacturing alone, half of employment - or almost 1 million jobs - were lost in net terms
between 1991 and 2000. This employment effect cannot be attributed exclusively to the
closing down of old companies, but is also due to the failure to attract sufficient new
investment. Although 4% higher unit labour costs in manufacturing in the East compared to
the West may be within the range of statistical inaccuracy, a region attempting to catch up in
terms of income, productivity and employment should rather have lower unit labour costs
than other regions in order to compete for more investment and jobs.
High and only slowly falling relative unit labour costs took a severe toll in the labour market.
In 2000, there were on average 1.36 million unemployed people in East Germany.
Furthermore, there were about 800,000 people in “hidden” unemployment in East Germany,
so that the total number of registered and hidden unemployed in East Germany amounted to
2.16 million (cf. Figure B1.4). At the end of 2001, the official unemployment rate stood at
16.9%, compared with 7.4% in West Germany. These averages conceal variations in
unemployment rates in labour office districts of between 2.7% in Freising/Bayern (West
Germany) and 22.6% in Neubrandenburg/Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (East Germany). Thus,
within the same country there are regions with extreme labour shortages and others with
almost a quarter of the labour force without job.
However, in spite of higher unemployment and lower wages East German workers seem to
migrate insufficiently to West German regions offering jobs and higher wages. The main
flows of out-migration from East to West took place in the years 1989 and 1990. Since then,
net migration from East Germany has been only slightly negative although due to the
improved labour market situation in West Germany in 1999 and 2000 net out-migration from
the East increased again slightly. There is some evidence that the migration propensity is
higher among young and qualified people, although this is still hardly visible in the
demographic structure of East Germany relative to West Germany.
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1.2.3  Labour market developments
Unemployment has been on a rising trend in Germany over the last three decades (Figure
1.8). The labour market issue became particularly virulent after re-unification. In particular,
open unemployment of more than 20% of the labour force in the New Länder brought the
German labour market into the limelight. Box 1 deals in more detail with labour market
developments, and economic developments more generally, in the New Länder.
Figure 1.8: Unemployment in per cent of the labour force (1970-2001)
The question arises whether Germany was exposed to labour supply shocks which, by virtue
of a limited absorptive capacity of the labour market, could explain high and rising
unemployment in the 1990s. As shown by Table 1.5, in the longer term labour supply in
Germany has, like in other countries, grown at a faster pace than population, reflecting mostly
the increasing activity rate of women. However, for a number of years following re-
unification labour force
10 growth fell short of population growth. Labour force growth during
this period was depressed by (1) the deep economic recession in 1992-93 and (2) a decrease
in the activity rate of women in the New Länder, which at the time of re-unification was
comparatively high but started to converge to the lower Western level thereafter. After 1993,
the longer-term trend of labour force growth outpacing population growth resumed.
Table 1.5: Labour Force (annual average growth)
D(1) F I UK EUR(2) EU(3) US JP
1971-2000 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.6 1.7 0.8
1991-2000 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.4 1.1 0.6
1991-1995 0.1 0.4 -0.2 -0.5 0.2 0.0 0.9 1.0
1996-2000 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.9 0.8 1.2 0.3
(1) Data up to 1991 West Germany.
(2) Euro-area  excluding Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain
(3) EU excluding Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain
Source :  Commission services
On average, therefore, labour force growth during the 1990s was broadly in line with longer-
term trends in Germany. In other words, country-specific shocks to labour supply can hardly
account for the observed increase in unemployment in the 1990s. The increase in
unemployment during this period seems to reflect rather the continuation of a longer-term
trend characterised by a rate of employment creation which was too low to fully absorb the
(unspectacular) expansion in the labour force. More specifically, over the last three decades
the rate of job creation during cyclical upswings was insufficient to make up for the rate of
job destruction during cyclical downswings. This contrasts with the experience in the US and,
                                                
10   Labour force is defined here as the sum of the total number of employed and unemployed persons.23
for the latter part of the period, the UK where job creation accelerated much above its trend
during upswing periods. The data suggests, however, that for the larger continental European
countries the situation improved in the second half of the 1990s, when the economic upswing
was also accompanied by an impressive expansion in the number of persons employed.
The specific behaviour of job-growth is mirrored by the development of unemployment. In
particular, the large continental European countries witnessed a sharp rise in their
unemployment rates during cyclical downturns which was not reversed symmetrically during
upturns (see Figure 1.8 above). This so-called “hysteresis” phenomenon of unemployment in
continental Europe stands in stark contrast with developments in the US and the UK where
labour redundancies built up during economic downswings were mostly (or even fully)
reabsorbed during ensuing upswings. Again, for France and Italy the situation appears to have
improved since the mid-1990, with the unemployment rate at the end of the period in these
countries roughly at the level observed at the beginning. Apparently no such improvement
occurred in Germany, where unemployment at the end of the period was almost twice as high
as that at the beginning.
1.2.4  Labour input and labour productivity
Table 1.2 used the average number of persons employed per year to derive growth rates for
employment. If the intention is to measure total annual labour input in an economy it would
be preferable to use instead the total number of hours worked per year. In the absence of
comparable data for total hours worked a second best solution is to use employment on a full-
time equivalents basis. The latter data are derived from the “raw” employment figures by
using the ratio between the actual hours worked by an average worker and the standard (e.g.
statutory) working hours as an adjustment factor.
Table 1.6 shows the evolution of labour input in full-time equivalents
11. Comparison with
Table 1.2 suggests that the growth rate of labour input in Germany during the 1990s was
much below the growth rate of the number of persons employed. This contrasts with the other
countries where the transition to full-time equivalents reduces labour input growth only
slightly (France and Italy) or even increases it (USA)
12. Several factors are behind the
significant downward correction in measured labour input for Germany: first, the “raw”
employment figures hide a rapid increase in part-time employment in the 1990s; second, the
most dynamic element in overall part-time employment were jobs with a very low working
time content (so-called “630 DEM jobs“), resulting in a decline in the hours worked for an
average part-time worker; third, overtime hours were reduced as a result of subdued output
growth and an increase in the working-time flexibility included in tariff agreements. As a
result, moving from employed persons to full-time equivalents reduces the annual average
labour input growth by 0.9 percentage points for the 1990s. While labour input as measured
by persons employed shows positive - albeit in comparison with other countries still rather
subdued - growth, full-time equivalents indicate that labour input growth was negative to the
tune of 0.7% per year, revealing the actual scale of the German labour market slack in this
period.
Table 1.6: Labour input in full-time equivalents (annual average growth)
D(1) F I US
1991-2000 -0.7 0.2 0.0 1.6
1991-1995 -1.4 -0.5 -0.8 1.2
1996-2000 -0.2 1.0 0.8 2.1
(1) Due to missing data on full-time equivalents for 1991 averages for Germany are 1992-2000, 1992-1995 and 1996-2000.
Source :  Commission services
                                                
11  No official data for full-time equivalents exists for Germany. The data series used here has been gratefully
provided by the German “Institut für Arbeitsmark- und Berufsforschung” on the basis of its database on
working time data.
12  For the UK and Japan no data for full-time equivalents were available.24
The difference between labour input in terms of persons employed and labour input in full-
time equivalents needs to be kept in mind also when looking at the development of labour
productivity. As suggested by the data in the upper panel of Table 1.7, which uses the number
of persons employed as the labour input measure, in the longer term labour productivity
growth in Germany differs little from that observed in the other large continental EU
countries. In other words, the employment intensity of output growth in Germany has
developed similarly to that of France and Italy. Particularly, a distinct slowdown in
productivity growth is witnessed in the 1990s, although as a consequence of the re-unification
boom in Germany this occurred only with a lag.
However, the picture changes considerably if full-time equivalents are used as a labour input
measure. In this case, as shown by the lower panel of Table 1.7, labour productivity growth in
Germany in the second half of the 1990s continues to lie at some 2%, i.e. around its longer-
term value and much higher than in the other large continental countries. This suggests that,
in contrast to France or Italy, there are little indications that during the 1990s a significant
change in the longer-term relationship between employment and output growth had taken
place in Germany.
Table 1.7: Labour Productivity (annual average growth)
D(1) F I UK EUR(2) EU(3) US JP
Based on Persons Employed
1971-2000 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.5 2.6
1991-2000 1.7 1.2 1.4 2.1 1.4 1.7 2.0 1.1
1991-1995 2.3 1.2 2.0 2.7 1.6 2.0 1.5 0.6
1996-2000 1.1 1.3 0.9 1.5 1.3 1.4 2.5 1.5
Based on Full-time Equivalents
1991-2000  2.3  1.5  1.6  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  1.8  n.a.
1991-1995  2.7  1.5  2.0  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  1.2  n.a
1996-2000  2.0  1.5  1.1  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  2.4 n.a
(1) Data up to 1991 West Germany. For Germany, due top missing data period averages in the lower part of the table are
    1992-2000, 1992-1995 and 1996-2000.
(2) Euro-area  excluding Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain
(3) EU excluding Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain
Source :  Commission services
Since, tautologically, labour input growth is the product of output growth and the labour
intensity of output growth, these results demonstrate quite clearly the German employment
problem. Employment growth has remained depressed ever since the re-unification boom
because of a sharp slowdown in output growth combined with a low and basically unchanged
labour intensity of output growth. This differs from the experience of other countries like
France where the significant improvement in the employment situation in the second half of
the 1990s was due to the rise in output growth coupled with an increase in the employment
intensity of growth.
1.2.5  Growth accounting
The previous sub-sections point to the fact that weak employment growth has been one of the
salient features of the German economy in recent years. To get a somewhat fuller picture
about the factors behind the slowdown in German output growth in the period after the re-
unification boom this sub-section uses a traditional growth accounting framework to quantify
the contributions from labour input, capital input and technological progress to overall output
growth. However, due to the lack of comparable cross-country data for employment in full-
time equivalents in the period under consideration the labour input indicator used in this
exercise is the number of employed persons. As shown above, in the case of Germany this
introduces a significant upward bias in the contribution from labour input to growth during
the 1990s which has to be borne in mind when interpreting the results.25
Table 1.8 shows that, in conformity with the results above, in Germany the growth
contribution from labour input has been weak throughout the past three decades. Despite an
apparent improvement since the mid-1990s in relation to the longer-term average, in
comparative terms this tendency has become even more accentuated in recent years. More
specifically, during the period 1996-2000 the labour input contribution to output growth rose
by around ½ percentage point for the EMU/EU partner countries whereas in Germany the
increase amounted to only about one half of this value. Moreover, as mentioned before the
contribution from labour input to output growth in the 1990s would be further weakened if as
a measure of labour input full-time equivalents were used instead of persons employed. This
would result in a negative growth contribution from labour input of around 0.8% for the first
half of the decade and of some 0.1% of GDP for the second  half.
Table 1.8: Contributions of Labour Input, Capital Input and TFP to Output Growth
D(1) F I UK EUR(2) EU(3) US JP
Labour Input (annual averages)
1971-2000 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.3 1.1 0.5
1991-2000 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.8 0.2
1991-1995     -0.2     -0.1     -0.4     -0.6     -0.2     -0.4 0.6 0.5
1996-2000 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.0
Capital Input (annual averages)
1971-2000 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.7 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.6
1991-2000 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7 1.0 1.1
1991-1995 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.8 1.3
1996-2000 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.3 0.9
TFP Growth (annual averages)
1971-2000 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.3
1991-2000 0.9 0.7 0.7 1.5 0.9 1.1 1.5 0.1
1991-1995 1.3 0.4 1.0 1.9 0.7 1.1 1.1     -0.4
1996-2000 0.6 1.1 0.5 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.9 0.6
(1) Data up to 1991 West Germany.
(2) Euro-area  excluding Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain
(3) EU excluding Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain
Source :  Commission services
The differences in the growth contribution from capital for the larger European countries are
not very significant, neither across countries nor over time. More specifically, the results for
Germany do not differ much from those of other European countries. In general terms,
following the first oil price shock, the growth contribution from capital has declined for most
of the European countries. Germany eschewed this tendency in the first half of the 1990s due
to the huge amount of capital input necessary for the reconstruction of the New Länder, but
the second half of the decade bears again witness to this general trend. A noteworthy result of
Table 1.8 is the increase in the growth contribution of capital in the US in the second half of
the 1990s, a development which is not replicated in any of the large European countries.
A similar story holds for the contribution of total factor productivity (TFP) growth to output
growth. A slowdown of TFP growth can be observed over the past three decades for the large
European countries. Once again the experience of the US was different as TFP growth
accelerated over the past three decades, particularly in the second half of the 1990s. With the
exception of France, a rise in TFP growth in the second half of the 1990s did not occur in the
larger European countries. Clearly, the German development must be seen against the
background of the strong economic acceleration in the aftermath of re-unification, which was
accompanied by strong TFP growth. The fall of TFP growth in the second half of the 1990s
could, therefore, be seen as an adjustment to the longer-term trend. Moreover, with TFP
growth measured as the unexplained (Solow) residual after accounting for contributions from
labour and capital input, a downward revision in the contribution from labour input leads uno
actu to an upward revision of TFP growth. Revising downward the contribution of labour
input by the order of magnitude indicated above would, in fact, result in TFP growth for the
1990s  much above the EMU/EU average.26
In conclusion, the results from this growth accounting exercise indicate that in comparison
with other European countries Germany reveals a particularly low growth contribution from
labour input. This largely confirm the results of previous sub-sections where the insufficient
capacity of generating employment was identified as a key problem of the German economy.
Conversely, the results presented here are difficult to reconcile with the notion of a lack of
capital formation as a major source of the German growth slowdown. Similarly, TFP growth
does not seem to be a decisive factor in the explanation of low output growth in Germany
since the mid-1990s.
1.2.6  Demand components of output growth
While the previous sub-sections looked at the supply structure of the economy this sub-
section will focus on the demand components of output growth. One of the central issues in
this context is whether with re-unification the demand composition of growth has changed or,
more precisely, whether there was a break in the pattern of growth that characterised the West
German economy during the post-war period. Such a break could be expected primarily in the
growth contribution of net exports. Indeed, during most of the 1970s and 1980s, Germany had
a large current account surplus, but following re-unification this surplus turned into a deficit
as the positive external trade balance of West Germany was not sufficient to compensate for
the huge excess absorption the New Länder.
Interestingly, at 0.1 percentage points the annual average growth contribution of net exports
declined only marginally in the 1990s in comparison with the longer-term trend (Table 1.9).
In addition, while the growth contribution of net exports fell to zero in the first half of the
1990s, it bounced back to 0.3 percentage points in the second half. Figure 1.9 shows that, in
fact, after being dented by re-unification the growth contribution of net exports improved
quickly after 1992, dipping only with the onset of the Asian crisis in 1997/98. This contrasts
with developments in other countries where the contribution of net exports fluctuated strongly
and, with the exception of Japan, remained rather low, often turning negative. It should be
noted in this context that the improvement in the volume of German net exports was not due
to developments of relative export prices. In fact, during the 1990s the terms of trade even
showed a slight improvement up to the year 2000 when they deteriorated due to the surge in
oil prices (see Figure 1.9).
Table 1.9: Contributions of Net Exports and Domestic Demand to GDP growth
D(1) F I UK EUR(2) EU(3) US JP
Net Exports (annual averages)
1971-2000 0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.2
1991-2000 0.1 0.3 0.3 -0.3 0.3 0.2 -0.4 0.1
1991-1995 0.0 0.4 1.0  0.5 0.7 0.6 -0.1 0.0
1996-2000 0.3 0.2     -0.4 -1.1 0.0     -0.2 -0.8 0.2
Domestic Demand (annual averages)
1971-2000 2.1 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.4 3.3 3.2
1991-2000 1.8 1.5 1.3 2.6 1.6 1.8 3.6 1.3
1991-1995 2.0 0.7 0.3 1.3 0.6 0.8 2.4 1.4
1996-2000 1.5 2.3 2.3 3.9 2.5 2.8 4.8 1.2
(1) Data up to 1991 West Germany.
(2) Euro-area  excluding Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain
(3) EU excluding Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain
Source :  Commission services
These findings corroborate the notion, derived previously, that external trade has a
comparatively high importance for the overall development of the German economy.
Apparently this pattern has not changed with re-unification. Furthermore, it appears that the
popular hypothesis that the German growth slowdown in the 1990s was caused by a sustained
loss in external competitiveness in the aftermath of re-unification needs further qualification.
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despite generally unfavourable exchange rate developments and a sharp rise in unit labour
costs in the first half of the 1990s
13. As a corollary these results suggest that the slowdown in
output growth in Germany in the second half of the 1990s was predominantly the result of a
deceleration in domestic demand rather than in net exports (see also the lower panel of Table
1.9).
To see more clearly which demand components were particularly affected, Table 1.10 gives a
further breakdown of domestic demand. The table shows that in Germany the contribution of
private consumption to output growth was weak in comparison with most other EU countries
and even more so in comparison with the US. However, such a difference should not be over-
emphasised as it reflects also institutional features of the provision of certain goods and
services such as education and health care (i.e. public or private provision). More important is
the development over time. In this regard it is noteworthy that during the period from 1996 to
2000 the contribution of private consumption to growth in Germany fell significantly below
its long-term average. Such  a drop did not occur in the EMU/EU partners countries, nor in
the US. As a consequence, more than one half of the output growth differential between
Germany and its EMU/EU partners in the second half of the 1990s is explained by this
demand category alone.
Figure 1.9: Growth Contribution of Net Exports and Terms of Trade
To a large extent the sluggish development of private consumption can be attributed to the
weak growth of household disposable income (Table 1.11). This emerges clearly from a
comparison with the US and the UK but seems to be true also to some extent for France. The
softness of household disposable income growth in Germany seems, in turn, to be related to
weak employment growth and a subdued development of real wages combined with a
substantial increase in the tax burden.
Regarding government consumption it should be noted that its contribution to growth has
declined in almost all countries, particularly in the more recent past, as can be gathered from a
comparison of the long-term average with the annual average contribution in the period 1996-
2000. Although the growth contribution of government consumption is lowest in Germany,
together with Italy, in relative terms the decline was not more pronounced than for the
EMU/EU partner countries on average. Thus, as far as government consumption is concerned
                                                
13  The strong correlation between exports and imports in Germany in combination with the development of the
terms of trade indicates that one of the strategies used by the German export sector in order to cope with the
loss in competitiveness was an increased reliance on cheap imported intermediate products.28
budgetary restraint in the second half of the 1990 did not have a differential impact on growth
in comparison with the EMU/EU area as a whole.
Table 1.10: Growth Contributions of Demand Components
D(1) F I UK EUR(2) EU(3) US JP
Private Consumption (annual averages)
1971-2000 1.3 1.3 1.6 1.8 1.5 1.5 2.3 1.9
1991-2000 1.1 0.8 1.0 1.8 1.0 1.2 2.3 0.9
1991-1995 1.3 0.4 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.6 1.7 1.2
1996-2000 0.9 1.1 1.5 2.6 1.4 1.7 2.9 0.5
Government Consumption (annual averages)
1971-2000 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.5
1991-2000 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.5
1991-1995 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.5
1996-2000 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5
Investment (annual averages)
1971-2000 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.9
1991-2000 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.4 1.2 0.0
1991-1995 0.4     -0.2     -0.2     -0.1     -0.2     -0.2 0.7     -0.3
1996-2000 0.4 0.7 0.8 1.1 0.8 0.9 1.6 0.3
of which: Equipment (annual averages)
1971-2000 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 n.a. n.a. 0.5 0.5
1991-2000 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 n.a. n.a. 1.0 0.3
1991-1995     -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 n.a. n.a. 0.6 0.0
1996-2000 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.9 n.a. n.a. 1.3 0.5
of which: Construction (annual averages)
1971-2000 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 n.a. n.a. 0.2 0.4
1991-2000 0.2     -0.1 0.0 0.0 n.a. n.a. 0.2     -0.2
1991-1995 0.5     -0.2     -0.2     -0.2 n.a. n.a. 0.1     -0.3
1996-2000     -0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 n.a. n.a. 0.4     -0.2
(1) Data up to 1991 West Germany.
(2) Euro-area  excluding Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain
(3) EU excluding Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain
Source :  Commission services
As for investment, it can be seen that the average growth contribution of this demand
category over the longer term is not significantly different for the larger European countries.
What distinguishes Germany from the other countries, however, is that the sharp revival of
investment spending in the second half of the 1990s did not take place. Differentiation
between the two investment categories equipment and construction reveals that it is
predominantly construction investment which is at the root of comparatively sluggish growth
of capital formation. Indeed, compared to its longer-term average the average growth
contribution from equipment investment in Germany increased in the second half of the 1990s
by roughly the same amount as in the other large continental European countries, although the
increase fell considerably short of that in the US and the UK. By contrast, the growth
contribution from construction investment, which for the other large European countries
increased slightly in the second half of the 1990s in comparison with its longer term average,
saw a distinct drop in Germany. As a consequence, construction investment accounts for a
good one third of the growth difference between Germany and its EMU/EU partner countries
during the second half of the 1990s. Developments in the construction sector are dealt with in
more detail in Box 2.
Table 1.11: Real Gross Disposable Income of Households
D(1) F I UK US JP
Gross Disposable Income of Households
1971-2000 3.0 2.3 2.0 2.8 3.1 3.1
1996-2000 1.3 2.1 0.9 2.8 3.4 0.7
(1) Data up to 1991 West Germany.
Source :  OECD Statistical databases29
1.2.7  Conclusions
Weakness in domestic demand has been the principal factor explaining the growth gap
between Germany and its European partners since the mid-1990s. In particular, private
consumption has been dragged down by sluggish growth of households’ disposable income as
employment growth was anaemic and the purchasing power of households was dented by an
increasing tax burden. Construction is the other factor behind the growth gap. The
performance of the construction sector in the second half of the 1990s was severely affected
by the onset of saturation effects in the New Länder, the phasing out of generous public
subsidies for construction investment, especially in the New Länder, and a slow rate
population growth.
Over-capacity  together with budgetary restraint will continue to put a drag on construction
investment for some years to come, particularly in the Eastern part of the country. In the
West, on the other hand, construction investment could revert to positive growth rates in the
medium term as low vacancy rates are starting to kick in for some regions and the demand for
new business premises revives. As serious as the consequences of the ailing construction
sector in Germany on output and employment growth may be, in some sense they appear
inevitable. By contrast weak employment growth, which has in the more recent past
constituted a serious obstacle to a more pronounced rise in economic welfare, is an area
which needs to be tackled through economic reforms. Therefore, there seems to be a need for
a wider-ranging analysis of the system influencing the development of the labour market (e.g.
macro-economic policy mix, competitiveness tax benefit system, wage formation processes,
employment protection regulation etc.). Finally, the hypothesis of a sustained loss in
competitiveness as a major factor in the growth slowdown of the 1990s is difficult to confirm
on the basis of the evolution of the external sector and needs analysed in more detail.30
Box 2: Developments in the German construction sector
B2.1  Large differences between West and East Germany
The Eastern part of Germany saw its construction investment more than double in real terms
between 1991 and 1994 only to fall back by more than 30% in the period up to the year 2001
(Table B2.1). Nevertheless, in 2001 construction in the East remains 40% higher than in
1991. In the West, both the rise in construction investment in the early 1990s and the decline
in the period since 1994 have been much more moderate than in the East. In 2001,
construction investment in the West was 2.5% lower than in 1991, with the decline
accelerating recently.
Table B2.1: Construction Investment (in 1995 prices)
In bn. € 1991   1992   1993   1994   1995   1997   1999   2001  
Total 218.85 242.16 246.53 263.58 258.76 247.63 248.84 228.45
Residential versus Non-residential
Residential 109.77 121.32 126.78 141.56 141.98 142.31 144.91 131.20
Non-Resid. 109.08 120.84 119.75 122.02 116.78 105.32 103.93 97.25
Regional Distribution
West Germany 184.22 192.61 187.22 189.85 183.26 176.34 186.89 179.60
East Germany 34.63 49.55 59.31 73.73 75.5 71.29 61.95 48.85
By Government
Total 38.45 42.07 40.80 40.35 35.11 31.17 32.48 30.28
- residential 1.55 1.44 1.27 0.98 0.83 0.93 0.77 0.88
- non-resid. 36.90 40.63 39.53 39.37 34.28 30.24 31.71 29.40
Source :  Statistisches Bundesamt
Due to the strong rise in the East, construction investment in Germany as a whole was still
4.5% higher in 2001 than in 1991 (but down by 13% if compared to its peak in 1994). As is
evident from Table B2.2, this rise, however, does not affect all components equally:
residential construction is still up by almost one fifth, although 7.5% down from its 1995
peak. Non-residential construction performed clearly worse, being down by more than 10%
compared to 1991 and by more than 20% compared to the 1994 peak.
Nearly 30% of the decline observed in construction since 1994 is due to falling public
investment, practically all of it in non-residential construction. Falling investment by
enterprises makes up the remainder. In the industry sector alone, real construction investment
fell from € 22.57 billion in 1993 to € 16.46 billion in 2000
14.
Government policy had a very strong indirect impact on construction, especially but not
exclusively via fiscal and other budgetary incentives. Important indirect influences on
construction stem from changes in rental legislation and immigration laws.
B2.2  Residential construction
Residential building accounts for almost 60% of total construction investment. As shown by
Table B2.2, activities in residential construction were mainly supported by a strong demand
for owner occupied houses, with the number of newly built owner occupied houses in 2000
clearly higher than in 1994. The construction of rental apartments on the other hand went
down from 284,309 in 1994 to 136,445 in 2000. Given the overall importance of this sector, it
appears that this decline is the most important factor in explaining the very specific
developments of the construction sector in Germany since re-unification.
                                                
14 Cf. Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 18, Reihe 1.3 Hauptbericht 1999, S. 110 ; Fachserie 18, Reihe 1.2
Vorbericht 2001, S. 11331
Box 2 (continued)
This development is partially due to the introduction of the very generous special depreciation
for rental construction in the New Länder and its subsequent drastic reduction. The number of
completed apartment buildings actually declined from a peak of 99,201 in 1997 to 21,042 in
the year 2000, with available indicators showing another deceleration in 2001.
Table B2.2: Completed Dwelling in Germany, 1994-2000





212,354 205,165 188,802 211,056 220,611 237,331 229,715
Apartment
houses
284,309 312,481 292,173 285,586 208,400 167,314 136,445
Others 76,220 85,111 78,513 81,537 71,679 67,993 56,884





181,633 164,101 141,864 156,130 167,322 185,257 182,907
Apartment
houses
255,966 263,439 213,958 186,385 155,387 139,282 115,403
Others 67,580 71,003 60,300 57,835 49,534 45,234 38,450





30,721 41,064 46,938 54,926 53,289 52,074 46,808
Apartment
houses
28,343 49,042 78,215 99,201 53,013 28,032 21,042
Others 8,640 14,108 18,213 23,702 22,145 22,759 18,434
Total 67,704 104,214 143,366 177,829 128,447 102,865 86,284
Source :  Statistisches Bundesamt
However, Table B2.2 also indicates that in nominal terms the decline in the West between its
1995 peak and the year 2000 (115,403) was more important. Up to 1995, the strong rise in
population in West Germany from 1987 on evidently had a huge impact on demand for rental
apartments. Furthermore, since the mid-1990s the federal government has drastically cut back
public subsidies to low-cost housing and has at the same time changed its strategy in this area
from ‘object-oriented subsidisation’ to ‘subject-oriented subsidisation’. While the overall
effect might not have been very important in financial terms, it appears that the marginal
effect on the yields of apartments may have affect investment decision more strongly. This
holds true the more for high income earners, as investment in newly constructed apartments
for rent heavily depend on depreciation allowances. But a falling marginal tax-rate as
introduced by the latest German tax reform package reduces the profitability of investment in
property.
  2. The macro-economic policy mix
2.1 Monetary policy in the 1990s
In order to assess monetary policy one has to take into account its framework, in particular
regime shifts that have taken place in recent years as both the geographical entity and
responsibilities changed. Monetary policy has to be related to the overall situation of Germany
or, from 1999 onward, to its relative position in the Euro-area. The monetary policy stance
could be looked at using Taylor rates and a Monetary Condition Index. Results from these
different analyses could help in assessing monetary conditions in Germany.
2.1.1  Developments in the 1990s
In 1990, inflation was pushed by excessive wage increases and in response official interest rates
were raised on two occasions (Figure 2.1). But the economic performance in 1991 was stronger
than in neighbouring countries and despite the effects of the 1991 tax increases the inflation
outlook had become the main cause for concern. It was this concern that led to a further
tightening of monetary conditions in late 1991. But as monetary growth was approaching the
ceiling of the targeted growth range and inflation exceeded 4%, economic growth came to a
halt. The tightening of monetary conditions in Germany initially increased tensions within the
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS) and had spill-over
effects on monetary conditions in other countries. From the viewpoint of economies where
inflation was lower and unemployment was higher the increase in interest rates did not seem to
be warranted.
In 1992, German short-term rates rose relative to long-term rates (just the opposite of the USA
and Japan). Pressures on prices and wages remained strong as unification strained resources and
led to demands for compensation for tax increases. When it came to addressing internal and
external (ERM) needs, monetary policy concentrated on domestic needs. To fight inflation and
to slow the growth in monetary aggregates the Bundesbank tightened monetary conditions
again. Tight German monetary policy continued to put upward premia on other ERM
economies.
In autumn 1992 the German economy entered recession, i.e. with a certain delay with respect to
neighbouring economies and just a few months after the Bundesbank had raised policy interest
rates again (July 17). On 15 September 1992, one day after the revaluation of the DEM in the
EMS, the Bundesbank started to cut policy interest rates (see Figure 2.1). After the revaluation
of the DEM, monetary policy in Germany continued to ease as the Bundesbank responded to a
weakening economy, the improved inflation outlook and an agreement on the fiscal
consolidation programme. The widening of the ERM bands in August 1993 marked the
beginning of a period of a high degree of interest rate and exchange rate stability due to the
absence of further tensions. Also as a result of the strong DEM, inflation rates came down. The
Bundesbank responded to the decline in inflation rates by lowering the discount rate by 3
percentage points (to 5.25%). This process found support from progress toward fiscal
consolidation putting downward pressure on capital market interest rates and by low wage
increases creating a more favourable inflation environment.
The phase of declining interest rates continued into the recovery of the German economy up to
mid-1994 although monetary growth was already clearly exceeding targets. However, judged by
real short-term interest rates, which were near historical average levels, a relatively strong
DEM, and a yield curve, which - following the global increase in bond yields - had returned to
its more normal slope only shortly before (see Figures 2.2 and 2.3), monetary policy was not
excessively easy. Nevertheless, the stance of monetary policy helped the recovery to become
established and was widely regarded as being broadly appropriate: the output gap closed only
gradually, labour costs were falling due also to labour shedding, fiscal consolidation proceeded
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European currencies. This appreciation came on top of earlier rises in the effective value of the
DEM, particularly in 1992, which had to a large extent been consistent with the determination in
Germany’s external position necessary to finance the high level of investment. The
disappointing outcome of the 1995 wage round provided reasons for an end of interest rate cuts
even though subdued inflation and slack in the economy suggested room for manoeuvre to
reduce short-term interest rates further.
In 1996, economic growth slowed further and the outlook worsened. Short-term interest rates
were reduced considerably to help offset recession forces. The repo rate was allowed to fall
below 3.5% in early 1996 and in April the lower ceiling, the discount rate, was reduced to the
historically low level of 2.5%. The absence of inflationary pressures and the depreciation of the
DEM vis-à-vis the USD implied an easier monetary stance in Germany. As a result, nominal
long-term interest rates remained relatively low while those in the US rose.
Figure 2.2:
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the level prevailing in the
ERM core countries like
Germany. Moreover,
bond yields declined to record low levels due to the low-inflation environment and to the "flight
to quality" following the crises in Southeast Asia and Russia in 1997 and 1998 respectively.
With the ECB’s policy set according to the needs of the Euro-area as a whole, the monetary
component in the
national policy mix
cannot be expected to
fit well the
circumstances of all
economies at all times.
In fact, while the
initial repo rate of 3%
in the Euro-area
implied a decline as
compared to the
average of policy rates
in the Euro-area in
mid-1998, for
Germany there was no
change. In early 1999
monetary conditions




growth prospects the ECB lowered the repo rate in early April 1999 to 2.5 percent.
Throughout the year 2000 the ECB continued raising the official short-term interest rates.
Between November 1999 and October 2000 interest rates were increased by 1¾ percentage
points in six steps, raising the minimum bid rate of the ECB’s main refinancing operations up to
4.75%. This tightening, however, did not mean a turn to restrictive monetary policy as it mainly
responded to higher risks to price stability (economic upswing, oil price increases, decline in the
USD-EUR exchange rate).
2.1.2  Measuring monetary policy
An analysis could be based on two monetary policy indicators: (1) The Taylor rule, which
makes the short-term interest rate dependent on current cyclical and inflation developments. (2)
Figure 2.3:
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The Monetary Conditions Index (MCI), which combines changes in the real short-term interest
rate and in the effective exchange rate in one variable.
Taylor rates assume that
a central bank sets its
policy interest rates
depending on the current
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the business cycle and
inflation. The cyclical
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using the output gap
measure while inflation
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indicate that the actual
interest rate was within
the band derived from
calculations under
alternative assumptions
up to late 1998 (Figure 2.5). As the Stage III of EMU was approaching the actual interest rate
exceeded the Taylor rate, i.e. the interest rate chosen with respect to the whole Euro-area was
too high by German needs. However, in early 2000 the acceleration in economic growth in the
Euro-area triggered an interest rate that was above the one that would have been appropriate
according to Taylor-rate estimates, while it was mainly appropriate for the Euro-area as a whole
in early 2000 (see lower part in Figure 2.5). The decline in interest rates in 2001 changed the
assessment again as the interest rate appears now almost appropriate for Germany, but too low
for the Euro-area as a whole.
                                                
15  See Clarida, R. and M. Gertler 1996.
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The calculation of MCIs has led to the same mixed results as Taylor rates. Again the
Bundesbank has subscribed to a more sceptical view, while others, most notably private banks,
use MCIs as a standard tool of economic analysis. The Commission services use MCIs as a
supplementary device in analysis. The results obtained by the MCI suggest a tightening stance
in Germany since the mid-1990s and a marked easing in the most recent period (Figure 2.6).
Looking at the components of the MCI a marked easing in 1999/2000 can be identified, which
can be attributed to a fall in the short-term real interest rate (Figure 2.7). In 1994-95 and towards
the end of 1997 the interest-rate induced easing was obscured by a real depreciation of the
DEM. By contrast, in 1999 the decline in the external value of the euro came along with a
decline in the real interest rate resulting in an easing of monetary conditions. The significant
effects on the German real effective exchange rate and the contribution to the MCI indicate the
great importance of USD denominated foreign trade for the German economy. This view is
supported by the relatively small contribution of the real interest rate.
2.1.3  Assessment
The description of the monetary policy framework has shown that there was a continuation in
style between the approach chosen by the Bundesbank and that of the ECB. The Bundesbank
has always given clear priority to “safeguarding the currency” and understood this as achieving
price stability targets of the domestic economy. This has often resulted in appreciation pressure
on the DEM as other economies participating in the ERM of the EMS had somewhat higher
inflation rates. This attitude also contributes to the question whether monetary policy has
created a growth supportive framework. On the one hand, the strength of the currency vis-à-vis
other EMS countries helped to achieve price stability while weighing on export volumes. On the
other hand, the appreciation expectations and the de-synchronisation of macroeconomic
developments in the follow-up of re-unification created tensions in the EMS which can hardly
be regarded as growth supportive. In that regard one can have doubts whether monetary policy
has been growth supportive at all times. As regards the first years of Stage III of EMU monetary
conditions have not been an obstacle to economic growth, but it has to be acknowledged that the
one-size-fits-all monetary policy produced greater stimuli to those economies which had much
higher real interest rates before 1998.Figure 2.7a:
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looser monetary conditions2.2  Budgetary policy in Germany in the 1990s
2.2.1  Immediate impact of re-unification
Following the two oil price shocks, the period from 1982 onwards was characterised by the
absence of major international turbulence in the economic field. Not least as a consequence of
the more favourable environment, general government finances improved from a deficit of 3.7%
of GDP in 1981 to a surplus of 0.1% in 1989; at the same time, the debt level fell to a value of
close to 40% of GDP
16. The relatively favourable situation allowed for a reduction in income
taxes by DEM 50 billion implemented in three steps (1986, 1988 and 1990). The third and most
important step, which brought a net tax relief of DEM 25 billion was implemented on 1 January
1990. Following as it did the downfall of the Berlin wall by less than two months, the timing of
this third step was unfortunate because it coincided with the sharp rise in demand for West
German products and was therefore clearly pro-cyclical in nature.
The fast and unexpected re-unification, preceded by the introduction of the Deutsche Mark in
the GDR on 1 July 1990, put a huge strain on public finances due to three factors: First, the rise
in Eastern salaries was much faster than the rise in productivity, driving unit labour costs to
unsustainable levels, especially in the tradable sectors, which were immediately exposed to
international competition. With unemployment rising as a consequence, the complete
introduction of the West German social security system meant that social security payments
surged, putting a huge burden both on the social security systems and on government budgets.
Secondly, the exchange rate of 1:1 implied that the debt of East Germany (including its public
housing sector and the debt of East German companies) was at least partially converted at this
high rate. It was ultimately the federal budget which had to shoulder most of the bill, because
the privatisation of East German enterprises via the Treuhand-Anstalt required large subsidies to
be paid in order to make the now overly indebted enterprises economically viable; the
cumulated losses of the Treuhand reached  DEM 210.4 billion in 1995, when they were
integrated into the overall government debt
17. At the same time, the debt of the East German
public sector (DEM 102.6 bn. including Ausgleichsfonds Währungsumstellung) and part of the
debt of the housing sector (DEM 29.1 bn.) were directly added to the public debt. The overall
level of government debt, which had been slightly lower than 40% of GDP in 1989, and which
independent of the debt of the Treuhandanstalt had already risen to 49.4% in 1994, jumped to a
value close to the reference value of the Maastricht Treaty, i.e. 60% of GDP (Table 2.1).
Thirdly, the appalling state of infrastructure in the East meant that huge public investments were
necessary to allow the East to catch up with the West. In addition, the federal government
granted important tax breaks for the construction of rental apartments and houses to bring
housing standards up to those prevailing in the West. However, these fiscal allowances turned
out to be a major burden on government revenues, because the reaction of income tax payers
was substantially stronger than anticipated by the legislator. Box 3 deals in more detail with
financial transfers to the New Länder.
                                                
16  In the following, no direct comparisons of public finance data of the 1980s with those for the 1990s will be
undertaken as the change from ESA 79 to ESA 95 has rendered many ratios not comparable (cf. also SVR,
1999/2000, p. 104)
17  As these losses were not part of the annual burden, they were not incorporated into the deficit figures of the
corresponding years. If these subsidies were integrated into the official deficit figure of the respective accrual
years, the deficit would have reached figures above 7% of GDP in the early 1990s.Table 2.1: Deficit and Debt (in % of GDP)
91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00
Actual deficit -2.9 -2.6 -3.1 -2.4 -3.5 -3.4 -2.7 -2.2 -1.6 -1.3*
Real GDP growth - 2.2 -1.1 2.3 1.7 0.8 1.4 2.0 1.8 3.0
Cyclically adjusted balance -4.9 -4.4 -3.4 -2.8 -3.7 -3.2 -2.3 -1.9 -1.3 1.6
Debt 40.4 43.1 47.2 49.4   57.1* 59.8 61 60.9 61.3 60.3
*: without one-off UMTS receipts corresponding to 2.5% of GDP,
**: ‘jump’ in the debt level due to assumption of several funds directly linked to re-unification
Source: Commission sources (AMECO)
To meet the unexpectedly high financial burden of re-unification
18 the federal government in
1991 first introduced a strategy aimed at increasing revenues (e.g. through the so-called
solidarity charge on top of income tax). This drove the cyclically-adjusted ratio of total receipts
to GDP up from 42.3% in 1991 to 45.8% in 1993. However, these measures were insufficient to
solve the rising budgetary problems while contributing to the deepest recession observed in
Germany in the post-war area. Still, the government had no choice but to adapt a pro-cyclical
stance, reducing the cyclically-adjusted deficit by close to 1 percentage point in 1993 alone.
While 1994 showed a clear improvement in public finances and economic growth, the years
from 1995 onwards were characterised by a combination of weak economic growth and ongoing
efforts to put public finances back on a sustainable path, not least  to comply with the criteria on
European Monetary Union. As a consequence, both the revenue and the expenditure ratio to
GDP rose further, reaching 46.5% and 49.2% of GDP in 1997, the reference year for the
decision on membership in EMU.
In order to gauge the impact of budgetary policy during the 1990s on the economy at large,
Table 2.2 presents figures for the cyclically adjusted government balance excluding interest
payments, as estimated by DG ECFIN. The table shows that, judging by this indicator,
budgetary policy during the first half of the 1990s was more restrictive in Germany than in  the
Euro-area/EU on average. But between 1995 and 2000 budgetary consolidation efforts in
Germany were smaller than in the EMU/EU partner countries on average. Including the year
2001 even reinforces this argument. As a consequence, on the basis of this indicator the
hypothesis that a restrictive global budgetary policy stance after the mid-1990s was an
important factor in comparatively slow growth in Germany cannot be confirmed.
Table 2.2: Cyclically adjusted primary balance (in % of GDP)
DF I UK EUR(1) EU(2)
1991 -2.0 -0.2 -0.5 0.6 0.2 0.4
1995 -0.1 -1.4 4.0 -1.9 1.4 0.7
2000 1.7 1.6 4.6 4.0 3.3 3.7
2001 0.7 1.5 4.9 3.0 3.4 3.6
(1) Euro-area  excluding Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain
(2) EU excluding Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden
Source :  Commission services
2.2.2  Composition of revenues
On the revenue side, there has been a clear increase in all components since 1991, as shown in
Table 2.3. The ratio of indirect taxes to GDP went up from 11.1% in 1991 to reach a peak of
12.2% in 1999 (owed mostly but not exclusively to the introduction of the ‘ecological tax’). The
rise in direct taxes was as important as that of indirect taxes, due not only to the introduction of
the solidarity tax, but also to the absence of a major income tax reform, which lead to a
significant bracket creeping effect. The financial impact of re-unification, weak economic
                                                
18  While difficult to calculate, the annual net transfers from West Germany to East Germany are estimated at
around 4% of GDP per year in the 1990s.growth and a rise in the number of pensioners was clearly strongest on social security
contributions, which saw their share in GDP rise from 17.2% in 1991 to a peak of 19.7% in
1997. At the same time social security contributions rates increased from 35.5% in 1990 to 42%
by 1997, falling back gently since then to around 41% by 2001 (see Table 2.4).
Table 2.3: Development of General Government Revenues (in % of GDP)
91 92 93 94 95 95 97 98 99 00
Revenues (in % of GDP)
Of which:
44.1 45.5 46.2 46.6 46.1 46.1 46.6 46.6 47.4 47.1
   -Taxes on products & imports 11.1 11.1 11.5 11.8 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.6 12.2 12.1
   -Taxes on income & wealth 11.4 11.7 11.5 11.0 11.1 11.5 11.2 11.5 12.0 12.5
   -Soc. Sec. Contribution 17.2 17.6 18.2 18.6 18.8 19.4 19.7 19.3 19 18.7
p.m. Tax burden 40.7 41.5 42.1 42.5 42.3 43.2 43.2 43.2 44.0 44.0
Source: Commission sources (AMECO)
Table 2.4: Social Security Contribution Rates (West Germany only)
Total Pension Unemployment Sickness Old age
1990 35.6 18.7 4.3 12.6 -
1993 37.4 17.5 6.5 13.4 -
1996 40.9 19.2 6.5 13.5 1.7
1997 42.0 20.3 6.5 13.5 1.7
1999 41.4 19.7 6.5 13.5 1.7
2001 40.9 19.1 6.5 13.6 1.7
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank and Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs
2.2.3  Composition of expenditure
The rise in the overall expenditure ratio masks some interesting developments. Notably, social
benefits and interest payments rose strongly (Table 2.5). While the later is due to the huge rise
in public debt resulting from the way re-unification was handled economically, the rise in social
benefits is the more interesting development. It is clearly larger than the rise in social security
contributions described above. At first glance, such a development appears to contradict the
basic principle of the German social security system, which stipulates that in case of higher than
expected expenditure the contribution rates would have to rise in the short-term. This did not
occur because the divergence between the expenditure and revenue side in the social security
system was balanced by increased transfers from the general budget. In the early 1990s, this was
justified by the fact that especially the pension system had to shoulder burdens linked to re-
unification and the integration of so-called ‘ethnic Germans’, who where entitled to pension
payments but had never paid contributions. In 1999, the introduction of the so-called ‘ecological
tax’ to finance the decrease in pension contribution rates has further increased the tendency to
finance the social security system out of the general budget.
Table 2.5: Development of General Government Expenditures (in % of GDP)
91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00
Expenditures (in % of GDP)
Of which:
47.1 48.1 49.3 49.0 49.6 50.3 49.3 48.8 48.9 45.9
   -Social benefits (total) 26.2 27.3 28.5 28.9 29.5 30.9 30.6 30.2 30.1 29.7
   -Compensation of employees 9.0 9.2 9.3 9.0 9.0 8.9 8.7 8.5 8.4 8.1
   -Gross fixed capital formation 2.7 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.9
Source: Commission sources (AMECO)
At the same time, the sustainability of public finances had to be guaranteed and the Maastricht
criteria to be fulfilled. The strategy pursued by the federal, regional and local governments
relied on a reduction in public investment and a policy aimed at reducing public employment
and at achieving moderate wage increases in the public sector.As a consequence the structure of expenditure changed significantly over the decade between
1991 and 2000, with outlays for the compensation of employees and investment considerably
scaled back in terms of GDP while social transfers rose rapidly. As shown by Table 2.6
Budgetary consolidation in Europe in the 1990s made for a decline in the GDP ratios of the
government wage bill and of investment outlays in most European countries. On the other hand,
the rise in social transfers was particularly dynamic in Germany. While the EMU/EU average
for this category of expenditure remained unchanged, respectively decline slightly, in Germany
it went up by 3.7 percentage points, an amount which is unlatched by any of the other larger EU
countries. In the light of the need to reduce the deficit, this resulted in a strong upward pressure
on the tax burden.
Table 2.6: Individual government expenditure items (in % of GDP)
% of GDP DF I UK EUR(1) EU(2) US JP
Final consumption expenditure
1991 19.20 22.54 20.28 20.71 21.63 21.54 17.24 13.31
2000 18.98 23.29 18.22 18.82 21.07 20.54 14.39 16.67
of which: compensation of employees
1991 9.00 12.69 12.56 11.67 12.53 12.49 10.78 ..
2000 8.12 13.57 10.54 7.31 11.85 10.68 9.11 ..
Social transfers
1991 26.19 30.24 28.03 25.61 29.46 28.75 .. 14.5
2000 29.87 32.24 28.04 24.64 29.42 28.18 .. 19.3
Investment
1991 2.74 3.63 3.23 2.40 3.29 3.03 2.65 4.88
2000 1.86 3.01 2.41 1.15 2.65 2.18 2.70 5.02
(1) Euro-area  excluding Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain
(2) EU excluding Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden
Source :  Commission services
2.2.4  The year 1996 as a turning point?
The year 1996 constituted a turning point in the sense that many of the ratios analysed above
reached their peak in that year and have declined during most of the following years. This is true
for the revenue and expenditure to GDP ratio, the overall tax burden, social security
contributions (1997) and total social security benefits, interest ratio and final public
consumption.
The budgetary problems Germany faced again in 1995 (the deficit rose from 2.4% of GDP in
1994 to 3.5% in 1995), clearly showed that a more courageous approach was necessary in order
to comply with the criteria on EMU and that this would also require a tighter control of social
transfers than observed in the preceding years (cf. Table 2.4 for social benefits).
The fact that 1996 constituted a turning point is even more visible in the cyclically adjusted
revenue and expenditure ratios (Table 2.7). On the revenue side, there was a stabilisation
(in % of GDP) between 1996 and 1998, while the expenditure ratio could be cut back by 1.6
percentage points. Developments in 1999 were less favourable: While revenues expanded
strongly, expenditure stagnated in terms of GDP.
Table 2.7: Cyclically Adjusted Ratios (in % of GDP)
91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00
Revenues 42.4 43.8 45.9 46.2 45.8 47.1 47.0 46.9 47.7 46.8
Expenditure 47.3 48.2 49.3 49.0 49.6 50.3 49.3 48.8 48.9 48.4
Deficit -4.9 -4.4 -3.4 -2.8 -3.8 -3.2 -2.3 -2.9 -1.2 -1.6
Source: Commission sources (AMECO)
The deficit went strongly down at the Länder level, but rose at the level of municipalities and
decreased clearly less at the federal level (Table 2.8). This last development is all the moreregrettable as revenues had been expanding very strongly also at the federal level, even after
deducting the revenue from the newly introduced ‘ecological tax’.
The positive trend towards a lower expenditure ratio, however, returned in the year 2000. The
change in strategy clearly visible in 2000 is constituted by the simultaneous decrease in revenue
due to the implementation of income tax reform (first step already taken in 1999); as Table 2.8
shows, revenues as percentage of GDP decreased by almost 1 percentage point in cyclically
adjusted terms in the year 2000 only.
Table 2.8: Deficit in bn. DEM/€ for Different Levels of Government
Bund Länder Local Soc. Sec. Total
1991 94.3 17.5 -3.6 -21.2 87.0
1992 48.1 21.6 7.2 3.3 80.3
1993 69.4 33.2 4.0 -5.7 100.9
1994 37.9 41.8 5.8 -3.5 82.0
1995 46.6 41.7 8.6 14.9 111.7
1996 67.3 40.6 1.6 13.1 122.5
1997 58.5 43.1 -0.3 -1.9 99.3
1998 65.1 28.3 -10.5 -5.1 77.8
1999* 20.8 9.7 -2.3 -6.0 22.2
2000*,** 25.6 10.4 -1.9 -1.9 32.2
Source: Statisches Bundesamt; Finanzstatistik
*: in bn. €; **: excluding UMTS receipts
2.2.5  Conclusions
The  strong rise in salaries following monetary union in Germany, the impact of the chosen
exchange rate on East German debt and the appalling state of infrastructure all combined in the
aftermath of re-unification to drive up social security contributions, the deficit and the debt
level.
What is worse, the tax allowances for housing construction in the East did not only induce a
shortfall in revenues, but provoked a boom in the early 1990s and a bust ever since.
Furthermore, with a million apartments now estimated to be empty in the East, these allowances
led to a clear misallocation of scarce resources.
With developments in deficit and debt threatening the sustainability of public finances, the
federal government slowly embarked on a policy of reducing expenditures, mostly in the public
service and in public investment. This policy not only limited the growth contribution of public
consumption, but also might already have started to constitute a burden on the growth potential
of the German economy. In addition, the growth potential has also suffered due to the
unfortunate combination of a rise in the tax (and social security) burden and only minor changes
in the generosity of social transfers. Since 1996, however, the consolidation strategy pursued
appears more positive in qualitative terms, i.e. more conducive to economic growth in the
medium-term.
In 1999, when expenditure restraint was interrupted at the federal level, a new element,
however, was added to the strategy pursued: While expenditure was to continue its decline, the
burden of social security and taxes was to be lightened at the same time. While this strategy
promises to improve further on the medium-term growth potential, there is, however, an evident
danger that expenditure overruns occur (as happened in the health sector and at the lower levels
of government in the year 2001), putting into question the credibility of  envisaged
consolidation process.Box 3:  Economic policies in the new Länder
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B3.1  The size of fiscal transfers
There is a major gap between production income and disposable income in East Germany which
is financed by transfers from the West. These transfers mean that there is a significant difference
between regional demand (measured in terms of the aggregate absorption of households, firms
and the government) and regional production (measured in terms of GDP). This disparity
between demand and production gives rise to an important deficit (equal to public transfers and
capital flows), estimated at 46% of regional GDP in 1999 (which compares to an estimated 12%
of regional GDP in southern Italy)
20. As can be seen in Table B3.1, West German (and EU) net
transfers of about 4% of the West German GDP accounted for roughly half of East Germany’s
GDP in the early 1990s and about a third towards the end of the 1990s. Out of the total gross
transfers of about DEM 180 billion per year in the second half of the 1990s, DEM 80 billion
were social security benefits while only about DEM 30 billion were investment and about DEM
15 million were subsidies.
21 While this imbalance has often been criticised, it was hardly to be
avoided since it was the consequence of fully adopting the West German institutional and legal
framework, including the welfare system.
Table B3.1: Fiscal transfers to the New Länder in DEM billion, 1991-1999
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
(Plan)
Gross transfers to the new
Länder
Federal government budget 1) 75 88 114 114 135 138 131 134 145
German Unity Fund 2) 31 24 15 5
Statutory pension insurance funds 3) 5 9 12 17 19 18 19 18
Federal Labour Office 4) 25 38 38 28 23 26 26 27 27
West Länder/ municipalities5) 5 5 10 14 10 11 11 11 12
Total gross transfers 6) 135 146 162 164 178 180 176 183 191
Return flows
Additional tax revenue 7) 31 35 37 41 43 45 45 45 48
A d d i t i o n a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  r e v e n u e 222222222
T o t a l 3 33 73 94 34 54 74 74 75 0
Total intra-German net transfers 102 109 123 120 133 133 129 136 141
in % of West German GDP 9) 3.7 3.8 4.2 4.0 4.2 4.2 4.0 4.0 4.1
European Union budget 8) 455677777
Total net transfers 106 114 128 126 140 140 136 143 148
in % of East German GDP 9) 52.3 43.8 40.2 34.2 35.6 34.2 32.6 33.6 34.1
1) As of 1995 also tax renouncements of the federal government on the basis of the reorganisation of the fiscal equalisation scheme
2) Debt redemption, excluding the subsidies of federal government and the Länder
3) Net balance East excluding federal government transfers
4) Net balance East including federal government transfers to the Federal Labour Office
5) As of 1995 essentially revenues within the framework of the new fiscal equalisation scheme
6) Excluding double counting of federal government transfers to the Federal Labour Office (see footnote 4)
7) Estimate; as of 1996 including the impact of the annual tax law
8) Estimate
9) Berlin included in West German GDP
Source: Bundesministerium der Finanzen; no data after 1999
The immediate adoption of the West German welfare system – irrespective of the huge
differences in economic situation - has not only proved to be expensive in fiscal terms, but also
in terms of persistently high unemployment. In general, the decision to take up a job depends
mainly on the expected difference in real disposable income minus the transaction
                                                
19  This box mainly draws from section II of Davies/Hallet 2001.
20  Cf. Sinn/ Westermann 2001.
21  Deutsche Bundesbank 1998Box 3 (continued)
(and social) costs. Hence, people take up a job only if they expect an increase in purchasing
power taking into account the costs of moving, local prices, taxation, social transfers etc. The
social security system, while indispensable for those who cannot provide for their own income,
takes away much of the pressure on unemployed people to move to areas where they could find
employment or to take on a lower-paying job. While certain elements have been reinforced in
recent years to condition unemployment benefits on the preparedness to move, these have been
applied rather reluctantly. Particular problems at the lower end of the wage scale arise from the
tax-benefit system which reduces incentives to create or take up jobs in that it introduces wage
floors and sometimes makes employment financially less attractive than remaining unemployed.
B3.2  The efficiency of regional policy
Since 1996, the new German Länder fully participate in the sophisticated (and therefore
complicated) scheme of fiscal equalisation (Finanzausgleich) between the different
administrative levels of Bund (federal government), Länder (states) and Gemeinden (local
communities). In June 2001, an agreement modifying certain elements of the Finanzausgleich
was reached between the federal government and the Länder governments. It was facilitated by
the federal government’s commitment to take over some public debt from the Länder and to
finance a second “Solidarity Pact” for East Germany from 2005 to 2019 totalling about € 156
billion. The latter will have a decreasing path (from € 10.4 billion in 2005 to € 2.1 billion in
2019) of which € 51 billion is ring-fenced for business and infrastructure development while the
remaining € 105 billion will be unconditional. In addition, a whole range of programmes is
specifically targeting East Germany.
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Several innovation and technology schemes, although most of them are also applied to West
German regions, are a particular focus of government programmes targeting the innovation
capacity of small and medium-sized firms in East Germany. These schemes concentrate on
directly strengthening corporate innovation, promoting co-operation between firms and
universities and research centres. They support regional innovation competence centres and
promote universities and technical colleges as well as expanding the scientific and research
centres.
Economic development policy is composed of different elements. First, the Bund-Länder “Joint
Task for Improving the Regional Economic Structure”, to which all new Länder are eligible,
gives assistance to private investment and local infrastructure related to private investment.
Maximum rates of assistance which vary according to sector, firm size and structural problems
of a region can reach 50% for investment grants and 80% for local infrastructure. Second, East
Germany has been eligible for EU Structural Funds assistance under Objective 1 since 1991.
The Community Support Framework for the period 2000-2006 has been adopted in June 2000
and has a financial volume of EU funds of € 20.7 billion, which are co-financed by national
public (€ 12.4 billion) and private money (€ 17.2 billion). Third, a tax investment grant is given
for initial investment at a rate of up to 12.5% for large firms and up to 25% for SMEs, increased
by 2.5 percentage points in border regions (INTERREG III regions). Fourth, several specific
SME schemes are channelled through state-owned banks (Deutsche Ausgleichsbank and
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau which have been merged recently) with various financial
instruments such as support to start-ups with equity capital, loans or guarantees.
Infrastructure investment has been a focus of public investment in East Germany. In the
transport sector, about 50% of the federal investment programme 1999-2002, (which totals
                                                
22  Cf. Bundesministerium der Finanzen 2001, pp.53ff.Box 3 (continued)
€ 34.5 billion), are earmarked for railways, roads and waterways in East Germany. This is
complemented by an Operational Programme of the European Regional Development Fund
(ERDF) on transport infrastructure with a total volume of € 3.2 billion until 2006. In the context
of the Solidarity Pact, € 3.4 billion per year are foreseen for investment projects of the East
Länder and Gemeinden. Additional measures receiving public finance are on urban
development and the housing sector.
Active labour market policy (ALMP) measures are being undertaken by both national and EU
programmes by a range of programmes on training, job creation, wage subsidies, financing of
reduced working time and early retirement. ALMP in the new Länder had a financial volume of
about € 11 billion in the years 1999 and 2000 respectively. Most measures target problem
groups such as long-term, old and young unemployed. On annual average in 2000, there were
about 233,000 participants in training schemes, 192,000 in job creation schemes, 120,000 in
jobs with subsidised labour costs, 90,000 in early retirement schemes, 35,000 in youth
unemployment and 48,000 in other schemes, totalling 717,000 participants.
A joint evaluation of these different policies is not available, while there are many indicators,
studies and evaluations of single programmes. Regarding innovation and technology, most
R&D indicators show that existing firms and universities devote resources to R&D equalling
between 75% and 100% of the level in West Germany (Table B3.2). However, given the weak
economic structure in East Germany, there is a major gap when indicators are related to total
population.
Table B3. 2 : Indicators on R&D in eastern and western Germany
East West West = 100
R&D employees in % of all employed (1997) 3.49 4.24 82
R&D expenditure in % of total revenue (1997) 1.86 2.44 76
Patent registrations per 100,000 inhabitants (1995-98)   70 249 28
Private R&D expenditure in DEM per inhabitant (1995-97) 215 792 27
Expenditure of universities in DEM per inhabitant (1995-97)       1631      1724 95
Academic and artistic employed per 100,000 inhabitants (average
1995-98)
214 248 86
Source : DIW/IWH/IfW 2000, p.15 ; Pohl 2000, p. 228
In the context of the Joint Task, ECU 8.7 billion of a volume of ECU 30 billion were spent
between 1996 and 1998 to promote private investment. They were to create 108,000 new jobs
and to secure 300,000 existing jobs. ECU 3 billion were spent on local infrastructure projects.
23
The Joint Task foresees a regional differentiation of maximum rates of assistance to private
investment with a bias against better-performing regions, i.e. rates of assistance to private
investment are lower in those areas with higher growth.
24 The argumentation is that other
instruments such as R&D or urban policy measures will strengthen these growth clusters
anyway.
The volume of subsidies peaked in 1995 at more than ECU 18 billion and decreased to € 13
billion by 1999 (Figure B3.1). While the volume of state aid has remained fairly stable at above
€ 8 billion, the decline is mostly due to a special depreciation scheme for investment in the new
Länder, which came to an end in 1998. An additional factor is the abolition of the wealth tax
                                                
23  Cf. Bundesregierung 1999; job estimates based on approved applications.
24  The so-called “A-areas of assistance” have maximum rates of 50% for SMEs and 35% for other firms whereas
the so-called ”B-areas of assistance” have rates of 43% and 28% respectively, the latter being, as of 1 January
2000, the labour-market regions of Berlin, Dresden, Leipzig, Jena, Schwerin, Halle/Saale, Chemnitz,
Magdeburg, Eisenach, Sonneberg, Grimma and Belzig as well as parts of the labour-market regions of Erfurt,
Weimar, Pirna, Zwickau, Bautzen and GothaBox 3 (continued)
and the business capital tax in the West that had never been introduced in the East so that they
were no longer accounted as tax breaks. Per DEM 1000 of GDP, there were DEM 182 of
subsidies in 1991 and DEM 97 in 1999 in the East, while the value was rather stable at about
DEM 30 in West Germany.
25
Figure B3.1: State aid and tax breaks in the new Länder in billion ECU/€, 1991-1999
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank 2000 (based on data from Federal Ministry of Finance)
The number of start-ups and liquidations in East Germany can be seen as a further indicator for
the success of these various measures (Figure B3.2). The number of start-ups halved from
140,000 in 1991 to 74,000 in 1994, and increased again to 96,000 in 1998.
26 However, at the
same time the number of liquidations increased steadily from 11,000 in 1991 to 87,000 in 1998,
leading to a total addition of only 9,000 in 1998. Nevertheless, adding up the total balance from
1991-1998, a net 328,000 enterprises have been created and survived.
A further indicator for the success of policies in the new Länder is the volume of investment
which, in order to converge towards the West German economy, needs to be higher for a
considerable period of time. In per capita terms, gross fixed capital formation in constant prices
has indeed been higher than in West Germany since 1993, by more than 50% in 1995 but then
declining to 24% in 1998 (Figure B3.3). However, it must be taken into account that the figures
also include public investment which have a considerable share of total investment in East
Germany. In most years, about two thirds of fixed investment have been in buildings, while
only one third went into equipment. This is a problem with regard to private housing where
over-capacities have built up so that an estimated 1 million apartments are now deserted.  Most
of them are low-quality standard GDR houses – leading to calls for public funding to tear down
those buildings. The capital stock per person employed, excluding renting and agriculture, is
estimated to have only increased from 46% of the West German level in 1991 to a level of 76%
in 1998.
27
                                                
25  Cf. Pohl 2000, p.233 based on data from Federal Ministry of Finance.
26  Actual market entries, estimated on the basis of commercial business registrations, applications for the Federal
financial support programme ERP and on empirical inquiries. It must be taken into account though, that the
high number of start-ups in East Germany in the early 1990s was partially the outcome of the restructuring and
privatisation of GDR socialist firms (“Kombinate”) with a very high vertical integration and social policy
functions.
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Figure B3.2: Start-ups and liquidations in East Germany in 1000, 1991-1998
Source: Hauser 2000
The impact of the EU Structural Funds programme in East Germany since 1994 has been
simulated by a sectoral macroeconometric model (“HERMIN”).
28 In spite of the limited size of
Structural Funds (and national public co-financing), declining from an initial 2% of GDP to
around 1.2% in the year 2006, the combined demand-side and supply-side effects have
increased from 3% in 1994 to above 4% in the period 2000-2006. After 2006, when for
methodological reasons the simulation assumes Structural Funds payments to stop, the effects
level off to supply-side effects of about 1.5% in 2010. Similarly, the unemployment rate is more
than 2 percentage points lower than without the Structural Funds programme throughout most
of the years of the period 1994 to 2006. However, after 2006 the effect on unemployment
diminishes due to the model’s feature that the continuing supply-side effects mainly have an
effect on productivity rather than on employment.
Figure B3.3: Gross fixed capital formation per capita 1991-1999 (1995 prices)*
*) in 1000 ECU/€
Source: Arbeitskreis “Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung der Länder”
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Regarding public infrastructure, a study by two economic research institutes (DIW and RWI)
estimated that in 2005 East Germany will still have a deficit in infrastructure relative to West
Germany of a value of between € 135 and 140 billion.
29 And this in spite of major achievements
in adding, modernising and upgrading infrastructure over the last decade. A new calculation by
DIW arrives at a lower value of € 80 billion.
30 Figure B3.4 illustrates that the public capital
stock per inhabitant is already higher than in the West in several public functions, in particular
in social institutions, while there are major deficits in waste water treatment, roads, universities
and schools. Notably, the first are usually labelled as “soft” factors of location whereas many of
the latter tend to be the “hard” factors which are indispensable for attracting investment.
Figure B3.4: Public gross fixed capital stock of East German Länder and Gemeinden by
           functions in % of West German Länder (excluding city Länder), 1999
Source: DIW/IWH/IfW 2000
A review of existing evaluation studies on the impact of active labour market policies in East
Germany arrives at the following main conclusions:
31
First, regarding measures on further training, some studies show positive results which are
however not consistent over different specifications regarding time and target groups. Most
microeconomic studies find no significant impact of further training although macroeconomic
analyses on Germany as a whole find a reduction of regional long-term unemployment.
Second, for work provision schemes (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen, “ABM”), only one study
arrives at positive effects while three other studies find significantly negative effects.
Macroeconomic analyses of Germany as a whole find a positive impact of ABM.
Given the available data and the methodological heterogeneity of the studies, the authors
conclude that the impact of training measures and ABM is at best low, although not
                                                
29  DIW/IWH/IfW 2000, p.24, based on DIW/ifo/RWI/ILS: Solidarpakt II – Infrastrukturelle Nachholbedarfe
Ostdeutschlands, March 2000, unpublished.
30  Cf. Vesper 2001




























necessarily negligible. Two studies recently carried out for the Federal Ministry of Finance
criticise the consistently negative effects of ABM in reducing the incentives to look for aregular
job for two reasons.
32 First, the wage is paid at 20% less than those in collective agreements and
is therefore often higher than for many regular jobs paid outside collective agreements. Second,
participation in ABM renews the right to unemployment benefits that are higher than
unemployment assistance to which long-term unemployed are entitled; this has already been
abolished for training measures in 1998. The overall conclusion is that ALMP need to be better
targeted to specific problem groups and the requirements of the labour market, but should not
serve merely as a means of reducing unemployment temporarily by creating a second labour
market.
                                                
32  Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung 2000 and Schneider et al. 20002.2.A  Annex: The effects of German fiscal policy in the 1990s:
It is likely that the German growth potential has been strongly influenced by the effects re-
unification had on public finances. Changes in income taxes and strongly rising social security
contributions have driven the tax wedge up (Table 2A.1). In combination with moderate wage
increases and only minor changes to social security benefits, these developments have at least
not increased incentives to take up a job
33.
Table 2A.1: Total Tax Wedge on Labour
80 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00
D 48.9 49.1 49.2 50.1 51.0 52.0 52.0 52.7 53.0 53.3 53.8 53.7
F 49.9 53.2 53.5 53.1 53.4 54.3 54.5 55.7 55.7 55.4 56.1 56.0
EUR-11 45.0 48.5 48.9 49.3 50.4 50.7 50.7 51.2 51.5 51.5 51.9 51.8
Source: Commission services; for the method of calculation cf. Martinez-Mongay (2000)
What are the short and medium-run growth and employment effects of the increase in
government expenditure and the strategy adopted to finance these additional expenditures by the
German government? More precisely to what extent can the lower growth in Germany in the
second half of the 90 be explained by the long run consequences of these fiscal developments
documented above?
Standard macroeconomic models predict that a permanent fiscal expansion - if financed by
distortionary taxation - could potentially generate substantial “hangover effects”, after the
positive demand stimulus has petered out. An important transmission channel from a fiscal
expansion to lower growth operates via crowding out of private investment. The crowding-out
effect arises from a loss of competitiveness, higher expected wage costs and lower expected net
profits from higher taxes. In the case of distortionary tax financing a second transmission
channel emerges. The negative investment response is reinforced by adverse labour market
developments. These arise from attempts of workers/trade unions of shifting part of the
increased labour tax burden onto firms, which react by reducing labour demand.
Both transmission channels are operative in DG ECFINs macroeconomic model QUEST II,
which is used for the quantitative assessment of German fiscal policy in the 1990s. The results
reported below show the evolution of important German macroeconomic variables relative to a
baseline path where the share of government spending as well as the effective tax rates for
labour, capital and consumption are kept at their 1991 levels. Both the permanent nature of the
fiscal shock and its magnitude is likely to have a non trivial macroeconomic impact.
The results reported in Table 2A.2 clearly show an unfavourable trade-off between the short-
term expansionary effects and the long-term output losses inflicted by a tax financed
expenditure of government consumption. While GDP increases initially, though with a
multiplier smaller than one, GDP falls below the baseline already in the fourth year. Already
after the second year, the growth rate is about 0.3% points below baseline growth. The economy
continues to grow by about 0.3% less in the following years and eventually reaches a lower
level of GDP. Similarly, the unemployment rate rises by about 3% points after 10 years. In
QUEST this effect arises from the fact that an increase in labour and indirect taxation lowers the
wedge between the take home market wage and the reservation wage. According to these
results, fiscal policy may have contributed significantly to the growth slowdown in Germany
over the 1990s.
                                                
33  On the negative impact of high taxes and a generous social transfer system on labour supply in Germany see
also IMF Art. 4 (Selected issues) ,1999, p. 96 and Ifo, 2001, p. 31Table 2A.2: German Fiscal Shock (Standard QUEST wage equation)
   91    92    93    94    95    96    97    98    99    00
GDP  0.54  0.77  0.39 -0.30 -0.78 -1.34 -1.99 -2.45 -2.87 -3.05
Private Consumption -0.61 -0.44 -0.65 -1.13 -1.44 -1.82 -2.26 -2.60 -2.88 -2.93
Private Investment  2.39  0.95 -1.28 -2.75 -3.95 -4.69 -4.62 -4.11 -3.34 -2.66
Employment  0.03 -0.18 -0.57 -1.06 -1.48 -1.80 -2.15 -2.51 -2.88 -3.21
Rear wage costs  0.54  1.46  1.60  1.39  1.12  0.74  0.42  0.29  0.21  0.23
Real net wages  0.53  0.19 -1.26 -3.04 -4.27 -5.57 -6.93 -8.1 -9.10 -9.58
CPI  0.15  0.55  0.96  1.18  1.39  1.67  1.99  2.26  2.62  3.04
Capital stock  0.09  0.19  0.15 -0.01 -0.24 -0.53 -0.81 -1.05 -1.23 -1.34
Labour productivity  0.55  0.96  0.89  0.60  0.49  0.17 -0.21 -0.38 -0.50 -0.39
Inflation  0.15  0.40  0.40  0.22  0.21  0.27  0.32  0.26  0.36  0.41
Unemployment rate -0.03  0.17  0.53  0.99  1.39  1.68  2.01  2.34  2.69  2.99
Trade balance (% of GDP)  0.31 -0.64 -0.76 -0.70 -0.63 -0.48 -0.20  0.07  0.35  0.54
 Results are % deviations from baseline levels.
An important feature of these results is the strong negative labour market response to the
German fiscal shock. To a large part, this can be attributed to the increase in both the effective
labour and indirect taxes in Germany. Both in order to separate the effect from the first and the
second channel on output growth and to show the sensitivity of the results to alternative
assumptions on the employment elasticity of taxation, Table 2A.3 contains results, where it is
assumed that unemployment and other social benefits are fully indexed to the net wage. In this
scenario labour taxes are less distortionary. As can be seen the negative employment effect is
much smaller and consequently the long run effects of fiscal policy turn out to be less severe.
Nevertheless, even in this scenario, a two year increase in the growth rate is followed by a
period of slower growth until 1999.
 Table 2A.3: German Fiscal Shock (wage behaviour with less tax shifting)
  91   92   93   94   95   96    97   98    99    00
GDP  0.68  0.83  0.46 -0.05 -0.26 -0.57 -0.98 -1.22  -1.43   -1.42
Private Consumption  0.53  0.92  0.63  0.18 -0.02 -0.29 -0.62 -0.87  -1.05   -1.00
Private Investment  1.05 -0.78 -2.74 -3.63 -4.19 -4.33 -3.71 -2.68  -1.41   -0.33
Employment  0.09  0.05  0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.14 -0.28  -0.48   -0.73
Rear wage costs  0.50  0.96  0.53  0.02 -0.25 -0.53 -0.77 -0.84  -0.78   -0.50
Real net wages  0.53 -0.26 -2.28 -4.38 -5.63 -6.86 -8.18 -9.32 10.20 -10.48
CPI  0.20  0.64  0.99  1.10  1.17  1.32  1.52  1.67   1.91    2.23
Capital stock  0.04  0.04 -0.10 -0.31 -0.56 -0.81 -1.03 -1.17  -1.22   -1.19
Labour productivity  0.66  0.84  0.48 -0.03 -0.25 -0.58 -0.94 -1.08  -1.13   -0.90
Inflation  0.20  0.43  0.35  0.11  0.07  0.15  0.20  0.15   0.24    0.31
Unemployment rate -0.08 -0.05 -0.01  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.13  0.26   0.45    0.68
                      Results are % deviations from baseline levels
These calculations show that due to longer-lasting effects of a tax financed increase in
expenditure GDP growth could be subdued for a extended period of time. Clearly the
simulations should serve only for illustrative purposes. The increase in taxation might not be the
only channel through which the financial burden of re-unification might have affected growth.
Another channel might be via the loss of competitiveness as a result of the strong wage
increases in the first half of the 1990s and the sharp increase in the effective exchange which
were at least partially and indirectly consequences of re-unification. Separate simulations have
been carried out to gauge the growth effect of these factors and will be presented in a later
section. Moreover, it cannot be excluded that the strong decline in government investment since
the start of the 1990s, which was partly due to efforts to compensate for the increase in current
expenditure, might have adverse effects on potential GPD growth in the longer term
34.
                                                
34  Although studies on the productivity impact of public investment in Germany are not fully conclusive, at least
some of the these studies established a slightly positive contribution (cf. Ifo, 2001, p. 73f.)3. Structural issues
3.1 Competitiveness, trade and FDI
3.1.1  Development of competitiveness indicators in the 1990s
Competitiveness is a complex notion that could be analysed for the economy as a whole but also
for different sectors and industries and individual companies. Whether the measurement of
competitiveness at the level of nations is appropriate has been at the centre of academic
discussions in the 1990s.
35 In the case of Germany, an additional dimension comes into focus:
the competitiveness of two groups of states (Länder), notably the ten West German Länder and
the five new East German Länder plus Berlin (West and East). This sub-section deals with
competitiveness of the German economy as a whole and with the impact of re-unification on
Germany’s longer-term competitive position.
The competitiveness of German companies depends on a mix of price and cost determinants and
of other factors like product quality, ancillary services or the degree of flexibility. As the latter
factors are difficult to measure quantitatively, prices and costs indicators attract most of the
attention. Among these, the real effective exchange  rate (REER) is one of the most widely used
indicators. The real exchange rate between two countries is calculated by multiplying the
nominal exchange rate with an index of relative prices or costs. For a group of countries,
weighing the bilateral real exchange rate by trade shares and summing up yields the REER.
Depending on the group of reference countries and/or on the choice of the price/cost measure
these REERS may differ. However, variations in the price/cost indicator should not
fundamentally change the picture at least as far as the trend is concerned.
36
Developments vis-à-vis a group of 24 industrialised countries
Figure 3.1 shows REERs for Germany vis-à-vis 24 industrial countries for the  period 1988-
2000 using the following price and cost indices: the deflator of private consumption, the GDP
deflator, the price deflator of goods and services exports and two nominal unit labour cost series
(for the whole economy and for the manufacturing sector).
37 As expected, the resulting REERs
show a high degree of correlation. Peaks and troughs are most accentuated when unit labour
costs are used as a price/cost measure.
The development over time allows to distinguish five sub-periods:
•   the  pre-unification period in the late 1980s during which competitiveness indicators
showed only minor variation,
•   the early post-unification period (1990-1993) marked by a significant deterioration in
price and cost competitiveness for Germany,
•   the  exchange-rate-turbulence period in the mid-1990s (1994-1996) during which all
series peaked (i.e. reach their turning point), starting to indicate improvements thereafter,
                                                
35  Much of this discussion was stimulated by Krugman (1994) who noted that it is an illusion that countries
compete with each in the same way as companies do. His point of view is that if competitiveness means
anything, it means that the standard of living depends on productivity relative to that of other countries,
implying that if other countries become more productive then, other things equal, the home country may be
considered worse off. In that sense he called competitiveness a very primitive, actually mercantilist notion
dressed up in modernist garb.
36  Due to the introduction of the single currency in 1999 the term “exchange rate” has to be replaced by the term
“indicator”. However, as most of the period analysed in this sub-section are years with national currencies in
place the term exchange rate will be used with the understanding that for the years 1999-2001 this should be
understood as a synonym for “indicators”.
37  For a discussion of the benefits of using a set of price and cost series see e.g. Turner and Golub (1997) and
Bundesbank (1998).•   the  pre-euro years (1997-1998) during which competitiveness indicators stabilise
somewhat at least to some extent reflecting the sharp fall in the exchange rates of some
Asian countries, and finally
•   the first euro years (1999-2001), which were characterised by improving price and cost
competitiveness driven by the depreciation of the euro vis-à-vis the US dollar and the
currencies of other trading partners. The weakening of the euro partially offset the effects of
the fall in the DEM/USD exchange rate towards the end of 1998.
Developments within the Euro Area
Figure 3.2 shows the same REERs limited to the countries of the Euro-area. While in the first
half the 1990s developments were in parallel with those for the larger reference group, the
picture has changed thereafter. Changes in the Euro-area based indicators have become smaller
than those based on the larger group of countries, in particular if measured in terms of relative
unit labour costs for the manufacturing sector.
Figure 3.1:
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manufacturingThis is suggestive of the fact that fluctuations in nominal exchange rates have played a major
role in the development of the REER of Germany. Indeed, although exchange rate fluctuations
between Euro-area countries have been constrained within the EMS system, a substantial part of
the rise in the REER vis-à-vis these countries during the first half of the 1990s was due to the
nominal appreciation of the DEM (Figure 3.3).
However, the DEM also rose in previous periods without causing serious problems for German
competitiveness. But, in the past, a nominal exchange rate appreciation was generally balanced
by a slower increase in nominal unit labour costs, which over the long run kept the real effective
exchange rate down; relative wage moderation thus kept the export sector afloat.
By contrast, in the first half of the 1990s, on top of a substantial rise in the nominal exchange
rate vis-à-vis the other Euro-area countries currencies, Germany’s trade unions gave up their
customary restraint with the effect that during this period nominal unit labour costs rose faster
than those of other European countries. This contributed decisively to the severity of the
recession, which the German economy experienced in 1993, and worsened the price
competitiveness of the German economy leading to a loss in export shares, which the country
has not recovered since.
The low external value of the euro in recent years has eased the competitiveness problem vis-à-
vis non-Euro-area countries and allowed to regain to some extent previously lost export market
shares. In addition, since the mid-1990s, not least due to the record unemployment levels,
Germany witnessed a significant degree of wage moderation. However, as nominal unit labour
costs in other Euro-area countries were also rising only relatively slowly, the gain in cost
competitiveness has been painfully slow. The high costs have kept Germany from recovering
the market share it once had. Much less could the country increase its market share in
accordance to its larger economic weight due to re-unification. In fact, as will be seen below, it
is exactly the East German enterprises that suffered the most from the high effective exchange
rate, because only very few East German, products were able to compete based on quality. The
rest needed to compete on the basis of lower cost, which due to high wages and despite massive
subsidies from the West, many enterprises have found next to impossible.
Figure 3.3:
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German re-unification brought together one of the most advanced economic areas of the world
with an area of low productivity, state-protected companies, artificial exchange rates and an
almost obsolete capital stock. The clash this implied for East German production was enhanced
by a 1:1 conversion rate of the East German mark into the DEM, while the exchange rate
applicable for East German exports had been at 1:4.3.
38 Moreover, wage negotiations that
started in East Germany very soon after re-unification raised cost pressures. Led by West
German trade unions, most attention was given to the convergence of wage rates in West and
East Germany, arguing that many workers would leave East Germany if wage differences would
be sustained. By setting East German wages for subsequent years as a percentage of West
German wage rates all future increases in West Germany had already been implemented.
From the analysis in the previous sub-sections one might conclude that the deterioration in
external price and cost competitiveness weighed heavily on German growth prospects in the
first half of the 1990s, but that in the second half of the 1990s improvements have helped to
regain initial positions. However, one has to acknowledge that this reasoning is mainly based on
observed changes, whereas it is essential to assess also the levels of the indicators. Here Figures
3.1 and 3.2 tell different stories: while thanks to the exchange rate movements in recent years
indicators versus 24 industrial countries have already reached levels below those observed in the
pre-unification period, the indicators vis-à-vis the Euro-area economies have not done the same.
In the year 2001, some Euro-area indicators were still by about 10-15% above the levels
observed before the fall of the Berlin Wall.
An analysis of the competitiveness of the German economy is made difficult by the fact that re-
unification introduces a statistical break in the country data series. Price and cost
competitiveness indicators in the figures depict data for unified Germany from 1991 onwards
and for West Germany in the years before. When merging the two series it is assumed that the
index value for West Germany and unified Germany are identical in 1991. The choice of that
particular year is justified by the fact that re-unification took place in late 1990 and that initial
estimates of national accounts data for the Eastern part suffered from several shortcomings,
most notably from the absence of market prices. In using this chaining point, however, the rise
in East German unit labour costs during the years 1990 and 1991 are not reflected in the data. A
way to cope with this shortcoming would be to choose an earlier year for merging West German
and pan-German data. One can expect that due to the rapid changes in the East at that time, pan-
German levels went up by a substantially higher percentage than is reflected in the West
German index figures. This is shown in the calculations underlying Figure 3.4 based on data
from the Federal Statistical Office.
In 1991, East German average labour productivity was only one third of the West German
counterpart. This resulted in a sharp drop of pan-German labour productivity compared to 1990
West German figures (Figure 3.4a). As plants were closed down and new capital stock became
available, labour productivity surged in East Germany displaying double-digit growth rates.
However, by 1997 the East German per capita output level had only reached half of the West
German level.
The compensation of employees in East Germany was at 42% in 1991 and started to converge
towards the West German level, reaching 68% of it in 1997 (Figure 3.4b).
                                                
38  This means that East German companies, which produced shirts for 10 East German Marks sold them for 2.3
DEM to West German retailers (before GEMSU started). At this price East German producers were competitive
vis-à-vis West German producers. Applying the conversion rate of 1:1 in GEMSU they immediately had to
charge 10 DEM which made them lose price competitiveness and thus almost all of their market shares. See
also Sinn and Sinn (1994).Figure 3.4:
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The sharp increase in  unit labour costs in Germany from 1991 onwards indicates that the fall in
average labour productivity was not fully matched by the decline in compensation per employee
(Figure 3.4c). Between 1990 and 1993 average German unit labour costs rose by more than
17%. The extraordinary increase in unit labour costs came mainly from East Germany, where
labour costs rose sharply from a level that was already well above that of West Germany. In
addition, the costs of re-unification weighed also on West German labour costs as direct taxes
(e.g. "solidarity surcharge") and social security contribution rates went up in response to East
German financing needs. However, the amount by which average German unit labour costs
exceeded those in West Germany indicates the extraordinary huge mismatch in the five new
Länder and East Berlin. Moreover, one has to take into account that the observed unit labour
costs in East Germany do not fully reflect the full pressure of wage increases in the East, as they
only partly reflect genuine productivity improvements. Unit labour costs were dampened,
because output per capita in the East rose when a very large number of firms with low
productivity were simply pushed out of the market, leaving only the most productive companies
as survivors.The real effective exchange rate of the DEM vis-à-vis the other Euro-area economies (based on
unit labour costs) displays a sharp increase following re-unification (Figure 3.4.d).
39 Although
this trend has been reverted since the mid-1990s, the level of the real effective exchange rate has
remained high. Clearly, therefore, indicators that are based on a late chaining point of West
German and pan-German data risk to underestimate the impact of re-unification on external
competitiveness.
3.1.2  Trade developments
The decline in competitiveness indicators as a result of re-unification is clearly visible in
Germany’s trade performances. This is of particular significance, because despite its large size,
Germany’s economy appears surprisingly dependent on external trade.
Evolution of external demand
Unification brought about a substantial structural break in former West Germany’s external
balance. In 1980, at the height of the second oil crisis, West Germany had a current account
deficit of about 1½ % of GDP. During the first half of the 1980s this deficit was reversed into a
large surplus of over 4% of GDP, a level which was attained throughout the second half of the
decade (Figure 3.5). While a surplus of this magnitude was certainly not sustainable over the
long run, it put West Germany into an extremely favourable position to accommodate the large
import demand of the re-unification boom without endangering the pan-German external
position. Within two years, the large West German current account surplus of nearly 5% in 1989
was more than wiped out and turned into a pan-German deficit of 1% in 1991.
A deterioration of the external balance by 6% of GDP would have caused much greater
difficulties, had there not been such a large current account surplus. However,  it may have been
exactly the ease with which the economic impact of re-unification could be managed in the
early years that led to the surprisingly careless treatment of economic re-unification. Arguably
then, the advantageous external balance in West Germany was a hidden curse, if otherwise the
costly economic mistakes of re-unification would have been avoided out of immediate
necessity.
The substantial fall in the current account is not necessarily a worrisome sign, because a large
inflow of goods could be expected in light of the large pent-up demand in the New Länder.
Partly, it may have simply accelerated a reduction of the unsustainable large West-German
current account surplus to attain a more balanced external position. However, as the boom
subsided in 1993, the current account deficit remained stuck permanently at a level of around –
1%. A deficit of this order is not dramatic, but it is astonishing that it persists even though
domestic demand during the second half of the 1990s grow significantly slower than that in the
rest of the world.
A disaggregation of the current account into its constituent components shows that re-
unification affected most severely and immediately the balance of trade. The trade balance fell
substantially by around 5 percentage points from a pre-unification surplus of 6% of GDP to 1%
in 1991. It took about five years for the trade balance to attain a new plateau of a surplus of
around 3% of GDP, as the real exchange rates began to fall.
However, this recovery of the net trade balance was cancelled out by developments in the
primary income and services balance. The decline in balance of primary income simply
magnified the effect of a long-run current account deficit. As Germany’s net external capital
                                                
39  Due to a lack of national accounts data for the two parts of Germany results are available only up to 1997.
Moreover, it has to be noted that the calculations in sub-section 3 are based on ESA79 data, while the series
displayed in sub-sections 1 and 2 are based on ESA95 data.position fell, so did the primary income
account, declining steadily from a peak
of about 1% of GDP in 1990 to around –
½  % in 2000.
In parallel, the services balance declined
progressively. In contrast to trade,
however, the service balance does not
show any dramatic shift during re-
unification. Instead, net exports in
services remained on a secular decline,
which had started already in the mid-
1980s when the service account was
nearly balanced. From then it fell to the
present deficit of around 2% of GDP.
Much of this is explained by the ever
more negative tourism balance but also
by an increasing deficit in business
services.
East Germany
Clearly re-unification is at the heart of
the sharp decline in the external balance.
Part of the drop in the trade balance
reflects that the efforts of West German
enterprises were redirected from global
markets to East Germany. However, the
speed of the decline and the fact that
Germany never recovered its export
share points to a more substantial
problem, which is to be found in the
sharp increase in the real effective
exchange rate. Notably, compared to the
pre-unification levels, Germany has not
increased its export share in line with the
statistical GDP growth of about 12% that
the integration of East Germany brought
about. Much less is export growth in line
with the increase in population by about
one quarter.
The relative under-performance of
German exports can be nearly
exclusively attributed to the performance
of East Germany, while the performance
of the West is at least not worse than that
of the other European Union countries.
Even though in 1995 the German
statistical office stopped producing
separate trade figures for East and West Germany, the figures until 1994 give a clear indication
of the order of magnitude to which the New Länder run a trade deficit. Table 3.1 shows the net
external balance of goods and services for unified Germany, the West and the East. For the
latter two cases, the bilateral regional trade deficit is treated like external trade. The table shows
very clearly the cause for the very sharp decline in the external balance as a result of re-
Figure 3.5:  Germany’s current account
balance
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Note : West Germany until 1990unification. While in 1990, West Germany alone ran a trade and services surplus of 142 billion
DEM, the figure for unified Germany a year later shows a deficit of 6.9 billion. The separate
figures show that this drop does not find any counterpart in the West figures. To the contrary, its
nominal net position actually increased slightly. The New Länder, by contrast, started their first
year as part of the Federal Republic with a deficit of 169 billion DEM. This is equivalent to
nearly 80% of their GDP. In other words, consumption and investment in the East were nearly
twice as high as actual production.
Table 3.1: Net external balance of goods and services
Billion DEM % of GDP
Germany West East Germany West East
1990 .. 141.95 .. .. 5.9% ..
1991 -6.88 152.16 -159.04 -0.2% 5.6% -78.5%
1992 -7.78 187.07 -194.85 -0.2% 6.5% -74.9%
1993 5.69 210.22 -204.53 0.2% 7.2% -64.2%
1994 10.78 224.27 -213.49 0.3% 7.4% -58.0%
1995 22.70 .. .. 0.6% .. ..
1996 37.27 .. .. 1.0% .. ..
1997 50.13 .. .. 1.4% .. ..
1998 57.54 .. .. 1.5% .. ..
1999 37.62 .. .. 1.0% .. ..
2000 15.33 .. .. 0.4% .. ..
Source : Own calculation based on European Commission (Ameco data)
In the following three years, the excess absorption fell as a percentage of GDP to below 60%
due to the high growth rates of the area in these years. However, in absolute terms, the external
deficit of East Germany increased to well above 200 billion DEM in 1994. Most of this deficit if
balanced by transfers from the West, which in turn ran an very large trade and service surplus in
1994 of 224 billion DEM or 7.4% of GDP.
Even though these statistics are no longer produced, there is little indication that the situation
changed much in qualitative terms in the second half of the 1990s. It is estimated that net
transfers, and hence the East net trade deficit of goods and services continue to be around 50%
of GDP and that the West is burdened  to the rate of over 4% of GDP which is transferred to the
East (cf. Sinn 2000).
The weakness of East Germany’s export sector can also be seen from the relative trade shares of
the region. In 1991, barely 6% of East output was exported outside of Germany. From this low
level it even fell further to around 5% of GPD in 1993 and 1994. It has since doubled to reach
an unimpressive 10% in 2000 (Figure 3.6). While this marks relatively high export growth rates,
it has to be contrasted with a much higher West export rate of 25% of GDP in 1989, which
dropped to around 18% in 1993 and returned to about 25% in 2000. East Germany’s exports per
capita remain at a level of less than 30% of the West. Even when these figures are corrected for
the lower share of manufacturing in East German GDP and also taking out the German port
cities from the calculations, the export share of East German manufacturing barely attains 60%
of that of the West.
To be fair, the statistics might overstate the problem somewhat. As figures derive from customs
documentation, they do not always correctly register the place of manufacturing. Instead, they
reflect the place of shipment, often the company headquarters. This is distorting due to The fact
that East Germany often functions at extended workbench of the West, e.g. most West car
producers have put up factories in the East. This would imply that a share of East production
would not leave the country directly, but embodied in West products.




































































Nevertheless, even taking this factor into consideration, clearly East Germany has a severe
dearth of viable exports, even though they are catching up. With a few exceptions, East German
producers have not established themselves in international markets and often serve only a local
or regional market.
Furthermore, the statistical underestimation of East German exports also implies that imports
are higher than what the graph suggests. More importantly, the graph is misleading as is does
not show the large current account deficit discussed earlier. This is because the former GDR
appears to have almost balanced trade account vis-à-vis Germany’s trading partners. Not shown
is the huge trade deficit that East Germany has with West Germany.
As a consequence, one cannot talk of a German competitiveness problem. West Germany
evidently continues to run very large external surpluses, just as in the late 1980s. Instead, the
favourable competitive situation of the West hides the extremely uncompetitive situation of the
East. The trade results therefore mirror the development of West German and pan-German
competitiveness indicators discussed earlier. The high level of taxes associated with transfers to
the former GDR might have contributed to some fall in West German trade to other countries
(as opposed to “exports” to the East). However, external competitiveness is not the area most
negatively affected by the transfer costs. As described elsewhere, the cost of these transfers lies
rather in subdued domestic demand and slow growth, because much of the transfers are used for
East consumption rather than investment. In addition those funds that are invested are at least
not directly productive for West German companies.
Clearly, therefore, a solution to both the West and East economic problems have to be found in
reducing the East German balance of transactions to a manageable figure. To achieve this, the
long-run condition is that the East succeeds in building a strong export industry. This, however,
cannot happen overnight. In particular, it takes money and time to develop brands that can gain
a premium price in the international markets. In the short and medium run, however, the
development focus should be simply to produce more tradable goods and services, for instance,
to use its underdeveloped tourism potential. Even if these are only sold on the regional or
national markets, its import substitution effect should allow a reduction in transfers. By contrast,
in the present political set-up, growth in the West that is not matched by growth in the East willsimply lead to higher transfers to the East, which on the one hand would act as an obstacle to
further improvements in the West, and on the other hand act as a sweet poison that holds back
the East.
Analysis of manufacturing trade
Germany’s future competitiveness also hinges on the question of whether the country is strong
in market segments with a high growth potential. This can be analysed by looking at the relative
specialisation profile of Germany. Due to the small share of East German manufacturing, the
following statements reflect only West German companies. A priori, one would assume that the
biggest potential for growth lies in the sectors producing high technology products and using
skilled labour. By contrast, due to its high wages, Germany is unlikely to be competitive in the
world market in low technology sectors and sectors using mainly unskilled labour as their input.
Figure 3.7 shows the relative technology content of Germany’s exports, compared to the
average content of EU exports, which is set to a value of 1. As one would expect, Germany has
a strong comparative disadvantage in the low-technology sectors vis-à-vis other European
countries. This disadvantage is, however, not balanced by a comparative advantage in the high
technology sector, where Germany perhaps surprisingly shows a slight and slowly growing
comparative disadvantage. Germany’s export strengths compared with other EU countries lies
rather in the intermediate technology sector, such as vehicles and parts, chemicals, machine
tools and appliances.
The trend of loosing in the high technology sector is certainly worrisome for a high wage
country such as Germany. Other countries, such as France and the Netherlands appear much
better positioned, while the UK and Italy appear increasingly to lose out on high tech products.
However, it must be kept in mind that the term intermediate technology only applies to the
product itself. It does not necessarily apply to the production process. For instance, car
production can involve extremely complex machinery and production processes. It is therefore
useful also to take a look at the predominant input factors. An analysis shows that Germany’s
exports are relatively capital intensive and use high skilled labour (Figure 3.8). By contrast,
goods that use low skill labour are underrepresented. Here too, France and the Netherlands
appear to have a superior profile insofar as their exports are concentrated in high skill labour,
while the UK and Italy show no comparative advantage in skilled labour products.
It is not possible to draw direct conclusions on the future competitiveness of German industry
from this simple snapshot. However, a priori one would assume that the best potential for
Germany to maintain a global market share would lie in the capital intensive high-skill high-
tech sectors, because only these sectors can afford the country’s high wage level. It is then a
potentially worrisome fact that Germany appears to be losing slightly its comparative advantage
in these areas compared to other European countries. The changes in Figures 3.7 and 3.8 maybe
small but could point to a potential long-run decline of the German trade position. This is
compounded by the fact that the analysis does not include the service sector, where Germany is
particularly weak. In addition, by normalising the figures on an EU average, the data neglect the
fact that Europe as a whole is losing high tech market share, notably to the United States.Figure 3.7: Revealed comparative advantage of technology content
Source: Comext data base, own calculations EU
Figure 3.8: Revealed comparative advantage of factor content
Source: Comext data base, own calculations


























Beyond looking at the specialisation profile of Germany the question arises to what extent
Germany is fully taking advantage of the growth possibilities offered by international trade. One
way to look at this issue is the analysis of the relative share of intra-industry trade. Intra-
industry trade is defined as the mutual exchange of products within the same sector and is
distinguished from inter-industry trade, in which countries trade the products of different
sectors. Intra-industry trade makes up most of the trade-flows between advanced economies and
cannot be explained by standard trade theory of comparative advantage. Instead, it indicates the
presence of economies of scale. If all countries specialise in a narrow range of products that are
then traded they can reduce production costs per unit and offer a larger variety of products to
their consumers. Empirical evidence suggests that there is a positive relationship between
growth rates and measures of intra-industry trade.
40 Next to economies of scale, intra-industry
trade has been linked also to the transfer of technology and greater technological innovation, the
key ingredients of modern growth theory.
Figure 3.9 shows for some European countries the Grubel-Lloyd index, which measures the
relative share of intra-industry trade as a share of total trade (with a theoretical maximum value
of 1).
41 The figure reveals that intra-industry trade is increasing in all countries. It also reveals
that Germany is lagging behind other countries in intra-industry participation except Italy. Other
countries that had relatively higher growth rates during the last decade, such as the Netherlands,
France, and the UK both had higher starting levels of intra-industry trade and, potentially more
important, higher relative increases, which à priory would mean a higher additional exploitation
of scale economies.
Figure 3.9: Grubel-Lloyd Index of Intra-Industry Trade
Note : Calculated across all SITC Rev. 3 four-digit manufacturing categories.
Source : Comext data base; own calculations.
It is interesting in this context also that the Grubel-Lloyd index for all other countries is larger
for trade with the rest of the world than for trade with other EU 15 countries. Only for Germany
and, to a lesser extent France, the reverse holds true. This appears to indicate a larger openness
of the faster growing economies to business outside of the EU, and here mostly with the US,
while Germany’s intra-industry trade is more directed towards other EU countries. The lower
openness then would explain why Germany has missed out on much of the international
                                                
40  See for example, Backus, D., Kehoe,.P and Kehoe, T. (1992).





















EU15economic boom that characterised the 1990s. Another aspect is that the lower level of intra-
industry trade of the slow-growing economies reflects a lower attractiveness of these countries
for foreign direct investment, as much foreign trade takes place between subsidiaries of
international companies. This aspect will be analysed next.
3.1.3  Developments of foreign direct investment
Global flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) have increased substantially throughout the last
decade reflecting ongoing globalisation of economic activity. Also the flow of German direct
investment to foreign countries has been on an increasing trend since the mid-1980s. By
contrast FDI flows into Germany have remained at much lower levels and started a steady
increase not before the second half of the 1990s. This obvious discrepancy in developments of
inbound and outbound flows has raised the question whether it can be attributed to a lack of
attractiveness of the German economy, i.e. to the question whether there is a Standortproblem.
The question whether the size of foreign direct investment flows to and from Germany contains
information about the quality of the country as a location of business has attracted a lot of
attention of policymakers, economists and the public. It is difficult to find a clear-cut answer as
to whether FDI flows contain such type of information. Moreover, critical statements on FDI
inflows induced by the hostile take-over of a German company in 2000 suggest that not all FDI
flows are welcomed any longer. But from an economic standpoint it is difficult, if not
impossible to distinguish between FDI as the good, the bad and the ugly. However, one can
describe flows and review some of the arguments in the light of facts. This task will be in the
centre of this sub-section.
German direct investment abroad
German direct investment in foreign countries has been relatively flat in the first half of the
1990s and then started to increase in the second half of the decade. In the 1990 to 1999 period it
always exceeded inbound direct investment flows. Most of the direct investment flows were in
the form of equities, less in the form of credit transactions (see also Table 3.2 and Figure 3.10).
Table 3.2: Direct Investment Flows From and To Germany


















1994 24.800 3.534 2.767 31.104 6.708 6.405 -1.350 11.766
1995 48.194 6.992 3.227 58.413 13.085 8.578 -3.675 17.988
1996 43.539 25.387 9.376 78.302 4.007 13.106 -6.982 10.129
1997 51.071 14.921 6.173 72.166 9.439 12.498 -0.796 21.141
1998 110.780 34.006 10.031 154.820 10.640 32.784 -0.994 42.432
1999 177.548 13.257 10.757 201.532 48.415 63.081 -8.801 102.695
2000 99.444 -7.119 10.757 103.082 205.611 176.930 -8.801 373.740
FDI income
Credit Debit Net
1996 22.371 7.174 -15.197
1997 26.273 15.913 -10.360
1998 27.080 22.453 -4.627
1999 28.831 16.687 -12.146
2000 35.530 20.796 -14.735
Source : Eurostat., New Cronos
In line with these developments income from FDI has been increasing. Exceptionally high
outbound flows were observed in the years 1988 and 1999. These increases can be attributed to
a wave of cross-border mergers and acquisitions that drove FDI flows among OECD economies
in the late 1990s.The geographical distribution of German outbound flows has been a very broad one (see Table
3.3), but since the mid-1990s much has been directed towards the U.S. economy, in particular in
the year 1988 due to a single transaction, Daimler-Benz's USD 38 billion acquisition of Chrysler
(USA). Among the Member States of the EU the UK has been a key recipient of German direct
investment, but the rankings of recipients have changed a lot from year to year. Other major
flows went to France, Belgium-Luxembourg, and to the Netherlands. The size of flows to
neighbouring countries, most notable to the Netherlands, Austria and Switzerland, suggests that
vicinity played a major role in decisions about FDI.
Table 3.3: German Direct Investment Abroad: Outflows by Country (Billion DEM)
Outflows to: 90+91 92+93 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
B-L 9.93 11.63 1.38 2.84 0.46 2.83 5.25 9.83 26.83
DK 0.28 0.41 0.02 1.09 -0.21 0.82 0.20 0.80 0.92
EL 0.28 0.24 0.15 -0.03 -0.12 0.80 0.67 0.37 0.95
E 4.29 2.03 1.08 0.58 0.45 3.19 4.36 3.43 5.07
F 7.59 4.97 2.09 4.89 3.30 4.58 15.15 9.18 7.20
IRL 10.92 2.38 1.06 -0.22 -1.22 4.93 0.97 -1.74 -2.97
I 2.87 2.30 0.78 3.46 4.15 2.90 5.54 2.46 -5.76
NL 6.01 6.38 1.78 8.21 2.89 -0.59 4.28 7.99 -17.80
A 1.99 2.03 0.90 2.59 5.59 2.85 4.40 1.60 18.07
P 0.48 0.71 0.67 0.12 0.49 0.94 0.67 0.10 1.87
FIN 0.07 0.16 0.01 0.21 0.35 -0.09 0.87 0.57 0.28
S 0.62 1.29 0.71 0.25 0.28 0.42 2.93 11.92 3.17
UK 9.10 5.62 3.95 10.62 19.75 5.18 1.75 78.57 -21.71
CA 2.33 -0.58 0.31 0.14 -0.37 1.21 0.51 2.38 0.32
CH 3.72 2.27 1.46 1.81 0.71 7.11 4.43 0.06 -0.78
JP 1.20 0.40 0.65 0.51 2.59 0.04 0.97 1.23 6.39
NO 0.11 0.19 -0.06 0.01 -0.12 0.15 0.70 0.25 0.30
US 10.40 4.72 2.79 4.25 22.73 18.60 79.01 48.07 47.24
EU 54.53 40.16 14.56 34.61 36.15 28.77 47.01 125.09 16.11
OECD total 74.12 51.79 22.83 45.78 68.14 63.79 146.14 187.88 80.98
Total 77.92 55.82 27.88 55.59 76.48 72.48 155.87 201.56 103.08
Source : OECD Statistical Databases (2002).
Table 3.4 displays the destination of flows in selected years based on Bundesbank data. They
confirm the exceptional role of the UK and Belgium-Luxembourg as recipients, but they also
show the substantial change in relative importance from year to year. The latter can be seen in
the cases of Ireland and the Netherlands, where substantial changes in shares were observed.
In terms of sectors the lion’s share of direct investment has usually been taken by services,
except in the year 1998 due to a single transaction in manufacturing (see Table 3.5). Among the
service direct investment flows those related to financial activities and to real estate and
business were more or less the same in size whereas other services were negligible. The share of
manufacturing was at around 40% in most years with major flows recorded in the sector
petroleum, chemical, rubber and plastic products and in the sector vehicles and other transport
equipment. The strong investment of these sectors could suggest that large multinational
companies, which are dominating these two sectors in Germany (Bayer, Aventis, BASF in the
former, Daimler-Chrysler, BMW, Volkswagen in the latter), and their efforts to participate in
ongoing globalisation of business activity played a major role. Contrary the sectors for metal
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Source: Deutsche Bundesbank database, own calculations.Table 3.4: Direct investment with other Member states as the origin or destination
(DEM billion)
Outflow 1997 1998 1999 2000
A 2.850 4.396 1.600 18.066
BL 2.834 5.252 9.826 26.826
E 3.194 4.360 3.434 5.066
F 4.583 15.147 9.185 7.195
NL -0.587 4.277 7.984 -17.796
UK 5.179 1.745 78.568 -21.706
Others 10.712 11.836 14.493 -1.541
EU 28.765 47.013 125.089 16.110
Inflow 1997 1998 1999 2000
A 2.061 0.465 0.976 -0.947
BL 4.012 2.296 22.257 61.523
E 0.939 0.349 -8.490 -6.065
F -0.819 1.693 38.368 -2.093
NL 2.754 6.520 6.912 64.982
UK 3.903 15.185 16.505 249.087
Others 1.268 11.199 5.302 8.144
EU 14.118 37.707 81.830 374.631
Source : Deutsche Bundesbank, intenational capital links, May 2001.
Table 3.5: German Direct Investment Abroad by Industrial Sector (DEM billion)
Sector: 90+91 92+93 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Primary 1.69 -0.15 -0.36 -0.07 -1.66 -0.20 -0.16 -0.55 0.58
Manufacturing 31.75 22.01 10.55 20.08 16.52 28.08 86.06 90.97 36.43
- petroleum, chemical,
rubber and plastic products 10.20 6.61 0.08 10.05 4.56 10.23 14.07 1.50 14.49
- vehicles and other
transport equipment 6.29 4.28 5.70 4.81 4.02 1.80 62.33 2.07 14.62
- metal and mechanical
products 5.18 4.17 1.20 1.54 2.06 7.42 3.75 57.73 4.06
Services 30.05 29.57 16.44 31.61 45.73 37.56 57.95 98.98 53.28
- financial activities 26.35 10.59 6.82 11.21 26.02 15.52 25.03 57.07 59.65
- real estate and business
activities .. 11.36 6.06 11.54 11.86 13.71 28.09 4.71 -17.10
- other services 1.69 1.85 2.15 3.51 2.94 2.82 3.73 3.56 8.67
Unallocated 14.43 4.39 1.26 4.34 15.87 7.04 12.03 12.17 12.80
Total 77.92 55.82 27.88 55.96 76.45 72.48 155.87 201.56 103.08
Source : OECD Statistical Databases (2002).
In order to assess the size of inflows and outflows one has to compare German data with that of
other Member States taking into account special circumstances that might be reflected by
outliers. In that regard Table 3.6 indicates that as a percentage of GDP outflows have been in a
similar range with those of France and Japan, but considerably below those from the UK and
substantially above those of the US economy. However, as a percentage of exports outflows
have been relatively low indicating that German companies have a certain preference for
serving foreign markets by products from Germany instead of producing abroad.
Foreign direct investment in Germany
Foreign direct investment in Germany was relatively small in volume up to the late 1990s, but it
has grown significantly since, in particular recording an exceptional increase in the year 2000
due to a single transaction in the telecom sector, the USD 200 billion acquisition of
Mannesmann by Vodafone AirTouch (United Kingdom). The latter made Germany last year the
second largest seller in cross-border M&As worldwide, and it made the year 2000 the only one
in which flows to Germany exceeded flows from Germany. Contrary to outbound flows fromGermany credit transactions played a substantial role in investment flows while equity capital
was less important than it was for German direct investment abroad.
Table 3.6: The importance of FDI of major industrial countries
Direct investment abroad
USD Billion % of exports % of GDP
1984-89 1990-95 1984-89 1990-95 1984-89 1990-95
France 52.5 101.8 4.9 5.5 1.1 1.3
Germany 56.9 138.1 3.2 4.6 1.0 1.2
Japan 192.6 262.2 13.0 11.0 1.5 1.1
UK 145.2 149.7 15.1 9.7 3.8 2.4
USA 126.5 330.1 5.9 8.5 0.5 0.9
Source : Deutsche Bundesbank (1997b), p.67.
The geographical distribution of the origins of flows to Germany has been broad, but only a
handful of countries hosted investors making significant direct investment in Germany (see
Table 3.7). Among these origins were the UK, France, the Netherlands and Belgium-
Luxembourg in Europe and the US in the rest of the world. Important flows in a number of
consecutive years were reported especially from France in the first half of the 1990s and from
the UK in the second half. Flows from the US were subject to major shifts in size with positive
inflows of more than 1 billion euro only displayed in three years (1995-6, 1998) in the 1990-98
period covered by the OECD data.
A look at Table 3.7 of the countries of origin in selected years highlights the importance of
flows from the UK, Belgium-Luxembourg and the Netherlands in the chosen years. While the
latter could suggest that vicinity matters a lot, the rather tiny flows from Austria and
Switzerland provide counter-evidence.
Among the countries outside the EU it is mainly the U.S. economy from which FDI flows
originated. As Table 3.8 indicates substantially more than half of the direct investments received
by the EU from the rest of the world came from the USA. However, the German share in these
inflows has been relatively small with regard to the sheer size of the German economy.
Although the sharp shifts in shares displayed in the table advises not to put too much emphasis
on the figures, it appears astonishing that Germany attracted such a small share in the total, but
such a large share in flows from neighbouring Switzerland. Again, this could suggest that apart
from other motivation vicinity plays a key role in direct investment decisions.
In terms of sectors services related investment dominated the flows, accounting for the major
part of the allocated flows (see Table 3.9). While flows from abroad to the primary sector were
negligible, manufacturing reports only modest inflows, but strong changes in sectors displaying
positive inbound flows. Within the service sector real estate and business activities have
recorded the largest inflows, whereas financial institutions report substantial inflows only in few
selected years suggesting that single transactions matter a lot for these time series.Table 3.7: German Direct Investment: Inflows by Country (Billion DEM)(a)
Inflows from: 90+91 92+93 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
B-L -0.27 2.76 0.92 0.70 -3.57 4.01 2.30 22.26 61.52
DK 0.40 -0.09 0.08 0.06 0.31 -0.49 0.00 1.61 1.84
EL 0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.08 0.04 0.04
E 0.26 -0.07 -0.02 -0.10 0.27 0.94 0.35 -8.49 -6.07
F 3.11 2.71 1.19 0.82 1.18 -0.82 1.69 38.37 -2.09
IRL 0.42 0.19 0.45 -0.09 0.38 -0.08 0.83 0.90 0.21
I 0.99 -1.34 -1.90 0.40 0.22 0.25 4.68 3.64 0.60
NL 1.47 -1.55 2.87 3.87 3.92 2.75 6.52 6.91 64.98
A 0.25 0.55 0.27 0.73 0.12 2.06 0.47 0.98 -0.95
P 0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.07 0.17 0.18 0.50 0.13
FIN 0.13 0.53 -0.33 0.12 0.19 0.52 2.44 -0.45 0.55
S 0.99 -0.34 -1.04 0.37 0.16 0.89 3.16 -0.94 4.78
UK -0.15 2.47 2.53 2.93 2.41 3.90 15.19 16.51 249.09
CA 1.18 0.13 -0.23 0.17 -1.87 -0.18 -0.94 0.02 0.51
CH -1.67 -1.09 0.69 2.46 1.24 2.22 -5.86 1.59 -3.65
JP 2.21 1.14 -0.46 0.84 -1.29 1.01 -0.19 1.10 1.34
NO 0.09 0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.13 -0.05 0.26 0.07 1.66
US -1.37 0.43 -1.89 3.52 4.15 2.28 6.66 14.00 -6.34
EU 7.62 5.79 5.04 9.77 5.66 14.12 37.71 81.83 374.63
OECD total 8.14 6.65 3.17 16.86 8.07 19.26 38.14 99.46 368.48
Total 10.81 7.32 2.91 19.75 8.48 21.23 42.72 102.69 373.74
(a) Top three in bold figures
Source : OECD Statistical Databases (2002).
Table 3.8: Extra-EU FDI inflows excl. reinvested earnings with major partners
From US CH JP Others Total
EU Total 1992-96 78.2 18.5 6.9 31.5 135.1
(Ecu. Bn.) 1997 20.0 2.5 2.7 12.5 37.8
1998 52.7 19.9 1.5 10.0 95.0
1999 67.2 4.3 3.2 15.4 90.1
Germany 1992-96 11 14 12 8 11
(% of EU) 1997 4 44 26 81 0
1998 7 -15 7 26 3
1999 13 45 16 51 3
Source : Eurostat (2001), p.37.
Table 3.9: Foreign Direct Investment in Germany by Industrial Sector (Billion DEM)
Sector: 90+91 92+93 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Primary 0.03 0.03 0.28 -0.02 -0.39 -0.66 -0.65 -0.73 0.22
Manufacturing -4.88 0.00 -1.55 1.72 -2.80 1.65 -5.05 51.94 6.01
- petroleum, chemical,
rubber and plastic products -3.35 -0.51 -1.74 -0.50 -1.10 0.81 -0.89 28.98 ..
- vehicles and other
transport equipment 0.48 -0.75 -0.24 0.34 1.52 -1.55 -5.43 -1.27 14.01
- metal and mechanical
products 0.07 0.71 -0.01 0.08 -0.26 0.98 -0.56 15.84 -0.02
Services 15.70 10.48 14.42 19.17 19.16 20.83 49.76 60.42 376.52
- financial activities 12.45 -3.32 -0.64 -0.46 5.66 -1.61 13.69 13.59 8.32
- real estate and business
activities .. 12.19 10.90 18.82 16.77 14.56 33.48 43.91 326.83
- other services 0.71 0.21 0.62 0.14 0.39 -0.04 -0.30 0.03 2.35
Unallocated -0.04 -3.19 -10.24 -1.12 -7.48 -0.59 -1.34 -8.94 -9.01
Total 10.81 7.32 2.91 19.75 8.48 21.23 42.72 102.69 373.74
Source : OECD Statistical Databases (2002).An Assessment of FDI flows and Germany as a business location
There is no doubt that motives of direct investment are manifold. Many of them have been in
the centre of theoretical and empirical analysis of direct investment, in particular in the 1990s
accompanying the surge of interest in economic growth theory. Any full analysis has at least to
take into account developments in foreign trade, in wages and costs and in world economic
activity. Several studies of direct investment in Germany have gone into this direction. Among
them is a study published by the Bundesbank (1997b) based on data from 1975 up to the first
quarter of 1977. Concerning the inbound and outbound direct investment flows the study
emphasised the important role that cost factors play in addition to sales motives by stating that:
“the worsening of international competitiveness brought about by the relatively sharp rise in
unit labour costs (calculated in a uniform currency) has caused some German enterprises to
shift part of their production abroad in the past few years; at the same time it has deterred
foreign firms from investing more heavily in Germany" (Bundesbank, 1997b, p. 68).
According to the empirical estimates of that study a deterioration of price competitiveness of
one percent would, on average over the long term, result in an increase of 2½% in German
direct investment abroad. The German tax burden, also often been linked to direct investment
flows, though not incorporated explicitly, was identified as triggering a similar impact via its
effect on costs. With respect to foreign investment in Germany the Bundesbank stated that
"another locational disadvantage of Germany hindering the inflow of foreign corporate capital is
probably the specific structure of the enterprises and their financing" (p.73). As this
disadvantage is difficult to capture quantitatively the Bundesbank warned that when "it comes to
assessing the quality of Germany as a business location on the basis of the trend in inbound and
outbound direct investment ... a highly differentiated approach must be taken" (pp. 74-5).
Nevertheless, the Bundesbank study not only indicated that the international competitiveness of
Germany had hindered foreign investment in Germany and had stimulated direct investment
flows from Germany to foreign countries, it also suggested that direct investment flows contain
information about the attractiveness of a Germany as a location of business.
The aforementioned Bundesbank study had been based on data from the mid-seventies to early
1997 raising the question as to whether the conclusions are still applicable to the economic
situation in the late 1990s and today. Obviously, the determinants identified just a few years ago
can be presumed to be still in place and to affect today’s decisions on direct investment as well.
However, the weights that are attached to these determinants might have changed and such
changes might have enhanced the risks of misinterpretations of direct investment flows.
Indeed in the years since the launch of the study the framework has changed and so has the
behaviour: (a) direct investment flows have been increasingly affected by mergers and
acquisitions in the centre of which are other than short or medium term cost considerations; (b)
the more recent composition of flows by industrial sector suggests that mainly large
multinational companies are involved in direct investment and for firms of this size strategic
motives might have a more important role than economic conditions in Germany; (c) more and
more restrictions on the movement of goods, persons and capital have been removed since the
mid-seventies, the start year of the Bundesbank's empirical analysis, suggesting that the
relationship between exports and production on foreign soil might have changed; (d) the
introduction of the euro has removed exchange rate risks from a huge area in Europe bringing
about changes in one of the most important determinants of investment location; (e) the
transition process in the countries of Central and East Europe has progressed and their accession
with the EU has become more likely changing views on investment projects in these parts of
Europe (see e.g. Buch, Kokta and Piazolo, 2001). Obviously, the list of changes that affect
decisions about direct investment could be extended. But already the changes named above
provide good reason for first doubts whether results obtained a few years ago are still relevant or
more generally about the indicator properties of direct investment flows.Box 4: FDI as an indicator for Germany’s attractiveness as a business location
Recognising the link between FDI and macroeconomic developments, changes in the former
have often been interpreted as signalling a certain locational weakness or strength of the
economy. While the links are usually confirmed by empirical studies, there are some doubts
about the soundness of FDI-based statements, in particular with respect to the indicator
properties of FDI.
B4.1  Different FDI definitions in the 1990s
One drawback to international comparisons stems from the heterogeneity of FDI data due to
different definitions followed by data collecting institutions. FDI comprises investment in which
a resident of one country obtains a lasting interest in, and a degree of influence over the
management of, a business enterprise in another country. According to both the OECD
Benchmark Definition and the IMF Balance of Payments Manual the criterion used to
distinguish FDI from other types of investment is ownership of at least 10% of the voting
securities of an incorporated business enterprise or the equivalent interest in an unincorporated
enterprise. FDI comprises three components: new equity parent companies provide to their
affiliates, i.e. enterprises in which the parent company or investor owns at least 10 percent,
reinvested earnings of the affiliate, and long and short term loans from the parent to the affiliate
(inter-company debt). But for instance the Bundesbank has only adopted the definition given
above in January 1999 by reducing the threshold from 20 to 10% and by starting to consider
short-term credits and trade credits from the parent to the affiliate as DI, but reporting
requirements are still based on the 20% threshold.
B4.2  Statistical discrepancies might distort analysis
In much of the debate in Germany many participants have based assessments on data obtained
from German balance of payments statistics. But the main objective of these statistics is to
mirror financial transactions. Moreover, one has to acknowledge that the reporting systems and
recording practices for direct investment flows have greatly differed from country to country. In
order to illustrate the significance of this problem the Bundesbank has compared data based on
German balance of payments statistics with those obtained from foreign balance of payments
statistics. Some of the results for the first half of the 1990s are displayed in the table below.
Table B4.1 International discrepancies between reported direct investment flows
(net investment, in DEM billion)









1990 2.9 26.1 32.1 16.5
1991 4.7 26.0 32.2 16.3
1992 5.6 18.3 25.0 18.3
1993 0.6 13.4 19.8 30.5
1994 0.9 18.9 19.2 23.4
Source : Deutsche Bundesbank (1997a), p.78.
For the 1984-1996 period net foreign investment in Germany were 34.6 billion DEM according
to German data, but 137.2 billion DEM according to foreign data. For outbound flows the
difference was slightly smaller (226.1 billion DEM according to German data, 166.0 billion
DEM according to foreign data (source: Bundesbank (1997a), p.78). Thus, based on German
data one has to explain a net outflow of 191.5 billion DEM, while based on foreign data only a
net outflow of 28.8 billion DEM has to be explained.In addition to these very specific aspects of recent developments there is a more general risk of
misinterpreting the data on direct investment flows to and from Germany:
•   Inflows could indicate strength. Net FDI is not necessarily an indicator of relative cost
competitiveness, because it also depends on non-cost factors. Empirical studies suggest that
the proximity to markets matters more than costs. Thus, net-inflows could reflect a more
positive overall macroeconomic development in the area, which attracts most FDI in net
terms. However, one has to take into account country-specific structure in the private sector.
For instance a broad equity base of company ownership could make acquisitions easier for
foreign investors than bank-based financing would do. Obviously the latter is a
characteristic of the German economy where equity financing has played a minor role up to
the 1990s.
•   Outflows could indicate strength. FDI and foreign production are a result of firm-specific
competitiveness and transaction costs. Thus, high outward FDI could signal an
improvement of the competitive situation of domestic companies (e.g. due to scale
economies, technological knowledge or progress). Low outward FDI could also signal that
firms do not meet the preconditions for FDI (e.g. consumer goods producers have limited
resources). Moreover, FDI could come along with an increase in exports and widen the
domestic basis of R&D and future economic growth. In that respect FDI outflows would
strengthen the domestic economy and create new jobs.
•   Flows could be policy-induced. In case of political or other trade restrictions FDI might be
the only option of foreign engagement. Moreover, domestic authorities or international
institutions (e.g. the EBRD) could encourage FDI outflows. Thus it would be misleading to
interpret these outflows as a weakness of the domestic economy. In addition one might
expect positive effects for the domestic economy.
These considerations suggest that net FDI should not be used as stand-alone indicator of
competitiveness and add to the warnings already contained in the Bundesbank report mentioned
earlier. However, in the context of the general weakness of the overall economy, the small
amount of foreign direct investment flows coming into Germany has been a focal point of the
discussion about what might go wrong in the German economy. One reading suggested that the
conditions of production and investment were not good enough to attract foreign capital. A
closer look to direct investment flows to and from Germany confirmed the discrepancy between
both flows. However, the more recent developments were substantially different as mergers and
acquisitions and ongoing globalisation have substantially changed the size of flows. Thus,
doubts occur as to whether the results obtained in earlier empirical studies still hold, in
particular whether the link between the business locations and direct investment is the same as
for instance ten years ago. On the other hand, there is no hint that Germany has in any way
become a more attractive place for foreign companies to invest in. Despite all the caveats, the
analysis therefore gives supplementary information about an economy in need of reforms that
would increase its quality as a business location.
3.1.4  Some concluding remarks
In the discussion on Germany’s structural weakness during the 1990s, international trade and
FDI take on a very prominent role. This is because much of the economic ups and downs of
Germany’s growth has been attributed to external developments. More importantly, trade and
FDI allow for a direct comparison of Germany’s economic strength with that of other countries.
This section analysed the international performance with a threefold approach by studying, first,
competitiveness indicators, then trade figures, and finally FDI flows.
A look at indicators of cost-competitiveness revealed that Germany lost substantial ground in
the early years after unification and only recovered part of this loss in the second half of the
1990s. Underlying the decline in German competitiveness were several sharp exchange rate
adjustments, especially vis-à-vis non-EU countries, in the early 1990s that dominated the whole
development in the 1990s. In the more recent past the weakening of the euro seems to havehelped restoring cost competitiveness vis-à-vis a broader group of industrial countries. Of equal
importance is the development of unit labour costs, which in the aftermath of re-unification rose
at a much faster rate than in the trading partners. In particular, the very high unit labour costs of
East Germany, drags down the pan-German competitiveness. Here, too, the situation appears to
be improving in recent years due to relative wage moderation. The adjustment appears,
however, to be very slow because other countries are also practising relative wage moderation.
The economic consequences of the loss in competitiveness are obvious and can also be
modelled quantitatively (see Annex). Unification increased real wage costs in 1993 by over 7
percentage points compared to the hypothetical case of a Germany without re-unification. The
loss in competitiveness entailed by a real exchange rate increase of over 9%, results in the
model in a reduction in cumulative growth by 6½ % in 2000.
This pattern of a sharp loss and slow gain in trade competitiveness finds its reflection also in the
actual development of foreign trade. A large current account surplus of West Germany
disappeared when Germany was unified. This is accompanied by a relative fall in market share
of Germany’s exports. Unsurprisingly, the weakest element can be found in East German
companies. In fact, the West German export sector remains highly competitive and runs, if
taken alone, a de facto current account trade surplus of roughly 4% of GDP and an estimated
trade surplus of around 7% of GDP. The East, by contrast, runs a huge current account deficit in
the order of 50% of its GDP, which is sustainable only as a result of West-East transfer
payments in the same order of magnitude.
A sectoral analysis of trade suggests, however, that even the West might have longer-run
potential problems insofar as it is loosing its edge in the high-tech high-skill industries. In
combination with a relative decline in the capital intensity of exports, a continuation of this
trend would make Germany’s status as high wage country untenable. An analysis of intra-
industry trade flows also indicates that Germany might not take advantage of the economic
potential of globalisation to the same extent as the other faster growing countries do.
Finally, the discussion of FDI shows that FDI flows into Germany are smaller than both
outflows from Germany and inflows into other countries. As opposed to the situation in trade,
an analysis of FDI is not so clear-cut. Nevertheless, it can be taken as a further indication that
business climate in Germany is falling behind that of other countries.
The analysis of these various aspects of Germany’s competitiveness allows three conclusions.
First, Germany’s trade performance remained behind that of its trading partners. Second, an
analysis of German competitiveness must clearly distinguish between the East, where
international competitiveness is still catastrophic and largely maintained by subsidies, and the
West, with only relatively mild problems. These might, however, be growing, if companies do
not keep up with the latest international developments. Third, clearly the institutional aspects of
economic unification are at the heart of Germany’s competitiveness problems both in the West
and the East. The economic drain the intra-German transfers impose on the West are obviously
higher than the economic benefits the East derives from it. Any hope of lifting Germany’s
competitiveness must take the different needs of East and West as a starting point and set
policies accordingly. This requires, on the one hand, a redirection of public funds and tax
incentives towards raising productivity rather than consumption. On the other hand, and
politically more difficult, it requires lowering unit labour costs to competitive levels. In concrete
terms this means in particular for the East that wages need to be set less according to economic
realities rather than principles of equal wages across the country.3.1.A  Annex: The real exchange rate and economic performance in Germany
In the 1990s we observed a real effective appreciation of the DEM, which peaked in the mid-
1990s at around 10%. This sub-section looks at the macroeconomic impact of a competitiveness
shock of this order of magnitude on the German economy. Such an analysis is complicated
since the real exchange rate is not an exogenous variable but is itself the result of specific
shocks. Depending on the type of shock, the macroeconomic outcome of a real appreciation can
be very different. It can be associated with an increase as well as with a decrease in economic
growth. A positive link between growth and appreciation could emerge, for example, if world
demand for domestic goods increases. Another example for a positive link would be
expectations about positive future return differentials in the domestic economy versus the rest of
the world. The US experience in the 1990s is suggestive of such a link. Alternatively a real
exchange rate appreciation could indicate specific demand or cost pressures in the domestic
economy. In this case one would expect a negative effect of the real appreciation on economic
activity. Therefore, an analysis of the impact of real exchange rate movements on the German
economy requires an explicit view on the type of shock that occurred in Germany. It the case of
Germany, both a demand and a cost shock can be identified. The demand shock arises from
expansionary fiscal policy, driven by the need to finance substantial transfers to the New
Länder. The explicit policy of social partners to achieve a rapid convergence of wages in East
Germany to West German levels, constitutes a cost shock. Both shocks are quantified as
follows:
Fiscal shock: This is identical to the shock discussed in sub-section 2.2. The budget deficit
increases by 3.5% in 1995, despite an increase in effective labour taxes of 4% and an increase in
consumption taxes of 1.5%.
Wage shock: Within the first two years after re-unification the accumulated difference between
real wage and labour productivity growth in the business sector reached about 4%. This was due
to an explicit policy of social partners to equalise living conditions. These post re-unification
agreements are not captured in the standard wage bargaining rule of the QUEST model. In order
to analyse the impact of these agreements a wage shock is calibrated such that the model
generates an increase of real wages over productivity of 4% in 1992
42 and matches the evolution
of the wage share in Germany. From 1993 onwards the policy of rapid real wage convergence
was pursued less vigorously. This is reflected in the simulations by keeping the level of the
wage shock constant from 1993 onwards.
Table 3A.1: German Fiscal Shock and Wage Shock: (Cumulative Percentage changes)
1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
GDP 0.21 -0.96 -3.96 -5.71 -6.38 -6.62 -6.95 -7.79
Employment -0.56 -4.90 -7.13 -7.80 -8.46 -8.93 -8.96 -8.99
Real wage costs 2.38 7.15 3.58 1.93 1.93 1.96 1.23 0.51
CPI -0.43 1.94 3.83 4.72 5.53 6.75 7.17 6.30
Real exchange rate -3.23 -6.28 -9.60 -9.77 -9.44 -9.50 -9.64 -8.56
Wage share 0.77 1.38 0.08 -0.16 -0.16 -0.27 -0.46 -0.39
Trade balance -0.35 -1.53 -1.57 -1.12 -0.59 -0.39 -0.32 0.64
Source :  Simulation with QUEST ; note that the results ignore the partial reversal that occurred since 1997.
As can be seen from the table, demand and cost shocks of the magnitude observed in Germany
can explain an appreciation of about 10%. This, together with the underlying source of the real
appreciation has persistent macroeconomic effects. Without reversal of the initial wage impulse
in later years the economy is moving to a new equilibrium with a permanently lower level of
employment and GDP. Though most of the output losses have occurred in the mid-1990s, the
simulations indicate that the process of slow growth is likely to continue beyond the year 2000.
                                                
42  This is calculated by comparing the 1992 level of wages and labour productivity to the respective pre-
unification levels in 1990. Data source is OECD’s Business Sector Data Bank (BSDP).3.2 The functioning of the labour market
3.2.1  Overview
An analysis of labour market inertia is an essential part of any attempt to explain Germany’s
slow growth in the 1990s. The growth scenarios presented in previous sub-sections suggest that
a lack of labour market dynamics - in particular in terms of employment growth - is the single
most important factor behind Germany’s anaemic output growth. However, the look at
aggregate data alone does not provide satisfactory insight into the mechanisms that underlie the
disappointing labour market performance. The purpose of the present section is to analyse the
underlying structural weaknesses of the labour market in order to close that gap. The discussion
of micro-evidence confirming shortcomings in specific labour market segments thus
complements the macro-oriented earlier sections.
The macroeconomic role of employment is dual by nature. As a production factor it affects the
supply side, as a source of private households’ income it affects demand. This section focuses
mostly on labour as a production factor and is organised as follows: The first sub-section
provides an overview of the employment situation and its development during the 1990s. As the
corollaries of employment, unemployment and labour market participation are also briefly
discussed. The second sub-section deals with wage formation. Given that in the aggregate,
wages do not seem to be overly rigid, the analysis concentrates on the compression of the wage
structure and on the issue of wage differentiation across skills levels and regions. In sub-section
3, the broad costs of job creation are assessed, introducing both non-wage labour costs and the
cost-related issue of labour market flexibility. Sub-section 4 reviews labour supply under the
aspects of work incentives in the tax-benefit system, impediments for female labour market
participation and mismatch problems. Sub-section 5 concludes on what seem to be the main
structural problems for employment growth.
Employment dynamics
The number of people in employment declined in Germany during most of the past decade
(Figure 3.11). Only from 1998 onwards have part of the losses in employment been
compensated, and total employment in 2000 was roughly at the same level as in 1991. Even if
one excludes the period of very strong employment destruction in the former GDR until 1993,
the overall picture of low employment dynamics remains. What is more, the pick-up of
employment growth from 1998 onwards was limited to the West Germany. In the East,
employment started to decline again after a short period of employment gains in 1994-95.
Labour in Germany is a much underused resource, not only due to close to 4 million
unemployed people, but also due to a large hidden labour force. With an employment rate of
65%, Germany lies two percentage points above the EU average, but still significantly below
the target, set by the European Council at Lisbon, of 70% for the EU as a whole by 2010. The
employment rate is also well below that of some northern European countries and the UK
(Table 3.10 includes Norway which, as can be seen, is a European benchmark in this respect). It
is interesting to see that employment rates for prime age male workers do not differ much
between “high employment” and “low employment” countries. The employment rate of men
aged 30 to 49 is even higher in Germany and Italy than e.g. in Sweden. The main disparities in
the overall employment rate stem from the marked differences in employment of women and
older workers.
The picture of low employment dynamics is even more worrying if one looks at employment
volume, i.e. the number of hours worked. Whereas the 1994-1997 decline in national
employment was rather soft, hours worked declined by 4½ % in the same period. The
subsequent increase was substantially weaker in hours worked than in employment, also
reflecting a tendency towards more part-time work. Furthermore, the East-West differentialbecomes even more evident in the development of hours worked in recent years. The downward
trend of labour volume continues in the East; it even accelerated in 2000.
Figure 3.11:Employment and hours worked
Source: IAB
Table 3.10: Employment rates
                   Total D E F I NL S UK N
Between 15 and 64 years 65.3 54.7 61.7 53.4 72.9 71.1 71.2 77.9
Between 30 and 34 years 80.1 71.2 78.2 70.9 85.8 82.0 80.7 85.8
Between 35 and 39 years 81.4 70.1 79.8 73.7 83.1 84.1 81.0 87.2
Between 40 and 44 years 81.9 70.3 81.0 73.3 82.6 85.0 82.5 87.5
Between 45 and 49 years 80.6 65.8 79.9 70.5 80.0 84.8 81.6 87.6
Between 50 and 54 years 74.3 58.4 74.9 58.1 71.4 83.8 76.1 82.8
Between 55 and 59 years 56.4 46.0 48.1 36.5 54.1 78.6 63.2 76.7
Between 60 and 64 years 19.6 26.4 10.2 18.0 18.5 46.0 36.1 50.8
Males
Between 15 and 64 years 72.7 69.6 68.8 67.6 82.1 72.6 77.9 81.8
Between 30 and 34 years 89.4 87.4 88.4 86.6 95.1 84.8 89.8 91.4
Between 35 and 39 years 90.1 88.7 89.3 90.7 93.6 85.6 89.4 90.4
Between 40 and 44 years 89.2 89.2 89.9 92.3 93.4 86.1 89.2 90.5
Between 45 and 49 years 88.0 87.6 88.5 91 90.8 85.9 86.0 90.1
Between 50 and 54 years 83.8 82.1 83.8 78.9 86.7 84.0 81.8 87.0
Between 55 and 59 years 66.1 68.4 53.8 50.8 69.2 80.6 70.8 82.1
Between 60 and 64 years 27.2 39.4 10.6 29.4 26.2 49.0 47.3 57.8
Females
Between 15 and 64 years 57.8 40.3 54.8 39.3 63.4 69.7 64.5 73.9
Between 30 and 34 years 70.6 55.4 68.0 54.8 76.0 79.0 71.3 80.2
Between 35 and 39 years 72.1 52.3 70.6 56.5 72.3 82.6 72.4 83.9
Between 40 and 44 years 74.5 52.2 72.4 54.3 71.6 83.9 75.8 84.3
Between 45 and 49 years 73.2 45.3 71.5 50.2 68.8 83.7 77.1 85.0
Between 50 and 54 years 64.7 35.5 66.1 37.7 55.5 83.6 70.4 78.4
Between 55 and 59 years 46.6 24.8 42.5 22.9 38.6 76.5 55.9 71.2
Between 60 and 64 years 12.1 14.8 9.8 7.6 10.9 43.2 25.4 44.2
Source: LFS, 2000 data
Figure 3.12 plots employment in full time equivalents. Even in the more favourable years up to
2000, job creation was quite weak in West Germany, let alone East Germany. The absolute
employment gains in full time equivalents from 1997 to 2001 were 0.7m in West Germany,
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hours (total) hours (east) hours (west)Figure 3.12 : Employment in full time equivalents (1991=100)
   Source: IAB
The employment share of services is 68%, slightly above the level in Italy, but substantially
below that in the UK (Table 3.11). Germany appears to be catching up,  however: The share of
services has risen by 8½ percentage points since 1991, somewhat more than in other economies
with an already high service share. The OECD (2001) has analysed the services employment
gap towards the US by level of income. This gap (also visible in the comparison Germany-UK)
concerns both low- and high-paid services jobs. In the low paid segment, Germany has
significantly fewer jobs in wholesale and retail, hotels and restaurants, education as well as
health and social work (Table 3.12). The latter two sectors have also lower employment in the
high-paid segment, where financial services, real estate and business activities as well as
community, social and personal services have to be added to the list.
The corollary to services employment is a still relatively high share of employment in industry,
even though the statistics probably overstate the true discrepancy, since the outsourcing of
services seems to have gone further in other countries. Employment in construction was
particularly influenced by the effects of re-unification: The construction boom associated with
the investment in infrastructure and housing led to an increase in construction employment by
430,000 (or 15%) from 1991-1995. These increases proved unsustainable in the following bust.
In the meantime, however, the decline of the construction sector seems to go well beyond the
adjustment to post-re-unification over-capacities and concerns West Germany as well.
Table 3.11: Employment shares (in %)
DFI U K
Agriculture 1991 4.0 5.6 7.2 2.3
1999 2.6 4.4 5.1 1.9
Industry (excl. constr.) 1991 29.4 19.8 25.4 19.0
1999 22.3 16.7 24.1 16.4
Construction 1991 7.3 7.2 6.8 7.8
1999 7.5 6.1 6.6 6.4
Services 1991 59.2 66.6 61.9 70.8










1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Germany West G East GTable 3.12: Low paid services
Employment rate gap between the US
and…
Germany France Italy United
Kingdom
Service sector 8.5 6.7 11.2 4.0
Wholesale and retail 2.2 2.4 3.3 1.6
Hotels and restaurants 2.2 2.4 2.0 1.4
Transport and communications 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
Real estate and business activities 0.5 0.1 0.9 0.2
Education 1.4 0.8 1.3 0.1
Health and social work 1.5 0.4 3.0 0.3
Community, social and personal 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5
OECD Employment Outlook 2001
Dynamics of unemployment and participation
As in many European countries, the main feature of unemployment developments in Germany
over the last three decades has been the slow reaction to economic upturns which resulted in an
increased level of unemployment after each of the adverse shocks that hit the economy. It is a
standard argument (cf. the overview in Wyplosz (2000)) that this (quasi) hysteresis is a
symptom of too rigid labour market institutions. Rigid structures may have existed well before
the unemployment crisis, but became binding only when the economy was hit by adverse
shocks. One indicator of structural unemployment is the so-called Beveridge curve, i.e. the
relation of vacancies to unemployment. The curve has shifted outward in every decade since the
1970s (Figure 3.13) and points to an increasing mismatch of skills in the labour market. Another
indication for a structural problems is the high percentage of long-term unemployment, which
accounts for half the total unemployment: Of the 7.9% unemployed in 2000, 3.9 percentage
points were due to persons who had been unemployed for more than twelve months.
Figure 3.13 : Beveridge Curve
Source: BA; national unemployment concept, "reported" vacancuies; figures for june of each year
In the past decade, the strong regional dimension of unemployment has been most remarkable.
In February 2002, non-seasonally adjusted unemployment rates ranged from 5.6% in Baden-
Württemberg to 20.8% in Sachsen-Anhalt, or 8.3% in West Germany compared to 19.2% in the
East
43.
The unemployment rate of female workers is, at 8.1% in 2001, relatively close to the total
unemployment rate of 7.9%. The unemployment rate of workers under the age of 25 is
somewhat higher, at 9.3%, but younger workers are relatively less disadvantaged in the German
labour market than in most other EU Countries. Unemployment of older workers, however, is
                                                























1975 1990significantly above average and older women face particular difficulties (older workers’
unemployment rate in 2000 was 12.6%, for women 14.1%)
44.
The risk of being unemployed is strongly related to the skills level (Table 3.13). Low skilled
workers in Germany have a share in active population of 17% but their share of unemployment
is 27%. The gross probability for a low skilled worker of being unemployed is therefore
increased by a factor of 1.6, compared to the average worker. This factor is slightly higher than
in France and well above the value for Italy. The comparative disadvantage is higher in West
Germany than in the East (where the incidence of unemployment is higher among all skills
groups). Furthermore, unemployment of low skilled workers increased by 7% from 1995 to
2000, whereas that for highly skilled persons decreased by 9%. In the longer run, the education
level of working age population is increasing (Hummel /Reinberg (2001)) and employment of
low-skilled workers is declining, both in absolute terms and relative to the demand for medium-
and high-skilled workers. From1991 to 1998, more than one in five low-skills jobs was lost, a
total of 1.2m. Medium-skills jobs declined by 6% and high-skills jobs increased by as much as
31% (or 1.3m) over the same period (Reinberg (1999)).
Table 3.13: Unemployment share of skills groups (2000)






D 27.2% 54.3% 12.7% 5.8% 17% 1.59
F 47.6% 39.3% 13.0% 0.0% 32% 1.50
I 50.2% 41.4% 6.4% 2.0% 45% 1.11
D_E 14.9% 67.2% 14.7% 3.1% 11% 1.40
D_W 35.6% 45.6% 11.2% 7.5% 19% 1.90
Source: Eurostat
The rise in labour market participation experienced in West Germany during the 1980s came to
a halt in the 1990s (Figure 3.14). East Germany, where labour market participation had been
considerably higher under the socialist regime, witnessed a gradual adaptation to West levels.
The participation rate of women in East Germany is, at 71%, still higher than in the West (61%)
although it is slowly declining in the East and increasing in the West. Without the flow of
workers out of the labour market, unemployment rates in East Germany would look even worse.
The same is true with regard to low-skilled workers: less than half of the job losses of this group
between 1991 and 1998 actually translated into an increase of unemployment as a large number
of low-skilled workers (620,000) left the labour force (Reinberg (1999)). The participation rate
of low-skilled workers is very low, at 58% in 1999 (OECD (2001)). Among the larger Member
States only Italy has a lower participation of low-skilled workers, namely 53%.
3.2.2  Wage formation: how flexible can it be?
At the aggregate level, wages in Germany seem to be rather flexible. The  extreme wage
increase in the early 1990s related to re-unification was followed by a period of rather sustained
wage moderation. However, the wage structure (i.e. the relation of high to low wages) is
remarkably stable, given the unemployment differentials across regions and skills levels. This
sub-section looks at the structure of wage bargaining to explain the lack of wage differentiation.
Institutional setting
In Germany, sectoral wage negotiations prevail (Industriegewerkschaftsprinzip), often at a sub-
national level (covering Tarifbezirke). Negotiations by occupation are the exception. In West
                                                
44 ditto.(eastern) Germany 45% (23%) of firms participated in a sectoral collective agreement in 2000,
covering 63% (46%) of workers. These shares have, however, been declining
45.
Figure 3.14 : Participation rates
  Source : Eurostat
With its sectoral collective agreements, wage bargaining in Germany takes place at an
intermediate level of centralisation. In France, the bulk of bargaining takes place at the company
level but sectoral agreements are also common. Wage negotiations in Italy are more centralised
through nation-wide sectoral agreements and they are completely decentralised to the company
level in the UK. The discussion of how wage bargaining structures affect wage developments
has to a large extent been shaped by the Calmfors and Driffill (1988) hypothesis. It predicts a
‘hump-shaped’ relation of unemployment and the centralisation of wage bargaining. Fully
centralised and fully decentralised bargaining produce the most employment-friendly outcomes
because, in a nutshell, firm-level bargaining takes the competitiveness of the firm into account
and economy-wide bargaining is concerned with its macroeconomic employment effects. In
between the two extremes, the externalities of wage increases on employment are not fully
taken into account, which leads to inferior outcomes. However, economy-wide co-ordination of
wage negotiations can help internalising macroeconomic externalities (cf.) Calmfors (2001)).
Germany and Italy have a high degree of wage bargaining co-ordination across sectors, which is
a persistent feature in Germany over the last two decades (OECD (1997)). De facto co-
ordination in Germany stems from pattern bargaining (i.e. the fact that, in a specific year, it is
usually up to an influential trade union to conclude the first agreement, which then becomes a
benchmark for other sectoral negotiations). Since 1998, tripartite high-level discussions take
place between employers’ associations, trade unions and the federal government in the so-called
“Bündnis für Arbeit” (Alliance for Jobs). The Alliance has issued a recommendation on wage
moderation for the first time in the context of the 2000 wage round. Although not binding for
the Social Partners at the sectoral level, this recommendation had indeed a moderating
influence.
In practice, aggregate real wages seem to be rather flexible in Germany. Wage equation
estimates (e.g. OECD (2000)) show a relatively high elasticity of aggregate wages to aggregate
                                                
45  Firm level collective agreements still play a minor role. They were applied, in 2000, by 3% (4%) of West (East)
German firms, and covered 7% (10%) of workers. The remaining firms are not covered by any collective












UKunemployment. Figure 3.15 shows that real wages moved more or less in line with those of the
other big Member States in the 1980s. Then in the early 1990s, strong wage increases followed
during the re-unification boom. These developments – in the end political rather than
economical – had enormous costs in terms of employment and competitiveness. Only the wage
moderation of the second half of the 1990s brought a new convergence towards the
developments in partner countries (see section 3.1). Still, the data presented in the first sub-
section show that the very strong regional dimension of unemployment remains. Furthermore,
the risk of unemployment is substantially higher for low-skilled workers, compared to the
average worker.
Figure 3.15 : Real compensation per employee (index 1991 =100 ; GDP deflator)
Wage differentiation across skills levels and regions
The unemployment pattern of low-skilled workers clearly indicates a flaw in the wage
formation process, because a lack of differentiation of wages according to skills has priced low-
skilled workers out of the market. As in many continental EU countries, wage inequality in
Germany is relatively low compared to the US or the UK. An analysis of socio-economic panel
data for West Germany (Prasad (2000)) shows that the wage dispersion decreased slightly from
the mid-1980s until the mid-1990s; then it started to increase again. Over the whole period
1984-1997, the increase of real wages was slightly stronger at the high tail of the wage
distribution.
One explanation for the existence of a wage floor for low-skilled workers is institutional
46:
Typically, sectoral collective agreements fix a factor (e.g. +2.5%) by which wages for all
workers of the concerned industry are increased, irrespective of their occupation and skills level.
This uniform movement has the effect that within sectors the wage dispersion is very inflexible.
The wage structure can become even more compressed, if the agreement foresees a lump sum
payment on top of the percentage increase, which is also current practice (cf.
Sachverständigenrat (2000)). Then, low wages increase more strongly, in percentage terms, than
high wages, thereby exacerbating the risk that the cost of low-skilled labour rises above its
productivity. The situation tends to be aggravated when high-skilled workers are in short supply
and have the power to exert pressure for strong wage increases. Furthermore, pattern bargaining
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D F I UK D-Wtends to strengthen the uniformity of wage developments also across industries. A survey
among German firms (Franz/Pfeiffer (2001)) confirms that collective agreements are seen as a
major impediment for wage flexibility especially in the low-skills segment.
Wages do not sufficiently reflect the regional labour market situation to reduce the large
regional unemployment disparities. The most striking example is the rigidity in East German
wages after the strong increases in the early 1990s. What is potentially more relevant for the
future growth potential is the striking rigidity of relative wages in the second half of the 1990s,
given that the unemployment rate in the New Länder is twice as high as the national level and
given that employment is stagnant and the labour volume continues to decrease. In fact, at 113%
of the West level, unit labour costs had the same relative disadvantage in 2000 as in 1994. Table
3.14 shows the convergence of unit labour costs across sectors. In construction, the initial
misalignment had been absorbed by the mid-1990s. In recent years, however, under-utilisation
of capacities drove unit labour costs up again. In manufacturing, the sector where competition is
strongest, the differential has disappeared by now, however, this was achieved through
enormous labour-shedding: Of the over one million job losses in the East industry in net terms
from 1991 to 2000, almost 900,000 occurred in manufacturing. The adjustment of the cost level
has lead to a stagnation of employment in this sector since 1997, but has not been sufficient to
reverse the trend (Table 3.15). Finally, in the service sector unit labour costs adjustment is still
rather far from completed and progress mixed. Given that the services sector in East Germany
was initially very small, employment has been dynamic anyway, especially in the segment of
financial and business services.
Table 3.14: Nominal unit labour costs* in East Germany by sectors (west Germany=100)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
agriculture, forestry, fishery 147 108 73 84 84 93 89 81 81 79
industry (excl. construction) 161 151 120 122 121 109 105 103 101 98
 - of which: manufacturing 205 174 136 135 133 124 115 111 107 104
construction 120 112 106 97 96 92 96 105 107 111
trade, tourism, transport 119 109 108 106 115 114 115 115 116 117
finance, housing, business
services
209 163 127 117 119 116 113 112 111 106
public and private services 104 105 106 104 107 107 107 110 112 110
total 143 128 116 113 116 113 112 113 114 113
* compensation per employee/GVA over employment in current prices; Berlin included in West Germany
Source : Statistisches Landesamt Baden-Württemberg
In nominal terms, wages have adjusted rather quickly close to the West levels. Looking only at
collective agreements, the level of East nominal wages reaches already 92%. Complete
convergence has been reached in a number of sectors in both manufacturing and services and
further convergence remains a goal for trade unions in most of the remaining sectors. Upward
pressure from the wage bargaining side will therefore probably remain intact as long as West
wages are the benchmark for the less productive East.
However, collectively agreed wages show only an incomplete picture, and the average actual
compensation per employee in the East remains around 77% of the West level. Firstly, the
average working week is still longer in the East, secondly the coverage of collective agreements
is declining and thirdly, pay supplements, such as a Christmas or holiday bonus, which are
common in the West, are rarely applied in the East. Finally, opening and hardship clauses allow
firms to pay lower wages in specific circumstances. The individual impact of these features on
wage dynamics is however hard to assess.Table 3.15: Employees in East Germany (thousands)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
All sectors 6438 5557 5377 5482 5583 5535 5443 5439 5454 5358
Agriculture, forestry, fishery 477 284 227 216 215 203 204 205 200 194
industry (excl. construction 1935 1258 1064 995 967 931 908 911 898 888
 - manufacturing 1697 1082 919 868 853 828 814 823 814 813
Construction 661 741 838 940 992 954 903 832 780 709
Trade, restaurants, transport 1248 1129 1132 1153 1172 1182 1185 1205 1228 1214
Financial services, lease, business
services
366 402 431 465 494 516 531 563 593 608
Public and personal services 1751 1743 1685 1713 1743 1749 1712 1723 1755 1745
Services 3365 3274 3248 3331 3409 3447 3428 3491 3576 3567
Source: Statistisches Landesamt Baden-Württemberg
Opening clauses: According to the WSI works council survey 1999-2000 (as quoted in eiro-
online (2001)), 22% of establishments in Germany use some kind of flexibility clauses provided
in collective agreements. Most of these concern, however, working time (Table 3.16). The
popularity of opening clauses that led to pay reductions is significantly higher in the East, where
also breaches of collective agreements seem to occur more often.
Opting out: Coverage by collective wage agreements in East Germany is down to 46% of
workers, because firms are leaving the sectoral employers’ organisation or because new firms
especially small ones do not join. According to a ZEW survey (see Franz/Pfeiffer (2001)), 11%
of firms who had applied a collective agreement in 1998 had by early 2000 taken measures to
‘opt out’ of it. However, Kohaut/Schnabel (1999) point out that quite often, firms return to
applying a sectoral agreement some time after having left the employers’ organisation.
Table 3.16: The use of opening clauses at establishment level
Germany West East
Establishments which do not use opening clauses 75% 77% 67%
Establishments which use opening clauses 22% 20% 30%
Establishments use opening clauses in following fields (as % of those that use opening clauses)
Working time extension 44% 48% 28%
Limited working time reduction 25% 27% 19%
"Entrance wages" for newly hired employees 20% 21% 16%
Reduction or postponement of annual bonuses 14% 11% 27%
Postponement of collectively agreed pay increases 12% 10% 21%
General "hardship clauses" 8% 3% 28%
Reduction of collectively agreed pay 6% 4% 11%
Reduction or postponement of holiday pay 6% 2% 22%
Source: eiro-online (2001)
3.2.3  Labour demand: Does job creation pay?
While wages are the largest cost component for recruitment other factors such as current costs
(e.g. social security contributions) or one-off costs (e.g. expenses associated with hiring and
firing) play a role. As aggregate figures are not very revealing, this sub-section illuminates some
problems in the institutional detail in Germany.
Unit labour costs
Differences in the long-term growth rate of real labour costs are clearly relevant when
explaining the record of employment growth in Europe as compared to the US (for a discussion
see e.g. IMF (1999)). The data on the development of real unit labour costs in European
countries in the 1980s and 1990s do not allow ad hoc conclusions on employment differentialsin terms of labour costs, however: Real unit labour costs (RULC) in Germany declined broadly
in line with those in France or Italy (Figure 3.16), reflecting well-behaved aggregate wages and
a rise in labour productivity. By contrast, in the UK the level of RULC was more or less
maintained over that period.
Figure 3.16: Real unit labour costs (index; 1982=100)
Source : AMECO
However, unit labour costs remain high in absolute terms. As a consequence, firms try to reduce
the labour share in output (basically, by substituting labour by capital). In very general terms,
shifts towards more capital-intensive production are relevant in large parts of the manufacturing
sector. Still, the aggregate growth of labour productivity, which should reflect enhanced capital-
intensity of production, was  relatively low in Germany compared to other countries, such as
France or the UK (Table 3.17). This indicates that the phenomenon has not been specific to
Germany.
Table 3.17: Average yearly productivity  growth (in %)
1982-1989 1994-2000 1982-2000
D 1.75 1.39 1.74
F 2.40 1.51 1.87
I 1.86 1.64 1.66
UK 2.44 1.73 2.05
Source: National Accounts
In the services sector, the option of substituting labour by capital is not always viable. Here,
labour cost are ultimately reflected in the (relative) price of the service provided. The high costs
have as a consequence that a service is not provided at all, or that households opt for doing the
work themselves. It is those services that are by definition labour-intensive and offer very
limited possibilities of productivity-enhancing investment where the employment gap to the US
as the service society par excellence is particularly wide. Penalising labour costs thus contribute
to the weakness of the low paid services segment. This also fits the anecdotal evidence that a
rather high share of this kind of services is provided through the shadow economy. To catch the
whole picture, however, restrictions stemming from market regulation and the demand side also
need to be taken into account. In fact, “cultural” explanations of low demand are quite popular.
For instance, Freeman/Schettkat (2000b) argue that Germans prefer to work shorter hours and
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* index base for "D" is 1991 val ue of "D_W"same product. After all, it is hard to disentangle the effects of consumer preference from those
of services’ high prices.
Income taxes and social security contributions add up to a high tax wedge in Germany (Table
3.18). It is the highest among the four largest Member States for single earners and double
income couples and in particular well above the tax wedge in the UK. Whereas the income tax
scheme is progressive, social security contributions (which are high in France, Italy and
Germany alike) are flat-rate and seem to counteract the tax progression (note that income tax is
already zero for low income, single earner couples). In competitive labour markets, in the long
run, additional labour tax burden will affect mainly the structure and less so the level of labour
costs. This is because with rather inelastic labour supply, the tax incidence falls almost
exclusively on employees. However, this might not be the case in the short to medium term, and
it does not hold true, if labour markets are non-competitive as it is the case in Germany. The
employees succeed in shifting part of the additional labour tax burden onto employers, with the
result of rising levels of unemployment (see, e.g. Daveri/Tabellini (1997)). Wage floors, in
particular, can be a reason why wages do not adjust.
Table 3.18: Total tax wedge
Germany France Italy UK
Couple, no children
 100 - 33 1996 46.5 46.7 48.4 27.0
2000 46.1 43.7 43.2 25.6
 67 - 33 1996 41.5 43.7 45.9 20.9
2000 41.3 37.5 39.8 20.8
 67 - 0 1996 36.0 43.1 45.3 24.4
2000 35.7 37.8 40.1 25.6
 50 - 0 1996 33.6 43.1 42.0 18.3
2000 34.0 34.0 37.1 20.8
Single, no children
67 1996 46.5 44.3 48.3 26.7
2000 46.1 39.2 43.0 25.6
50 1996 41.5 43.1 46.0 21.5
2000 41.3 34.0 41.0 20.8
Income tax and social security contributions (employer and employee) as % of total labour cost. Earners of 100%, 67% and 33% of the
APW respectively (e.g. “100 – 33” stands for the combination where the primary earner gains the APW, while the secondary earner gains
33% of it).
Figures for 2001 are preliminary.
Source: OECD, EC (DG TAXUD)
Flexibility
Labour market turnover indicates a labour market’s capacity of adaptation, in particular in the
context of structural change. At the same time, it is the outcome of various framework
conditions on the demand and the supply side, reflecting regulations (e.g. employment
protection legislation, EPL) as well as incentives (e.g. benefit generosity).
A quite comprehensive analysis of job loss and hiring rates (Schmidt (2000)) for 1989-1991
shows 1½ to 2 times higher overall flows for West Germany as compared to France – while in
the US the flow rates are 2-3 times higher than in Germany (op.cit., Tables 6 and 7)
47. But the
German-French gap seems to have closed since. Labour market turnover
48  in 1995-2000 was
                                                
47  Furthermore, in all three countries, for men the risk of being laid off is increased when their level of education
is low, whereas the picture is less clear for women. When it comes to the probability of finding a job, men with
a low educational attainment face rather large disadvantages in West Germany and France, whereas in the US
their chances are much closer to those of the average worker.
48  In what follows, turnover is defined as monthly flows into and out of registered unemployment relative to the
level of employment. Note that this is a narrower concept than the one used by Schmidt. Moreover, job-to jobequal in Germany and France, at 3.1% and 3.0% respectively. Turnover rates for West Germany
had only slightly increased from 2.1% in 1975 to 2.3% in 1990 and follows the same cyclical
pattern as the unemployment rate (Figure 3.17). After re-unification, turnover has increased
somewhat faster, reflecting the higher unemployment rate, but also an increasing trend
49.
Figure 3.17 : Labour market turnover and employment
 Source : Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, AMECO
A potentially forceful explanation for the somewhat increased labour market flexibility is the
long term shift in the composition of employment, away from manufacturing with very
standardised forms of employment and powerful trade unions towards the services sector with a
higher share of ‘atypical’ employment. For example, the use of fixed term contracts has become
more widespread in Germany over the 1990s: 9% of workers had fixed-term contracts in 2000,
compared to 7.5% in 1991. The increase in the use of fixed term contracts was much stronger in
France, which could partly explain the catching-up in terms of turnover (cf. Blanchard/Landier
(2001)). At the same time, work in temporary work agencies is increasing fast, although the
share of workers employed by such agencies remains, at 1.1% of dependent employment, still
quite low in an international comparison (Konle-Seidl and Walwei (2001), (2002)).
The regulation of work contracts in Germany, as measured by the OECD indicator of EPL
strictness, is less severe than in France or Italy, but much more rigorous than in the UK. For the
rules defining permanent contracts (such as procedural requirements, notice and severance pay,
standards of and penalties for unfair dismissals) the indicator finds more strictness than for the
regulations characterising (renewals and maximum duration of) temporary contracts (Table
3.19). Still, there is a concern that the use of temporary contracts is a substitute for “normal”
contracts which offer insufficient flexibility rather than an indicator of increased flexibility by
itself. The fact that the ranking of the incidence of temporary contracts among France, Germany
and the UK is the same as the ranking of EPL strictness would rather support the latter
interpretation.
                                                                                                                                              
changes without a spell of registered unemployment are disregarded (lack of suitable data), although certainly
very relevant.
49  Even if the rising unemployment rate is controlled for, a small but significant trend towards higher turnover is
discernible for West Germany over the period 1964-1994. For reunified Germany, labour market turnover








1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000
Turnover rate (W) Unempl rate (W) Turnover Rate (D) Unempl rate (D)Table 3.19: Employment protection legislation (1998)
overall index permanent contract temporary contract
index rank Index rank index rank
Italy 3.3 3 3.0 3 3.6 3
France 3.1 5 2.5 6 3.7 2
Germany 2.8 6 3.0 3 2.5 6
United
Kingdom
0.5 11 0.7 10 0.3 13
rank refers to the EU Member States ex Lux and US, J.
Source: OECD (2000) EMU One year on
3.2.4  Labour supply: Does work pay?
The last sub-section of this section looks at essential features of labour supply, namely the
financial incentive to accept a job offer, the possibility to combine work and family care and the
match between searched and offered skills.
Reservation wage
The decision to accept a job offer depends on the generosity of benefits when out of work (i.e.
its level, duration and, eligibility; and the enforcement of sanctions), as compared to potential
take-home pay, and on the rate of withdrawal of benefits when taking up a job. Concerning the
generosity of benefits, again, Germany does not seem to be an outlier. OECD (1999) provides a
summary measure of benefit entitlements, by which Germany scores well between the UK and
France. Moreover, this overall measure has been remarkably stable for Germany over a long
period and the relative positions of the three countries have not changed since 1980. Also when
it comes to availability criteria, a measure of the strictness of the administration of
unemployment benefits, the differences between the three countries are marginal.
Table 3.20 shows net replacement rates (i.e. benefits in relation to last earnings) for selected
levels of last earnings and household types. In the UK, initial replacement rates are higher than
in Germany for low-wage earners, but lower for the average worker. Initial replacement rates
are higher in France, but income support in the 60
th month of unemployment is cut more
strongly. In fact, for a single, long-term benefit recipient in Germany, the difference between
out-of-work and in-work income is particularly low as compared to the other large Member
States; the difference for couples with children is less pronounced. The relative high level of
income support for the single worker type is almost entirely due to (means-tested)
unemployment assistance. It is more than probable that unemployment traps reside here.
Confronted with similar problems, the UK and France operate tax credits for those taking up a
job
50. Both schemes are judged to be rather successful.
Table 3.20: Net replacement rates depending on family type and earnings
APW level 66.7% of APW level
Single Couple, 2 children Single Couple, 2 children
1st month 60th month 1st month 60th month 1st month 60th month 1st month 60th month
France 71 38 74 50 83 55 86 60
G e r m a n y 6 05 47 45 26 97 57 46 1
I t a l y 3 62 85 46 23 63 95 27 5
United
Kingdom
50 50 64 73 73 73 83 95
Source: OECD, Benefit Systems and Work Incentives, 1999
                                                
50  In the UK, the Working Families Tax Credit and in France, the Prime pour l’emploi. These measures differ
greatly with respect to the degree of targeting and the maximum amount per capita, but both can be seen as a
contribution towards increasing work incentives, in particular for low-wage earners.Table 3.21 presents the average effective tax rate (AETR) for couples at the average wage level.
The AETR indicates the combined effect of taxation and benefit withdrawal on the gross wage
when moving from unemployment to employment. Germany has the highest AETR among the
four largest Member States for all categories. If, for example, the principal earner whose partner
is not employed takes up a full time job, he loses 80% of the change in gross income (column
1). In a situation where even more than the additional income is “taxed away”, there is virtually
no economic incentive for the principal earner to take up a part time job, and also the secondary
earner finds 50% or more taxed away when taking up a job. The high marginal and average
taxation of secondary earners bears, in particular, the risk of discouraging women from
participating in the labour market. For part time work, social security contributions are charged
from a threshold of €325, creating a poverty trap in the income area above the threshold
51.
Table 3.21: Average effective tax rates for taking up a job (principal earner at APW level)
in 1997













France 76 69 28 38
Germany 80 115 51 50
I t a l y 6 38 43 32 5
UK 72 93 28 20
Source: OECD, Benefit Systems and Work Incentives, 1999
Family and work
One out of five workers in Germany work part-time. The incidence of part-time work is highest
among women (38%), among whom there is also a strong East-west differential: 42% of West
German women in employment work part time and two thirds of them report that they have
chosen part-time for personal and/or family reasons, whereas only 6% would rather take a full
time job if they found one. In East Germany, the incidence of part time among women in
employment is 23%; more than half of them would prefer a full time job. This difference not
only reflects the different labour demand. It sharply raises the issue of availability of full-time
childcare facilities: In East Germany, where full-time childcare is relatively widespread, only
21% of women in part-time report personal and family reasons. The lack of childcare facilities
in West German Länder (available for only 3% of children below the age of 3) is a major
impediment for women’s move from part- to full-time, and probably for female labour market
participation as a whole (the participation rate of East German women is also higher at 71%
compared to 61%).
Skills mismatch and lack of mobility
As mentioned above, the long-term tendency in labour demand is towards more high-skill and
less low-skill jobs. On the supply side, the qualification level of workers has been rising steadily
over the past decades. However, the supply of ever more qualified labour seems to have lost its
dynamism: The educational level of school leavers has been broadly stable for a decade, and the
age group with the highest average qualification are the 35 to 49 year old. Against the backdrop
of demographic change with a reduction of the number of new labour market entrants it is
worrying that, according to the Mikrozensus 2000, the scope of training for the employed
actually decreased by 43% from 1991 to 2000.
                                                
51  Those working in short part time jobs and earning less than €325 do not pay social security contributions, but a
person earning €326 has to pay the full rate. Therefore, while approx. 4m people have “€325-jobs”, the number
of people earning between €325 and €670 is only ¼ of this figure. Put differently, in order to increase his net
income by only €3, a worker currently earning €325 would need to have his gross salary increased by €87.
Currently, experiments are being carried out in order to find ways of overcoming this poverty trap through
subsidised social security contributions.In the shorter run, in line with the increased number of vacancies, skills shortages have been
gradually emerging. The average number of vacancies increased steadily from 279,000 in 1993
to 514,000 in 2000 (in 2001 it fell back to 504,000). Over the same time, the number of
unemployed per vacancy roughly halved. Whereas the lack of qualified ICT personnel has
found the largest public attention, skills shortages could be felt in several sectors, in 2000. In the
4
th quarter of 2000, 15% of firms in West Germany reported that a lack of suitable workers
impeded their activity. This was particularly acute in agriculture (29%), business services
(28%), transport and communication (22%) and consumption related services (21%). Also in
East Germany business and consumption related services registered labour shortages (18% and
14% of firms, respectively), while overall only 6% of East firms reported skills shortages. In a
recent study for the Euro-area, the ECB (2002) reports that educational mismatch (measured as
the variance of the ratio of skills-specific unemployment rates to the total unemployment rate)
increased significantly in Germany and France in the period 1992-2000, while it remained
stable in Italy.
The persisting regional imbalances in labour supply and demand raise the issue of geographical
mobility. Gross internal migration in Germany is much lower than in the UK (and even more so
the US, Table 3.22) and also lower than in France, while Italy has a notoriously low regional
migration rate. Furthermore, the net flow from East to West Germany in 2000 was a mere
61,000 persons
52, or 0.35% of the East population – not an order of magnitude of which one
could expect a rapid balancing of the unemployment differential. A household’s decision to
move to another region will mainly depend on the expected net gain in disposable income and
the transaction cost of moving. A high level of transfers to equalise the standard of living across
regions (including region to region “Finanzausgleich” as well as individual social transfers) is
certainly a prominent factor explaining low inter-regional migration in Germany. Germany’s
low share of families living in owner occupied houses, and large share of private rented housing
(at 38% and 36% respectively the lowest and the highest in the EU (cf. Maclennan et al (2000))
point on the other hand at relatively low transaction costs. Table 3.22 also shows the share of
employees commuting across regional borders. Commuting partly compensates for the lower
migration with respect to France but is only at half the level of the UK
53.
Table 3.22: Mobility
ratio of gross internal migration to population (%)
1980 1990 1995 1998
commuters as share of
the employed (1998)
D 1.29 1.34 1.24* - 8
F 1.52 1.40 1.49 1.58 5
I 0.68 - 0.50 0.53 2
UK -- - 2 . 3 0 1 7
US 2.79 3.32 2.22 2.40 3
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2000.
* 1993; prior data is for West Germany.
(migration: level 1 regions for D, UK, US; level 2 regions for F, I.
commuting: level 1 regions for UK, US; level 2 regions for D, F, I.)
3.2.5  Concluding remarks
Low employment dynamics contribute a great deal to the overall sluggishness of German
growth. In this section, the underlying structural weakness of the German labour market was
analysed. It is not possible to pin down a single decisive problem as the root of all evils. Rather,
several problem areas have been identified that, taken separately, might have a limited impact
                                                
52  East-West net migration peaked in 1989 at 383,300 persons, already in 1991, it was only half as high. Since
1998 it is slowly increasing again.
53  The figures should be compared with caution, however, as the size and spatial distribution of regions has a
substantial impact on the result.on overall employment performance. Malfunctioning could be identified for several specific
labour market segments, the most problematic areas being:
•   wages for the low skilled. The wage bargaining process in Germany favours uniform wage
developments within, and to some extent also across industries. Workers’ differences in
skills and labour productivity are typically not taken into account in sectoral collective
agreements that do not differentiate according to occupational groups and that – overall
wage moderation notwithstanding – have a tendency towards raising low wages more
strongly than average wages. The compression of the German wage structure is thereby
maintained. The result is a share of low-skilled workers in unemployment that is far above
their share in active population and that is high in a cross-country comparison. More
(downward) flexibility has been introduced in collective agreements over the last years, but
the use of these possibilities is not yet very widespread.
•   reservation wages, in particular at low wage levels. Although replacement rates are, overall,
not particularly high in comparison to other Member States, incentives to accept a job offer
are weak or non-existent for specific groups of the labour force. The still high level of
taxation and linear social security contributions combines with long benefit duration and
high rates of benefit withdrawal to significant unemployment traps.
•   lack of wage differentiation and mobility. Unit labour costs had exploded in East Germany
in the early years after re-unification. The necessary adjustment is hampered by the rigidity
of the relative East-west collectively agreed wages. Even the facts that meanwhile the
coverage of collective agreements in East Germany is far below West level and that opening
clauses exist within collective agreements have not yet brought about the adjustments that
would be necessary in order to move on from employment stagnation to renewed
employment growth. Wage differentiation and  geographical mobility would be expected to
be to some extent substitutes when it comes to re-balancing regional labour markets. Yet,
mobility is far too low to reduce the large regional unemployment disparity.
Although probably less pressing immediately, two additional issues carry the potential of
seriously hampering future employment dynamics, in particular against the backdrop of a
shrinking working age population:
•   Several impediments for female participation in the labour market have been identified. The
tax-benefit system discourages work of second earners in a couple. It is hard to combine
(full-time) work and family, due to the lack of childcare facilities in West Germany.
•   Emerging skills shortages and the bleak labour market prospects of the low skilled highlight
the need to re-dynamise the educational progress of the labour force, both in initial
education and job-related further training.
Without the enormous challenge of transforming the East German economy, one may think, the
corset of structural inflexibility would not have hurt the German labour market as much as it has
in the past decade. In any case, in terms of comparison to the other larger EU Member States,
Germany’s labour market structures do not always look tremendously bad. But the European
experience of the past 30 years also shows that it is precisely in the presence of economic
shocks that rigid labour market institutions produce painful and long-lasting effects.
Moreover, interdependence of labour market structures translates partial malfunctioning into a
bad overall performance: It is through their interactions that individual problems present a major
impediment to employment and ultimately to GDP growth. (for a discussion of labour market
institutions’ complementarity see e.g. Belot/van Ours (2000), Buti et al. (1998)).
•   Wage levels, reservation wages and non-wage labour costs have a combined impact on the
low-wage/low-skills segment of the German labour market, that translates inter alia into the
economy’s weakness in providing low-paid services. It is however not straightforward toassess the relative importance of wage floors, taxes and (high, linear) social security
contributions as a deterrent to labour demand and the tax/benefit system as a disincentive to
labour supply: Recent studies disagree even on the wage elasticities of labour supply and
demand in the low wage segment (see Fels et al. (1999) for an overview).
•   Interdependence also exists between labour market flexibility and wages. In the reaction to
a shock (aggregate) wage flexibility and flexibility of hiring and firing are, to a certain
extent, substitutes (cf. McMorrow (1996)). The same argument holds for the cyclical
adjustment of individual labour market segments. In the 1992-94 downturn the shake-out
was strongest for low-skilled workers. It would probably have taken a much higher amount
of flexibility in work contracts in order to swiftly reverse this in the following upturn.
Instead, even in the upturn their employment perspectives have not improved. The increased
use of ‘atypical’ contracts could not compensate for rigidity in ‘normal’ contracts and wages
at the same time.3.2.A  Annex: Simulation of Germany's potential growth rate
Table 2.A.1 shows the estimated potential average growth for Germany and for the euro-area in
the 1990s together with its determinants. As can be seen, potential growth in Germany in the
second half of the 1990s fell short by around ½ percentage point of that of the Euro-area
countries, even if the cohesion countries are excluded. The difference stems almost exclusively
from the labour contribution to potential growth.





Labour Capital TFP Potential
Growth
Labour Capital TFP
Germany 2.4 0.3 0.9 1.2 1.7 0.2 0.7 0.8
Euro-area  (excl. DE) 2.1 0.3 0.8 1.0 2.5 0.8 0.8 0.9
Euro-area  (excl. DE
+Cohesion countries)
1.9 0.2 0.7 1.0 2.2 0.6 0.7 0.9
Table 2.A.2. presents the results of a counterfactual analysis, asking the question what the
German growth potential would have been, if the growth determinants had developed similar to
those in the other countries of the Euro-area (excluding again the cohesion countries) and
compares these values to actually estimated potential growth rates. Unsurprisingly, the result is
similar to the one above, with “simulated” potential growth rates about ½ percentage point
higher than actual rates. A projection of the underlying growth determinants over the medium-
term shows that this growth gap is likely to persist also in the years up to 2005.
Table 2.A.2 Actual and simulated potential growth rates for Germany 1995-2005
95 96 97 98 99 00 01-05*
Observed potential growth 2.0 1.7 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.9
Potential growth if growth determinants had been
similar to those of Euros area countries (excl.
cohesion countries)
2.0 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.4
Source: Ameco, Commission services calculation, * projection
The counterfactual analysis of Table 2.A.2 can be used to decompose the overall growth gap
into its components. As shown in Table 2.A.3, once again developments in the labour market
can be identified as the exclusive growth factor, where Germany fell behind. By contrast, the
investment ratio in Germany was even relatively higher than in the other countries. Most
important in explaining the growth gap in the 1990s is clearly the development of the NAIRU
(which remained fairly stable in Germany, whereas it fell in most other Euro-area countries) and
of the labour market participation rate. Combined, these two factors reduced the cumulative
growth rate in the 1990s by 1.6 percentage points. For the period from 2001 to 2005, these
factors will continue to play a crucial role. However, in the future slow population growth in
Germany and a relative decline in investment will become increasingly important.
Table 2.A.3: Contributions to the Cumulative Growth Differential between Germany and
the Euro-area  (excluding Germany and the Cohesion Countries)
1991-2000 2001-2005
Population of Working Age 0.1 0.5
Participation Rate 0.7 0.7
NAIRU 0.9 0.4
Investment to GDP Ratio -0.3 0.6
Cumulative Growth Differential 1.4 2.23.3 Product markets: Obstacles to growth in individual markets
Previous sections showed clearly that the labour market is the area most critically in need of
reform. However, obstacles to higher growth in Germany can be found also in a number of
other areas that a comprehensive structural reform should not lose sight of. Ample room for
regulatory improvements can be found, for instance, in the further liberalisation of product
markets, the government sector and the removal of outdated regulations. The modest ambition
of this section lies in giving a brief shopping list of reform candidates to lift the German growth
potential. It is refrained here from the difficult task of quantifying the benefits of each potential
reform or of undertaking comparisons with other countries.
3.3.1  Network industries
Germany made substantial progress during the 1990s in liberalising its network industries.
Compared to most European countries, Germany is no laggard in this field (cf. Pryor 2002).
Nevertheless, in a number of areas further reform could bring long-term or even immediate
economic benefits.
•   Telecommunications: The telecommunications sector proved to be the most successful
example of liberalisation, which resulted in noticeable price reductions, product variety as
well as a qualitatively better range of services. Competitors of the former monopolist
Deutsche Telekom could increase their share in the fixed-line phone calls to 22% in the year
2000 and the prices for long-distance calls fell by half since liberalisation in 1998. By
contrast, competition is underdeveloped concerning local calls so that further measures for
the easing of the access to the "last mile" are necessary. In this context, it appears to have
been a regulatory mistake to leave the cable TV-infrastructure with Deutsche Telekom,
which had no incentive to develop the cable network as alternative to its own local network.
Despite Telekom’s recent partial sale of the cable networks these are unlikely to be
equipped for telecommunication in the near future, as has occurred in other countries. The
present structure of the cable network also appears to be a impediment to a greater
expansion of electronic media.
•   Postal service: In the postal sector, progress is much less advanced even though it has to be
conceded that Deutsche Post made substantial progress in transforming itself from a
sluggish state monopoly to a modern logistics company. However, little of the improvement
in its operations is passed on to customers in lower prices, because Deutsche Post remains a
monopolist in a large share of the market. Germany has completely liberalised only the
market for parcels, courier and express services. However, this segment represents a limited
share of the total market. By contrast, the mail market for letters below 200g remains
completely closed, with a total share of competitors reaching 2% of the whole mail market.
Germany supports verbally a far reaching opening of the European market for mail but
prolonged its exclusive licensing of German Mail by end of 2007.
•   Energy markets: Formally, energy markets are completely privatised and liberalised. Since
1999 electricity networks are opened up by a bargained third party access, which is
supervised by competition authorities. Prices for electricity for industrial as well as private
consumers showed a strong fall during the last years and now range in an average price
bracket in Europe. However, in practice only very few customers actually change suppliers,
which indicates that impediments to free market access might still exist. In the gas market,
so far competition remained limited, as technical details for access and pricing still have to
be solved. A stronger regulator authority and a sharper separation of the fields production,
distribution and transmission on the electricity and gas markets should help promote
competition further.
•   Transport markets:  In the transport sector, the regulatory developments are mixed. In road
freight transport, market entry contingents were abolished in Germany in 1994. By contrast,
the success of railways liberalisation was modest, even though it theoretically allows third
parties access to railway networks. The main problem remains the incomplete separation ofnetwork and operator. On the other hand, regional public rail transport improved. These
services have to be bought now by regional governments and are allocated through a call for
tenders, which should lower costs and increase efficiency. In cases where selections are
taken based on an open competition, the non-federal railways were able to win 42% of the
orders. Nevertheless, in order to guarantee a non-discriminatory access, a separation of
network from operator and a stronger regulatory authority appear to be necessary.
•   Clearly, in all four networks a better regulatory set-up could lead to increased economic
efficiencies implying cost reductions to enterprises and consumers worth billions of euros,
which would directly boost Germany’s competitiveness. In addition, and possibly more
important, the lack of further deregulation obstructs innovation and the creation of new
markets with high growth potential, notably in telecommunications and logistics sectors.
3.3.2  Inefficiencies in spending public money
The efficiency with which government money is spent also has a substantial influence on the
efficiency of the overall economy. Quite evidently, a shift of public expenditures towards
investment rather than consumption would lift the economic growth potential. It is, of course
beyond the scope of this study to discuss this aspect in detail. Two particular fields should be
pointed out, however.
•   Public procurement: A potential for lowering costs for public procurement would be to use
public tendering instead of awarding contracts directly. However, in 1998, less than 10% of
public procurement was published as call for tender. This is below the EU average of 13%
and maximum levels of above 20% for some countries. Since the adaptation of the calls for
tenders law to EU-legislation in February 2001, public procurement in Germany has been
opened up somewhat. Tenders will also be possible via the Internet by the end of 2001,
making procedures easier and more transparent even for foreign offers. Some of the savings
potential for public tendering might be lost, however, through a new law that makes
payment of tariff wages mandatory for all companies bidding for public construction jobs
and is likely to push up prices for public investments.
•   State Aid: From an economic point of view, state aids is generally undesirable, because they
tend to distort competition. In particular, they are mostly geared towards large industrial
companies. Furthermore, it is often capital inputs that are subsidised. It is due to this aspect
that labour-abundant East Germany has a more capital-intensive industry structure than the
West. Finally, a substantial part of the money is spent on old industries to slow down
industrial change. This is particularly wasteful in the case of coal, which has been receiving
annual transfers worth several billion euros (€4.7 billion in 2000) since the 1960s for
restructuring without having to show much for it. The mining regions (Ruhr area and
Saarland) maintain the highest unemployment rates in the West, apart from the areas with
(also subsidised) ship production. In state aid, therefore, less means often more. Despite
stricter controls at both the national and Community levels, state aid has been decreasing
only slightly in Germany and remains above €20 billion annually (around 0.8% of GDP).
An important share of the state aid (nearly 10%) is still in favour of the new Länder whose
volume is decreasing and set to be phased out by the end of 2019.
3.3.3  Capital markets
An efficient allocation of capital is an important condition for attaining a high growth potential
in an economy. While the capital market in Germany is efficient compared to most other EU
countries, it appears to be lagging behind that of Anglo-Saxon economies. Improvement could
be made in two areas.
•   Capital market regulation: For international investors, Germany’s capital markets still
appears to be relatively closed and lacking in transparency. While the situation has
improved in recent years in step with the very dynamic evolution in equity financing in
particular in the second half of the 1990s, capital market reform remains still behind that ofother countries. Some momentum might however come from the 4th Financial Market
Promotion Act, which should improve security for investors by stronger controls on price
manipulation and insider trading and give exchanges and capital investment companies
more flexibility to run their business. A recent law enhancing transparency of public
security offers and take-over procedures together with the company tax reform is also likely
to improve market efficiency by giving incentives to reduce the widespread cross-ownership
of German companies.
•   Pension funds: The recent pension reform is likely to bring a boost to previously practically
non-existent pension funds. However, the new funds will remain legally extremely
constrained in the type of investments they are allowed to undertake. In addition, their
volume is likely to remain very small in comparison with the UK, US or the Netherlands.
Consequently, there remains substantial room for deepening the capital markets. In
particular, large pension funds could exert substantial pressure to increase share-holder
value and hence the efficiency of stock traded companies and provide a source of financing
for companies other than bank credits.
3.3.4  Restrictions to market access
There exist a number of areas where reform in Germany could directly or indirectly improve
market access and efficiency.
•   Service society: It is meanwhile a well-known cliché that Germany is lagging behind in
creating services. While the country mentality (and high taxes) might be one reason
(Freeman/Schettkat 2000b), there are also a number of regulatory impediments to providing
services. Notably, in many fields the chamber of craft trades (i.e. the insiders) regulate the
access of newcomers. The effect is that entry hurdles are set high and competition in the
services sector remains limited. This is backed by regulations that demand that unlike
almost everywhere else, companies can only be set up by persons having passed a lengthy
apprenticeship and a master’s certificate. Although recently there has been a minor reform
in this field, this requirement limits effectively the creation of a low-wage service sector.
Relatively strict shop opening times also act as a factor that might impede setting up a shop
in particular in providing retail related services. The fact that petrol stations, which are
exempted from the regulation are increasingly developing into convenience stores might be
an indication of the lost market potential.
•   Education: At the high-wage end, an inefficient university system is to blame for keeping
employees off the market. The completion of a masters degree in Germany takes on average
one or two years longer than comparable degrees in other countries. This keeps at least a
full one year age cohort of young and highly skilled people out of the job market, without
leading to a noticeably higher degree of education than in other countries. Furthermore, the
bachelor’s degree still remains practically unknown, leaving this important educational
bracket unused. Slight improvements in the university system have been made, but the
necessary radical changes are more discussed than implemented.
•   Social infrastructure: The potential labour pool is limited further by the underdeveloped
supply of day-care facilities in Germany. It is therefore difficult, mostly for women, to
combine the wish for children with a career. The fact that strict shop closing regulations
give little time to run errands after work and picking up the children exacerbates this
problem. Since part-time jobs are also often lagging, women often have to stay out of the
job market, accepting a loss in their human capital and future employability. The alternative
choice is to abstain from having children, as the extremely low birth rate in Germany attests,
which entails substantial social and economic costs in the longer run.3.3.5  Conclusions
Taken individually, no single item comes close to the importance of rigidities in the labour
market and the costs of re-unification in explaining Germany’s under-performance. Put
together, however, the remaining liberalisation potential in network industries, inefficient
government spending, a relatively low market capitalisation, and outdated restrictions for
market access hold back growth in Germany. This alone does not directly clarify why growth in
Germany lags behind that of other European countries who often have similar or other
regulatory problems. This difference is explained both by the fact that regulatory progress was
higher elsewhere and that Germany’s structural problem come on top of a rigid labour market
and unification-related problems. As a result, the break on growth is exacerbated because
rigidities in one area cannot be compensated by flexibility in another. The over-stretched budget
in Germany should not be used as an excuse for not reforming, especially in areas with little
short-term costs and clear benefits. The lack of progress in liberalising shop opening hours is
here highly symbolic for the difficulties Germany has in reforming its economy.References
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